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Abstract 
This thesis is an attempt to synthesise two streams of political thought previously 
conducted in isolation from one another: political realism and the theory of 
deliberative democracy. The thesis attempts to show that both of these approaches 
reveal something important about the nature of democratic politics, and that despite 
the appearance of mutual antipathy these approaches are compatible with one 
another. Political realism urges us to attend to the sites of power, conflict, and 
interest in politics, while deliberative democracy emphasises conciliation, inclusion, 
and reciprocity. By synthesising both approaches, we can achieve a greater 
understanding of the character and purposes of democratic politics and the 
possibilities for deliberative democratic reform. The overarching argument is for the 
central place of deliberation within a realist account of democratic politics.   
 I begin by considering three realist models of democracy: agonism, 
competitive elitism, and deliberative democracy. I argue that deliberative democracy 
offers the most promising model as it can accommodate realist concerns. I then move 
to examine several aspects of democratic politics overlooked by political theorists 
but which realism directs us towards. These are: rhetoric and leadership, parties and 
partisanship, and states of emergency. In each case, I elaborate how these features of 
real democratic politics appear to pose challenges for deliberative democracy, before 
outlining how the dominant treatments of these aspects are inadequate for various 
reasons, and then propose alternative accounts of each in which they are compatible 
with political deliberation. The aim of each chapter is to extend the role and 
possibilities for deliberation in real democratic politics. I conclude with some general 
reflections on the recovery of politics for contemporary political thought.    
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Introduction  
Two Turns in Political Thought: the Deliberative Theory of 
Democracy and the Realist Critique of Liberalism 
 
1. Core concerns and aims 
This thesis is concerned with democratic politics. More precisely, it is concerned 
with democracy as it has been conceived of in modern political theory; with the 
normative relevance, descriptive accuracy, and motivational power of such 
conceptions. It is    concerned with one conception in particular: the deliberative 
theory of democracy, which places public deliberation - the collective reasoning of 
citizens over matters of mutual concern - at the heart of the democratic process. It is 
concerned with the elasticity and the limits of this conception. It is convinced of the 
value of deliberative democracy as a theoretical model for evaluating the quality of 
democratic politics; it is less convinced, however, of the efficacy of that model in its 
current incarnations. Let me explain.  
  The motivating problem of this thesis is how to reconcile two apparently 
diverging turns in political thought. The first is the deliberative theory of democracy, 
which is (at least in part) a product of contemporary  liberal political philosophy.
1
 
The second is the so-called realist critique of liberal theory, which rejects the terms 
of such theorising as inappropriate to the realm of politics. The details of both will be 
explicated in greater detail shortly. For now, I simply wish to explain my orientation. 
                                                          
1
 I view the terms 'political theory' and 'political philosophy' as synonymous. For a recent discussion 
which goes beyond an institutional distinction, see D. Runciman (2012). 
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These two moves (or, as I call them here, turns) in political theory proceed along 
apparently contradictory lines, and in seemingly opposite directions. And yet, I am 
convinced that both have value, and that both shed light on elements of democratic 
politics which are fundamental to understand it properly. The central problem of this 
thesis is therefore how to be both a 'political realist' and a 'deliberative democrat'.  
  It should be noted that my talk of 'movements' and 'turns' is apt to disguise 
the heterogeneity of both deliberative theorists of democracy and realist critics of 
liberal philosophy. The idea of deliberative democracy had a life prior to its 
contemporary manifestations, and its primordial elements are found in the works of 
John Dewey, John Stuart Mill, Alexis de Tocqueville, James Madison, and even 
visible in Aristotle's political philosophy. Contemporary deliberative democrats are 
thus indebted to and influenced by a diversity of sources, including the traditions of 
critical theory (Jürgen Habermas and John Dryzek), civic republicanism (Cass 
Sunstein), neo-Kantianism (John Rawls and Joshua Cohen), and the demands for 
inclusion by feminist and multicultural movements in the second half of the 
twentieth century (Iris Marion Young and Jane Mansbridge).  
 The register of the sources for political realism is no less diverse, and 
includes thinkers such as Carl Schmitt, Max Weber, Friedrich Nietzsche, David 
Hume, Thomas Hobbes, Machiavelli, and Thucydides.
2
 Noted realists include, 
among others, moral philosophers Bernard Williams and Stuart Hampshire; agonistic 
democrats and difference theorists, including Bonnie Honig, William Connolly, and 
Chantal Mouffe; historians of political thought, such as John Dunn and Geoffrey 
                                                          
2
 See Rossi and Sleat (2014) for a line-up of the historical sources upon which contemporary realists 
draw. There is, of course, the danger of anachronism in the drawing up of any such list, in 
attempting to assimilate any thinker to a particular tradition, or in viewing a thinker as a precursor 
to a contemporary or historical movement.  See also Galston (2010).  
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Hawthorn; Judith Shklar with her scepticism of utopian theory and emphasis on 
cruelty; and (each in categories of their own) the British philosophers John Gray and 
Raymond Geuss. Much like previous waves of critical thought, such as 
communitarianism (which, after all, included thinkers as diverse as Alasdair 
MacIntyre, Charles Taylor, and Michael Sandel), political realists are more united by 
what they oppose than what they share. Indeed, it is often unclear whether political 
realism has come to save liberal political theory or to bury it (the answer to which 
will likely depend upon the individual theorist) or whether realism is more than a 
simple corrective to the excesses of liberal thought.   
 Such an endeavour runs up against an immediate problem, however. It may 
seem obviously contradictory, and therefore pointless, to attempt to reconcile two 
movements which have not only developed from different intellectual traditions, but 
which point in divergent directions. Deliberative democracy appears to offer a 
moralised account of  political legitimacy, one governed by the ideals of inclusion, 
publicity, and achieving consensus among equals (Bohman, 1998; Chambers, 2003; 
Thompson, 2008). To realise this account of legitimacy, theorists of deliberative 
democracy suggest the creation of new institutional forums, and the reform of 
existing ones, where deliberation approximating to an ideal standard can take place 
among citizens. Political realism, by contrast, counsels against such moralising and 
idealisation. As a critical movement, realists comprise a much more disparate group 
than deliberative democrats. They are, however, united by their critique of 
contemporary liberal philosophy, which, they argue, not only constitutes a flight 
from political reality, but leaves no room for anything recognisable as politics 
(Galston, 2010; Stears, 2007; Rossi and Sleat, 2014). Consumed by increasingly 
abstract and politically irrelevant philosophic debate, realists claim that liberals (and, 
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often by extension,  deliberative democrats) discount the significance and 
permanence in politics of power, conflict, the pursuit of self-interest, the potential for 
violence, and the need for stabilising authority.    
 Though perhaps unlikely, an engagement and reconciliation between these 
two movements within political theory is important, for two main reasons: Firstly, 
both the  theory of deliberative democracy and political realism offer different but 
equally legitimate visions of political life. By reconciling these competing visions of 
politics, we can gain greater understanding of the nature of politics itself, particularly 
in its democratic form. Moreover, it is not clear that human beings can do without 
politics, making its absence from contemporary political philosophy all the more 
striking. Politics, in the sense that I understand it, is the way in   which human beings 
shape their collective fate under conditions of disagreement over fundamental values 
and the proper aims of government, or what Jeremy Waldron has called "the 
circumstances of politics" (Waldron, 1999:102). In other words, "the felt need 
among members of a certain group for a common framework or decision or course of 
action on  some matter, even in the face of disagreement about what that framework, 
decision or action should be" (ibid).  
  Humans must live together, but the terms of their common life and the goals 
of political association remain (often deeply) disputed. It is in these circumstances 
that    humans experience the need for politics; more precisely, for authoritative 
procedures and mechanisms which set the terms and goals of their association and 
the means by which     they will be pursued. It is this need for politics that makes 
engagement with realism warranted for deliberative democracy, for no matter how 
insightful or persuasive a      political theory may be, it has little normative relevance 
if it provides no guidance to  political subjects in the here and now. Deliberative 
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democracy, conceived in the realm of ideal theory, not only provides little guidance 
for advocates of deliberative politics, but  seems to leave aside aspects of politics 
which are inherent to modern democracy. If deliberative democrats wish to place 
their theory on an appropriately political footing (an objective which many such 
theorists, though perhaps not all
3
, share), then they need to pay more attention to the 
existing practices of democratic politics and forms of deliberation  which may be 
developed therein. Similarly, political realists would do well to pay closer attention 
to the felt need for deliberation as a central practice in democratic politics, and 
should not discount the possibilities for political reform which deliberation 
facilitates. A reconciliation between realism and deliberative democracy is thus 
desirable if we wish to arrive at a better understanding of the character of democratic 
politics. 
 Secondly, such a reconciliation presents an opportunity for advancing both  
research agendas in productive directions. While deliberative democracy has much 
to learn from political realism, realism in turn has much to learn from deliberative 
democracy. As I expand upon in chapter one, many of the criticisms which realists 
make of liberal philosophy are, I believe, overstated when it comes to deliberative 
democracy. Deliberative theories of democracy are more than usually sensitive to the 
concerns of practical politics, the subjects of political debate, and the exigencies of 
political power and moral conflict. Therefore, there is great potential for cross-
fertilisation between the two theoretical movements. It may be the case that, rather 
than moving away in opposite directions or talking past one another,  political 
realism and deliberative theory converge on a common nexus of issues. Such an 
engagement has the potential to move both realists and deliberative democrats to 
                                                          
3
 For example, Estlund (2008). 
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areas beyond their own areas of specialisation. If deliberative theorists need to pay 
more attention to what is politically platitudinous, then this imperative is even more 
urgent for avowed political realists. There is a worrying tendency among realists to 
excessively focus on reconstructing the thought of key realist figures, such as 
Raymond Geuss and Bernard Williams. Thus, they produce scholarship of a 
comparably abstract and non-political character as the original targets of the realist 
critique. If realism is to gain traction as a positive theoretical movement, it must 
move its focus beyond the rather self-referential confines of much contemporary 
political theory and return to its original ambitions.  This thesis hopes to facilitate 
such a meeting, and thus contribute to scholarly literatures on both realism and 
deliberative democracy. My specific aims in this essay are as follows:    
 Firstly, I want to argue that the theory of deliberative democracy and political   
realism are compatible with one another, despite what might be commonly assumed 
given    the theoretical pedigree of each stream of thought. I have already outlined 
my reasons for    taking this position. Secondly, I attempt to show that deliberative 
democracy can make a contribution towards political theory understood in realist 
terms; that is, by emphasising the importance of deliberation and deliberative 
practices in real politics, deliberative democracy can help to broaden the realists' 
field of vision and to direct realism towards more platitudinously political subject 
matter. As Philip Pettit puts it, "Many of the classic texts in political theory . . . deal 
with how institutions should be ordered in the real world of parochial bias, limited 
resources, and institutional and psychological pathology . . . [I]t is little short of 
scandalous that this area of work is hardly ever emulated by political philosophers 
today" (Pettit, quoted in Galston, 2010: 394). 
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  Thirdly, I aim to rehabilitate certain aspects of democratic politics which 
realism directs us towards, but which have been traditionally neglected rather than 
seen as opportunities and resources for deepening democracy. As I have already 
mentioned, these aspects centre around political leadership, and include rhetoric, 
parties, partisanship, and states of emergency. Most of these aspects have malignant 
forms, of course: leadership has demagoguery; rhetoric has sophistry;  and parties 
have factions. Even states of emergency  are often conceptualised as states of 
exception, and thus pose (I argue, unnecessarily) existential challenges to democratic 
politics. My aim is to disassociate these maligned  features from their anti-
deliberative counterparts, and to show how they contribute to democratic politics and 
to the prospects for more and better deliberation. In doing so, however, it is 
important not to be blinded to the potentially adverse consequences of   opening the 
door to these practices in political theory. On the contrary, these aspects of politics 
are prevalent in existing democratic polities and it is for this reason that theorists 
need to engage with and understand them much better than they do at present.   
 Having thus elucidated my motivating concerns and goals for the thesis, the 
rest of  this introduction is given over to a discussion of the two 'turns' identified at 
the outset. Rather than embark on a substantive discussion (which I provide in 
chapter one) I will focus on relevant methodological issues of each, before outlining 
my plan for the thesis as a whole. 
 
2. Realism versus non-ideal theory 
Contemporary political theory has recently witnessed an explosion in 
methodological debates. Two such debates are between, on the one hand, so-called 
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ideal and non-ideal theory, and, on the other, between moralists and self-styled 
realists. I began by nailing my colours to the mast, so to speak, as a political realist. 
Realism objects to moralist political theory's application of principles which are prior 
and external to politics, either to provide moral boundaries for politics, such as 
Rawlsian contractarianism, or to enlist politics as an instrument for moral ends, such 
as utilitarianism (Williams, 2005: 1-3; see also Rossi, 2012). I will say more about 
realism in chapter one. But what  merits a focus on realism rather than non-ideal 
theory? How do they differ?  
 The distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory is a hallmark of 
contemporary liberal philosophy, and derives from John Rawls's A Theory of Justice: 
"The intuitive idea" says Rawls, "is to split the theory of justice into two parts" 
(Rawls, 2003: 216). The first, "ideal part presents a conception of a just society that 
we are to achieve if we can. Existing institutions are to be judged in the light of this 
conception" (ibid). In other words, ideal  theory consists in the formulation of moral 
principles to govern the basic institutions of an ideal society while also providing a 
means to critique existing societies which fall short of this ideal. Rawls himself 
understood ideal theory in relation to two factors, which he called "full compliance" 
and "favourable circumstances": the latter describes the circumstances, such as 
human capital, infrastructure, and a tradition of constitutional democracy, which are 
necessary for the realisation of the ideal principles; the former describes the 
propensity for every member of society to adhere to the principles of justice. Non-
ideal theory, therefore, "asks how this long-term goal might be achieved, or worked 
toward, usually in gradual steps. It looks for courses of action that are morally 
permissible and politically possible as well as likely to be effective" (ibid). Non-ideal 
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theory is therefore tasked with eliminating injustice and with moving us towards an 
ideally just society (Simmons, 2010; Stemplowska, 2008;  and Swift, 2008).   
 Although Rawls introduces the distinction between ideal and non-ideal 
theory as relating to ideal principles of justice, the methodology may be employed 
for other ideals, such as legitimacy, equality, and democracy. The basic idea behind 
the ideal/non-ideal distinction is very intuitively appealing: political action must be 
orientated towards some goal, and before we attempt to effect change in the political 
realm, we ought to fix our orientation. One does not, after all, start on a journey 
without having some destination in mind. Thus the ideal is methodologically prior to 
the non-ideal. As Rawls himself put it: "until the ideal is identified ... non-ideal 
theory lacks an objective, an aim, by reference to which its queries can be answered" 
(Rawls, 1999: 90). Non-ideal theory thus aspires to lead us out of the wasteland of 
contingent political practice, to the promised land of the society which is ideally just 
(or democratic, or legitimate, etc). And yet, the stages by which we are supposed get 
from our present circumstances to the ideal are rarely specified. Rawls suggests 
justifications for civil disobedience or "partial compliance" under non-ideal 
circumstances, and deliberative democrats have tended to follow suit, suggesting 
their own projects of civil dissent and protest, but only insofar as these exhibit 
deliberative democratic practices and promote deliberative democratic goals. When 
viewed in isolation, however, these programmes hardly seem adequate to the task. 
Many other theorists seem to assume that acting by example will be sufficient, and 
that deliberative ideals will be infectious once put into practice. In other words, that 
we arrive at the promised land by acting as though we are already there. One does 
not have to be unduly pessimistic to suspect that such political strategies may be not 
only frustrated, but potentially disastrous.        
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 An exception to the above strategies common amongst deliberative 
democratic theorists is found in the work of Archon Fung. He writes, "No sensible 
political ethic can require unilateral disarmament", and that those hoping to effect 
change in politics by practicing only deliberative strategies "play the part of wishful-
thinking political fools who act in the world as they would like it to be, rather than 
the world they actually inhabit" (Fung, 2005: 399). In response to this wishful-
thinking, Fung proposes a provisional set of moral principles to guide the political 
conduct of deliberative democrats in non-ideal circumstances. These principles of 
"deliberative activism", as Fung calls them, are certainly a step in the right direction, 
as they acknowledge the practical weaknesses of many existing strategies for 
deliberative democracy.  
 However, Fung still adheres to the ideal/non-ideal theoretical approach. One 
of the problems with this approach, as Marc Stears (2010) has noted, is that it falls 
prey to what Bonnie Honig has termed "the paradox of politics" (Honig, 2007; 
2009). That is, virtuous political institutions depend upon virtuous citizens to 
construct them. In the absence of such institutions to shape the lives and the 
characters of citizens, it is not clear where these virtuous institution-builders will 
come from. Thus, "the paradox of politics traps us in a chicken-and-egg circle that 
presses us to begin the work of democratic politics in medias res" (Honig, 2007: 2-
3). In Fung's account, as in many other non-ideal theories, it is never  explained 
where the committed citizens will come from, or how they will be persuaded towards 
the ideal. (Rousseau, as we know, recognised this problem and thought to solve it 
with the presence of a foreign law-giver.) 
 In addition to this, I would add two further objections to the ideal/non-ideal   
approach. Firstly, ideal theory appears to take political stability for granted. 
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Deliberative democratic theory, and liberal political philosophy more widely 
understood, have very little to say about problems of political, economic, and social 
breakdown.
4
 One can speculate on the reasons for this. Liberal political theory has 
been nurtured in the post-war Western world; that is, an environment of relative 
stability and prosperity (and, perhaps, complacency). As such, the stability of 
political and social arrangements were assumed, and political philosophy need not be 
much concerned by foundational political problems, such as the legitimation of 
political order. Those assumptions now appear  to be far less secure; in the past two 
decades, the societies of Europe and North America have been confronted repeatedly 
with a series of crisis events, ranging from the failure of financial institutions to acts 
of large-scale political violence. Added to this picture are rising inequalities of 
wealth, with the concomitant disparities of political influence and social unity, as 
well as looming environmental calamities, and the concerns of much liberal political 
philosophy appear increasingly marginal.   
 Secondly,  the ideal societies towards which non-ideal theory points us are 
curious in at least one more respect: many seem to be without politics, or at least 
politics in any recognisable form. This tendency to evade politics is common in 
contemporary ideal theory (Honig, 1993; Newey, 2001), which variously conducts 
itself as a-political (without politics), post-political (after politics), or implicitly anti-
political (against politics). Non-ideal theory does not fare much better, as being the 
means to the ideal end, non-ideal theory self-consciously sets out to make itself 
redundant; that is, to remedy the less-than-ideal  conditions which make it necessary 
for practically-minded adherents of the ideal theory. Again, one can speculate on the 
reasons behind the tendency to eliminate or ignore politics. One cause may be the 
                                                          
4
 There are, of course, exceptions. For example, see O'Flynn (2006). 
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superficial but pervasive dislike of politics prevalent in modern societies, which 
perceives politics as an inherently undignified, morally compromised activity, whose 
elimination ought to be our long-term objective (Hay, 2007). Furthermore, normative 
political theorists may see it as their professional obligation put some distance 
between their prescriptions and, as they see it, contingent political practices, the 
domain of descriptive political science. They may also  view politics not as a subject 
in its own right, but as a bundle of (and thus as reducible to) other concerns, such as 
ethics, economics, law, and so on.   
 Whatever its source, the evasion of politics in ideal political theory is, I think, 
mistaken. Normative political philosophy should stand at a certain remove from 
existing political practices; not so far removed, however, that it loses sight of 
political reality. Similarly, the turn away from descriptive and towards 'pure' 
normative theory is itself an historically recent and theoretically impoverishing one; 
motivated, perhaps, by fears of falsification or future irrelevance (Sabl, 2011: 175-
176). Politics is certainly a malleable and, to a great extent, contingent practice (or 
set of practices). One can, however, follow Aristotle in basing normative theory on 
experience while avoiding his mistake of confusing contingency for necessity. The 
danger, which much political theory in the ideal/non-ideal mode seems to succumb 
to, is of going too far the other way: of standing guilty of Spinoza's accusation 
against the moralists of his time, of imagining polities that could only be instituted in 
a golden age when they would least be needed.   
 These are some of the shortcomings of a non-ideal theoretical approach. 
However, does realism fare any better? This is perhaps begging the question, given 
the criticisms of ideal/non-ideal theory set out above. Realism, after all, is concerned 
with what is politically platitudinous, and the absence of politics from ideal political 
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philosophy would seem to suggest the turn to realism as obvious. However, what is 
at issue is not merely what is discussed, but also the terms in which it is discussed. 
Throughout this section, I have employed the terms "ideal theory" and "non-ideal 
theory" as they are commonly used in contemporary political theory to imply a 
"moralist" or "ethics-first" approach to political theorising (Williams, 2005; Geuss, 
2008). Without denying the presence or significance of morality in politics, realism 
eschews such an approach, concentrating instead on the standards and values which 
are internal to politics. That is, it suggests a different location for the sources of 
political normativity (Rossi and Sleat, 2014). Moreover, realism proceeds "after 
politics"; that is, it takes existing politics as the object of its theorisation (Newey, 
2001). My approach in this thesis takes such a form, eschewing strictly normative 
theory and instead employing a realist approach which blends normative and 
descriptive elements.  As such, realism is more attuned to the concerns I have 
outlined above, and better placed to respond to them. 
 What kind of deliberative democratic theory would be consistent with such 
an approach? It is to that question which I now turn.  
   
3. Deliberation: forum versus system. 
The theory of deliberative democracy has been understood in many different ways 
and received many different theoretical treatments over the past quarter century. 
Originally conceived as an alternative conception of democracy to the prevailing 
competitive elitist and social choice models, deliberative democracy offers a vision 
of democratic politics which lays greater emphasis on the possibilities for inclusion, 
rational communication, and citizen participation. I will not attempt to map out here 
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the contours of the various transformations which deliberative democracy has 
undergone since that time, nor to list the diverse range of subjects to which it has 
been turned (including questions of the environment, nuclear power, ethnic conflict, 
healthcare reform, elections for public office, and much else besides). Instead, I want 
to contrast several different forms of deliberation as they appear in the theoretical 
literature. Two such forms in particular stand out: On the one hand, the traditional, 
dialogical form of deliberation, commonly prescribed for small-scale institutional 
forums (for example, see Ackerman and Fishkin, 2002). And on the other, more 
recent systemic forms which examine the quality and pervasiveness of deliberation 
across entire societies (Mansbridge, et al, 2012; Owen and Smith, 2015). I will 
sketch a case for why both forms of deliberation are ill-suited to my present 
endeavour, before elucidating a third, and more efficacious, comparative form.  
 We might start by drawing a distinction between deliberative democracy and 
democratic deliberation (Chambers, 2009: 324). The former refers to large-scale 
theories of deliberation within and across the public sphere, or civil society, and how 
this deliberation relates to and permeates the state. By contrast, the latter refers to 
small-scale theories of institutional design, primarily the construction of  'mini-
publics' such as citizens' juries and deliberative opinion polls. Theories of democratic 
deliberation have generally been on the rise, while theories of deliberative 
democracy have become relatively scarce. One reason behind this is that institutional 
forums were constructed as a response to the problems of scale and complexity 
which bedevilled deliberative democrats. In modern societies composed of  millions 
of individuals with widely differing cognitive capacities, values, and material 
interests, we cannot all gather together in the agora to deliberate over the business of 
the polis (Dryzek, 2001).  
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 Deliberative democrats have therefore sought to design small-scale forums 
for deliberation which could more closely approximate deliberative ideals of 
unobstructed, inclusive, and reasoned communication. This harks back to Bessette's 
(1980) original description of the United States legislature as a deliberative body. 
(Unlike such traditionally representative institutions, however, deliberative 
democrats sought to deepen the legitimacy of the decisions of institutional mini-
publics by promoting the participation of lay-citizens, rather than politicians.) The 
deliberations conducted within these forums would be dialogical in character, 
resembling the face-to-face deliberations of the small-scale polis. By propelling 
citizens into deliberation with one another, the expectation is that participants will be 
more likely to take the interests, concerns, and values of others  into account when 
formulating their own positions. Such deliberative forums, if properly designed and 
instituted, will therefore lead to electoral or policy outcomes which are better 
informed and ethically superior. 
  While the focus on small-scale deliberative venues has proven instructive on 
the workings of such group deliberation, it is, however, less clear regarding the 
efficacy and political significance of these venues. That is, it is not obvious just what 
functions these deliberative mini-publics are supposed to serve in the wider realm of 
state and society, beyond acting as exemplars of group reasoning conducted under 
artificial conditions approximating to a given set of democratic ideals. Moreover, 
such mini-publics are removed from the pressures and pathologies of real politics: of 
inequalities in political  power, eloquence, and wealth; of unreasoned discourse, 
exclusion, and flattery; and of  power-seeking self-interests. Of course, proponents of 
mini-publics contend, that is their  whole point - to approximate ideal standards, and 
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to be insulated from the structural disadvantages of the public sphere which make 
such an approximation less likely.  
 This has led to accusations of deliberative democrats' abandonment of the 
public sphere in favour of small-scale mini-publics (Chambers, 2009). While such 
forum-based approaches have been instrumental in the development of the empirical 
literature on deliberation, their efficacy for promoting widespread deliberation 
appears limited, and have come under repeated criticism for failing to even achieve 
their modest goals of reaching solutions to public problems which display the 
hallmarks of truly democratic deliberation (Shapiro, 1999; 2005b). Deliberative 
mini-publics will undoubtedly constitute important nodes of a more deliberative 
democratic polity. However, it is unlikely they will achieve this in isolation.  
 In contrast to this small-scale, institutional approach, a growing number of 
deliberative democratic theorists have endorsed what has been called the "systemic  
approach" to deliberative democracy (see Mansbridge, et al, 2012). (Although the 
two approaches are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, many proponents of the former 
have also become innovators of the latter.) Unlike the democratic deliberation of 
mini-publics, advocates of the systemic approach seek to evaluate the quality of 
deliberation in the polity as a whole. Jane Mansbridge and her co-authors describe it 
thus: "A system here means a set of distinguishable, differentiated, but to some 
degree independent parts, often with distributed functions and a division of labour, 
connected in such a way as to form a complex whole." Moreover, "a deliberative 
system is one that encompasses a talk-based approach to political conflict and 
problem solving - through arguing, demonstrating, expressing, and persuading. In a 
good deliberative system, persuasion that raises relevant considerations should 
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replace suppression, oppression, and thoughtless neglect" (Mansbridge, et al, 2012: 
4-5). 
 A systemic approach to deliberative democracy, then, is one that examines 
deliberation across the public, political, and even private spheres. Deliberation is 
thus no longer confined to institutional forums, and admits a variety of forms of 
communication, including rhetoric, storytelling, and "everyday talk" (Young, 1996). 
Moreover, deliberation is much less orientated towards reaching a specific decision, 
as it is diffused across the polity, and is conceived of more as an ongoing, open-
ended, process of opinion formation. The systemic approach also encompasses 
within its analysis the discourses of the public sphere, which provide a scaffolding 
for deliberation. This approach certainly seems more amenable to previous concerns 
regarding the attention given to the forces which shape politics in democratic 
societies. And yet, the systemic approach appears problematic in a number of ways 
in this regard. 
 Firstly, the kind of deliberation which Mansbridge, et al, advocate seems 
highly diffuse in character, as opposed to the extremely concentrated deliberations of 
the mini-publics. Indeed, it is sometimes difficult to see just what constitutes 
deliberation on this account, or how it can lead to a common decision. Secondly, this 
concern is heightened by the totalising effect of the systemic approach: it often 
seems that every communicative interaction within the polity is deliberative or 
contributes to deliberation. In other words, if practically everything counts as 
deliberation, then really nothing counts as deliberation. Thirdly, it is not clear that an 
approach which treats every discourse or communicative exchange in terms of its 
deliberative quality, or by the effects of its contribution to deliberation, is an 
appropriate method by which to analyse the different spheres of the democratic 
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polity. There may be areas of democratic politics where a lack of deliberative norms 
is entirely appropriate and justified. The systemic approach to deliberation thus 
moves closer in appearance to non-ideal theories of justice.
5
 
 Neither the systemic approach nor the institutional mini-publics approach to 
deliberative democracy appears satisfactory, then. Both tilt at opposite extremes of a 
spectrum: the latter is too modest, specific, and small-scale in it prescriptions; while 
the former is too broad, too totalising, and too diffuse. While not denying their 
usefulness as conceptual tools, it is clear that there is a middle-ground to be mapped 
out.       
   The approach to deliberative democracy which I will adopt in this thesis 
draws on both the lessons of deliberation within institutional mini-publics and the 
appreciation of public discourses found in the systemic approach. However, I do not 
focus on or tie the   thesis to either of these approaches. Instead, I adopt a general 
strategy of comparative evaluation. That is, I assume that circumstances in which 
there is more and better  deliberation is normatively superior to one which there is 
less and worse deliberation.
6
 The scope of this strategy is not, as I have already 
alluded, limited to institutional sites of deliberation, but neither does it seek to 
assimilate the democratic polity in its entirety to deliberative norms. This strategy 
was owes a great deal to the work of Amartya Sen on justice (Sen, 2006). Moreover, 
it is not entirely novel in deliberative circles; Simone Chambers (2009: 339) adopts a 
similar approach in her evaluation of the quality of deliberation within modern 
public spheres. While an ideal theory of deliberative democracy may be sufficient 
                                                          
5
 For a similar but sustained critique of the systemic approach, see Owen and Smith, 2015: 218-228.  
6
 Of course, what counts as "better" or "worse" deliberation will depend greatly upon the context in 
which it occurs, and I will not attempt to specify this independently or in advance of an appraisal of 
the contexts examined here. 
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for one to make comparisons between circumstances which approximate to the ideal 
to greater or lesser degrees, it is not necessary for one to do so. For example, we do 
not require a conception of a perfectly just society in order to judge a society with 
universal provision of healthcare as more just (at least along this single dimension) 
than one which lacks such provision. Similarly, we can recognise a society with 
conditions of greater public deliberation - for example, one with extensive freedoms 
of speech and association, an independent press -  without recourse to some 
deliberative ideal. In other words, ideals are not necessary for comparative 
evaluations.   
 Having said something about the approach to deliberative democracy which 
this  thesis adopts, I will now proceed to sketch out the contexts in which it is played 
out.  
 
4. Plan of the thesis 
Each chapter of this thesis demonstrates how various features of democratic politics 
which   realism directs us towards can be made compatible with deliberative 
democracy. I take seriously the realist exhortation that to engage in genuinely 
political thought, one must consider the forces which shape politics, and to interpret 
the standards and values internal to politics (Rossi and Sleat, 2014; Newey, 2001). I 
proceed by exploring a nexus of aspects of democratic politics, orbiting the practice 
of leadership in politics. They are a family of subjects which appear at the cross-
roads of deliberative democratic theory and realism. Indeed, much recent  theoretical 
work on political leadership has been done by theorists associated with the realist 
critique (Sabl, 2002; Philp, 2007). Moreover, many of leadership's accompanying 
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concerns, such as the roles of rhetoric and parties as forces which shape democratic 
politics, appear more directly related to deliberative democracy than to realism, 
which, despite realist claims to take politics seriously, has largely neglected first-
order political theorising.  These issues, which exist at the intersection of both areas, 
can provide a fertile common ground upon which theorists of political realism and 
deliberative democracy can meet and engage in common reflection. The thesis, then, 
has the following structure:  
 In chapter one I lay the groundwork for subsequent chapters by 
contextualising and elucidating the political realist and deliberative democratic turns 
in greater detail, and introduce two other realist models of democracy. These are the 
competitive elitist and agonistic models of democracy, advanced by the work of 
Joseph Schumpeter and Chantal Mouffe respectively. I argue that although these 
models have been more commonly linked with the realist critique of liberal political 
philosophy because of the emphasis which they place on the prevalence of power, 
interests, and conflict, there are persuasive reasons for rejecting them on both realist 
and independent grounds. I then turn my attention toward deliberative democracy, 
and argue that both the deliberative and realist perspectives on democratic politics 
stand in less tension to one another than is commonly assumed. I focus on three 
points of tension: rationalism, utopianism, and moralism.  
 In chapter two, I embark on a discussion of rhetoric. The prevailing neo-
Kantian accounts of political argument within the literature on deliberative 
democracy are, I argue, unduly restrictive and suffer from several drawbacks. These 
include inducements to insincerity in public argument, excluding the moral character 
of the speaker from the dimensions of argument, and excluding appeals to the 
emotions in political argument, leading to motivational deficits and an inadequate 
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account of political deliberation. I proceed to offer an alternative account of political 
argument drawn from Aristotle's account of deliberative rhetoric, drawing on the 
justification offered by Yack (2006) that Aristotle is a political realist.  
 In chapter three, I moved to discuss the role of political leadership in the 
theory of deliberative democracy. Leadership appears to be in tension with 
democracy's norm of equality. I seek to resolve this tension in the first section by 
demonstrating how political leadership and deliberative democracy are compatible. I 
then addressed the topic of deliberative leadership, discussing its character and 
origins, arguing that deliberative leaders are to be trained within the civil 
associations of the democratic public sphere, with an especial emphasis on the role 
of political parties in fostering the necessary qualities for deliberative leadership.  
 I take up the subject of parties in chapter four, where I argue that parties, 
once disassociated from their negative, anti-deliberative cousins, political factions, 
are sources of greater deliberation in democratic politics. Indeed, parties perform 
several important roles for democratic politics, which I proceed to outline. I then 
discuss several mechanisms whereby deliberation internal to parties can be 
promoted, including the production of partisan manifestos and the structure of party 
conventions and conferences. I then move to discuss the role which partisan 
competition and conflict can play in  structuring deliberation between partisans and 
for the wider public sphere.  
 In my final chapter, I turn to the possibilities for deliberation under 
conditions of political emergency. Following Lazar (2009), I argue that emergencies 
are continuous with the practices of everyday democratic politics, rather than 
constituted by a state of exception, By de-exceptionalising the state of emergency in 
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this way, we make it open to political deliberation. Nevertheless, emergencies still 
pose challenges to the possibilities for deliberation, and I will proceed to sketch four 
such challenges: necessity, complexity, secrecy, and urgency. In each case, I argue 
that deliberation can overcome or be made compatible with each feature of 
emergency outlined.  
  During the course of this project's gestation, fellow researchers often asked 
why any advocate of political realism should remain, perhaps stubbornly, attached to 
the concept of deliberative democracy. There are, of course, arguments to be 
presented in due course, but at its core, this thesis is occasioned by a conviction 
(nothing more or less) that many of the problems of modern politics exist, or become 
malignant, because of a lack of meaningful communication, whether between 
individual citizens, politicians, or nation-states. Such a conviction is neither naive 
nor utopian: it does, for example, not entail a belief that government by consensus is 
desirable, or even possible. It is, however, hopeful that democratic politics can, at its 
best, facilitate rather than obstruct such communication. To hope for the best whilst 
preparing for the worst is not to fall prey to unreality. (Indeed, to a balanced mind, it 
is perhaps the only way to maintain one's sanity.) And, for better or worse, this is 
where I  begin.   
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Chapter 1 
Realist Approaches to Democratic Politics 
 
1. Introduction 
In this chapter, my aim is to take some preliminary steps towards diffusing the 
apparent antipathy between political realism and the theory of deliberative 
democracy. If we are searching for a model of democratic politics which realists can 
endorse, then deliberative democracy may appear an odd choice when there are other 
models of democracy to be   found from within the realist camp itself. In particular, 
two such models which recommend themselves are the agonistic theory of 
democratic politics, which is advanced by thinkers aligned with the realist movement 
such as Chantal Mouffe and Bonnie Honig, and the competitive elitist approach to 
democracy, which finds its intellectual roots in Max Weber and Joseph Schumpeter, 
and has recently been updated by Ian Shapiro, another ally of realism. Deliberative 
theorists, on the other hand, often take their lead from the liberal moralist approach 
to politics, which is the target of the realist critique. However, my objective here is to 
argue that there is a strong case for viewing political realism to be compatible  with 
deliberative democracy, and for holding that deliberative democracy can address 
successfully features of democratic politics which political realism directs us 
towards. I explicate several of these features in subsequent chapters. For now, I want 
to address those contenders to deliberative democracy as a realist account of 
democratic politics, arguing  that they offer inadequate views of democracy and 
insights which can be accommodated in a deliberative model.  
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 The structure of this chapter, then, is as follows: I begin by explicating the 
character of political realism in greater detail. Realism seems to pose a challenge for 
the theory of deliberative democracy, as realism is critical of the moralist vision of 
politics which deliberative theorists often propound, and focuses instead on less 
edifying features of political life, such as the inescapable nature of conflicts over the 
proper exercise of political power under conditions of disagreement, and in whose 
interests that power is exercised. However, realism is not, importantly, a vision of 
politics which is hostile to either liberalism or democracy. Rather, realism serves to 
orientate us towards the existing realities of politics and how we might better 
understand and appreciate both the dangers and opportunities  which are presented to 
us by politics.     
 I then go on to address the models of democratic politics which realism 
supports, beginning with agonism, the core thesis of which is represented by the 
political thought of Chantal Mouffe. I explicate the central features Mouffe's theory 
of agonistic democratic politics, and then draw attention to several problems within 
her theory. I then move to  discuss a competing realist model of democratic politics, 
namely the competitive elitist account offered by Joseph Schumpeter and revitalised 
by Ian Shapiro. Again, I explicate central features of the competitive elitist position 
before illuminating several problems  within it. The problems which the advocates of 
both agonism and competitive elitism encounter should encourage us to look for 
alternative democratic models which can better attend to the features of politics to 
which realism directs our attention.    
 In the final section, I explicate the core features of the theory of deliberative 
democracy. I offer some reasons for the apparent tensions between political realism 
and deliberative democracy, as well as some reasons for why these tensions are less 
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important than they may at first appear. By reaching an accommodation with 
theories of political deliberation, I suggest, the realist vision of democratic politics 
can avoid an unduly constrictive and pessimistic focus on certain elements of 
politics, such as conflicts of  interests and values, over others, such as conciliation 
and persuasion.  
 
2. Realism in political theory 
Realism is a term which appears in many different disciplines, including literature, 
art, metaphysics, and moral philosophy. I am concerned here, however, with realism 
solely as mode of political thought. In my introductory chapter I noted some of the 
key features of the  realist turn in contemporary political thought, principally its 
rejection of mainstream   moralist liberal theory. The time has now come to 
investigate political realism in more   detail. I want to contend that, although realism 
as a tradition of political thought finds its wellsprings in a multitude of historical 
thinkers and moments, it does contain a shared and distinctive normative  thesis at its 
core. 
 Political realism is an umbrella term in political theory for a diverse range of  
thinkers, many of whom advance often contradictory views, and not all of whom 
would even self-identify as realists. As William Galston put it, realism is more like a 
community stew where everyone throws something into the pot, rather than a 
consolidated research programme (Galston, 2010: 386). Despite this diversity of 
voices, however, I wish to show now that realists share a set of commitments, both 
positive and negative, which  mark out political realism as an intellectual movement 
in its own right. In doing so, I disagree with the suggestion that realism is best or 
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principally understood as a negative thesis, or as merely a corrective to the excesses 
of mainstream Anglo-American liberal political theory. This is because, as I shall 
explain further, realism proposes a different conception of the political to that 
suggested by moralist liberal theory, and seeks to place the  grounds of political 
normativity on a separate footing from moralist liberal theory. Realism can thus be 
distinguished from non-ideal theory, which relies upon and is subordinate to ideal 
theories of moral concepts, such as justice, rights, and so on. For now, it is enough to 
simply establish that there is such a thing as realism, and to  identify its salient 
features.  
 
2.1. The rejection of moralism. 
While I aim to reject the view that realism is solely a negative or critical position, it 
is undeniable, however, that contemporary political realism largely came about as a        
counter-movement to a certain style or mode of political theory which dominated the 
discipline (and, albeit in a reduced capacity, still does). Advocates of realism have    
identified this mode as the "moralist" or "applied ethics" form of political theorising. 
According to Raymond Geuss, this view "assumes that one can complete the work of     
ethics first, attaining an ideal theory of how we should act" (Geuss, 2008: 8). It is 
only once we have completed our ideal ethical reflections that we can set about 
applying our theory to the actions and institutions which exist in the real world. In 
contrast to this ideal mode of theorising, Geuss recommends that political theory 
"must start from and be concerned          in the first instance not with how people 
ought ideally (or ought "rationally") to act . . .      but, rather, with the way the social, 
economic, political, etc, institutions actually operate in some society at some given 
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time, and what really does move human beings to act in given circumstances" (ibid: 
9).            
 In a similar vein, Bernard Williams, whose thought has exercised the greatest 
influence over the contemporary turn to realism, rejected two models of political 
theory,     both of which he characterised as "moralism". These are, as Williams 
termed them, the "enactment" and the "structural" models. The former propounds 
that "political theory formulates principles, concepts, ideals, and values; and politics 
(so far as it does what the theory wants) seeks to express these in political action, 
through persuasion, the use of    power, and so forth" (Williams, 2005: 1). The 
paradigm of such enactment theories is utilitarianism. The latter, by contrast, "lays 
down moral conditions of coexistence under power, conditions in which power can 
be justly exercised" (ibid). The paradigm here is Rawls's theory of justice. "In both 
cases" writes Williams, "political theory is something like applied morality"; that 
both models of political theory "represent the priority of the moral over the political" 
(ibid: 2). While the enactment model seeks to instrumentalise politics, viewing the 
political as the tool of the moral, the structural model seeks to constrain politics 
within certain bounds specified by moral principles of justice, individual rights, and 
so on. In contrast to these models, Williams proposes a form of political theory 
which addresses both the "'first'  political question" of securing conditions of order 
and security, along with questions of political legitimacy, and that which is 
"platitudinously politics" (ibid: 13). 
 While the works of both Geuss and Williams inaugurated the turn to realism, 
the realist movement had been growing for decades prior to their publication, 
spurred in          part by the dissatisfaction of many theorists with the excessively 
abstract, ideal, non-empirical style of much Anglophone liberal political theory. The 
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earliest work which expresses such dissatisfaction with the state of political theory 
was probably John     Gunnell's 1986 book, Between Philosophy and Politics. This 
work was followed by other important texts, including Bonnie Honig's seminal 1993 
book, Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics, John Schwartz's The 
Permanence of the Political (1995), and    Glen Newey's After Politics (2001), 
amongst others. Each of these texts, in their own way, decried the silence of political 
philosophy on matters which seemed politically significant, such as difference, 
recognition, and the recurrence of political conflict, and the absence of such concerns 
from the repertoire of liberal political theorists. This constituted, in Ian Shapiro's 
phrase, a flight from the reality of politics, in favour of arcane and increasingly 
technical debates, predominantly on and around conceptions of  distributive justice 
(Shapiro, 2005). In parallel to these complaints, the contextualist movement in the 
history of political thought, led principally by Quentin Skinner and John Dunn, 
sought  to reclaim the study of great political philosophers for history, decrying the 
a-historical  and often anachronistic way these thinkers were interpreted and 
appropriated for contemporary debates within political philosophy. It was principally 
by grasping the differences between ourselves and these historical figures, the 
contextualists argued, that we could apprehend the historically contingent nature of 
our own political settings, and understand the folly of seeking to formulate and apply 
eternal or universal principles (Skinner, 2002). The advent of contextualism was thus 
complementary to the realist backlash against the idealism of late twentieth century 
liberal political thought.   
 Taken together, the target of realist criticism turns out to be the colonisation 
of political thought by moral philosophy, which gives rise to a form of theorising 
about    politics which is curiously anti-political. This form of political theory sees 
37 
 
politics, at best with the case of utilitarianism, as a resource for its achieving its own 
predetermined moral ends, but more often simply as a problematic feature of human 
existence which is to be solved or suitably constrained. The symptoms of this anti-
political approach are the  excessive abstraction from much that is recognisable in 
politics, including its recurrent features such as power, conflict, and interests; and the 
a-historical character of much liberal political theory, which lacks accounts of both 
the historical specificity of modern politics and the rise of liberalism itself as the 
dominant tradition within our political milieu. Realism, then, thus seeks a more self-
consciously political, historically attuned mode of political thought, one which does 
not subsume politics to morality.      
 
2.2. The Priority and Autonomy of Politics 
Having considered what political realism is opposed to, I now turn to consider what 
it favours. I begin with the importance of locating or discovering a distinctively 
political normativity, which does not entail reference or subordination to extra-
political moral principles, as with Kantianism and utilitarianism. 
 Realists often speak of granting politics priority over morality, or at least of 
emphasising the autonomy of politics from morality at large.  In practice, this does 
not  merely mean the rejection of the "applied ethics" method of political theorising. 
It is an acknowledgement that what counts as an excellence in political life is 
unlikely to be an excellence in moral life. The good politician is not someone who 
may always act in accordance with moral obligations. At the extreme, politics may 
involve "dirtying one's hands", to invoke the familiar paradox: that is, allowing or 
participating in morally reprehensible (or, at least, questionable) actions for the sake 
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of political goods, such as national security or securing an advantage for one's 
citizens (Walzer, 1973).   
 Even morally permissible or desirable outcomes may require political virtues 
or judgements which are morally ambivalent, or for which moral principles cannot 
offer guidance. Bernard Williams's favoured example was of the case of an 
international humanitarian intervention (Williams, 2005: 148). Such actions, he 
suggests, cannot be governed by or modelled upon a moral principle of rescue. After 
all, rescuing a helpless child drowning in a lake or trapped in a burning building does 
not require a vast reorganisation of social relations, commitments to ongoing 
mediation between warring factions, and deploying coercive  powers in ways which 
may betray their wielders' original intentions. As William Galston  puts it, "the basic 
point and structure of politics creates a qualitatively different set of challenges to 
which individual morality offers an inadequate guide" (Galston, 2010: 392).   
 The father of this move to view politics as autonomous is clearly 
Machiavelli. However, a realist approach need not entail a complete divorce between 
politics and  morality. As in any diverse movement, how this relationship is 
conceptualised depends largely upon which realist is consulted. The phrase "the 
priority of politics" may be misleading here, as there is no necessary realist 
commitment to theorise the demands of politics as causally or conceptually prior to 
morality. It is doubtful that morality will be eliminated from politics, and if it has 
then we should be inclined to think something has   gone badly wrong.
7
 As Williams 
himself admitted, "Political decisions can be made, in part, for reasons that involve 
moral considerations, and they regularly are so made, when legislation is introduced 
                                                          
7
 It is worth bearing in mind, of course, that just as morality cannot be eliminated from political life, 
politics, pace Nietzsche, may play a large role in deciding the content of everyday moral life.  
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to control cruelty, abuse, and so forth" (Williams, 2005: 148). Realists thus need not 
insist on a strict and incommensurable value pluralism, though some, following 
Machiavelli and Isaiah Berlin, may indeed do so. The position which I think is most 
plausible here is that moral considerations are simply one source of political 
normativity, and that there is room for greater scope to be given to distinctively 
political concepts, such as legitimacy (see Rossi and Sleat, 2014). This means paying 
closer attention to issues of power, conflict, and interests, and how they structure the 
dynamics of political  life. Put simply, it means taking politics seriously as its own 
realm of value, without  reducing it to any other field of inquiry - whether that is 
ethics, economics, or law - although considerations from these other fields will of 
course bear upon political judgements.      
 By taking these concerns seriously, political realism begins to move beyond a 
mere critique of liberal moralism and towards offering its own distinctive vision of 
politics,  centred on the inescapability of forms of power and conflict, as well as 
goods which are internal to the practice of politics. Besides a focus on political 
goods, however, realism also leads us to consider the dangers inherent in any 
political order. 
 
2.3. The Dangers of Politics  
As we will see in the discussion of pessimism, realism champions an approach 
which is  more attuned to the negative side of politics than mainstream liberalism. 
On this reading, political philosophy should be focused less on fine-tuning  positive 
values and principles   than on being mindful of the evils of injustice, cruelty, and 
suffering. This feature of    realism goes hand in hand with its scepticism of utopian 
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theorising. Contemporary liberal philosophy goes wrong, says the realist, when it 
models an account of political morality  upon stable and settled foundations; in doing 
so, it forgets the fragility of political order and the constant spectre of political 
violence. This focus on the summum malum rather than the  summum bonum is 
articulated most clearly in the work of the late Judith Shklar and her 'liberalism of 
fear' (Shklar, 1989: 21-38), which inspired later realists, including Bernard Williams 
(2005: 52-61). It is a conception of liberalism which has a strong awareness of 
historical injustices and on  cruelties visited upon the powerless and dispossessed by 
those with power.  
 One has to be careful in charting the opponents of realism on this point. It is, 
of course, worth remembering that a traditional preoccupation of an older, 
constitutionalist  form of liberal thought was precisely to limit and curtail the powers 
of the state open to  abuse, principally through the medium of law. Liberal realists 
thus hark back to the constitutional thought of Montesquieu, Hume, and Madison. It 
also worth recalling the impetus behind John Rawls's theory of justice, from which 
contemporary liberal theory proceeds. Rawls's motivating concerns in formulating 
his theory of justice were, to a strikingly degree, similar to those of realists: the 
legacy of slavery and segregation in the United States, and the horrors of the 
Holocaust and the Second World War. It is hardly coincidental that the aim of the 
theory was thus to provide an alternative to utilitarian instrumentalism, or that the 
difference principle is concerned with maximising the welfare   of the  least 
advantaged and powerful members of society (Rawls, 2003). To this we can add the 
significant fact that, despite the well-rehearsed realist critique that Rawls ignores   
politics, Rawls did a great deal to inject political argument into analytic philosophy.   
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 In light of these facts about the motivation behind Rawls's work, the response 
to Rawls and post-Rawlsian liberal theory by political realists remains, to my mind, 
underdeveloped. What is clear, however, is that a treatment and appreciation of 
political  evils is by no means incompatible with a theoretical articulation of positive 
values, like justice and equality. Indeed, Shklar herself was an admirer of Rawls's 
work, and in his  "Reply to Habermas" Rawls notes an affinity between Shklar's 
liberalism and his own (Rawls, 2005: 374; see also Forrester, 2012). Realism thus 
counsels against taking stability and security for granted, but this does not preclude 
the achievement of more positive goals. In a less dramatic sense, there is much  room 
for political philosophy to engage with the various everyday 'bads' which politics 
presents us with - such as corruption, demagoguery, faction, and politically 
motivated violence - as well as moral vices and failures (Allen, 2001;  Edyvane, 
2013; Philp, 1997).    
 Despite these differences from mainstream liberal political philosophy, 
however, it is important to stress that there is no necessary tension between realism 
and liberalism, as deliberative democracy is a liberal theory of democracy because it 
relies of freedoms of  expression and association. Almost all contemporary advocates 
of greater realism in political theory self-identify as liberals of one sort or another, 
however. For example, Bernard Williams, from whose work many realists take their 
bearings, wholeheartedly endorsed Judith Shklar's conception of "the liberalism of 
fear",  and many other realist thinkers view their realism as compatible with 
liberalism (Finlayson, 2015; Sabl, 2011). The outlier here is Raymond Geuss, 
perhaps the realist thinker most sceptical of liberalism. Even Geuss, however, finds 
something to admire in the strain of liberalism "that is action-orientated but 
reflexively anti-utopian" (Geuss, 2005: 28).  
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 Realism, then, is not inherently opposed to liberalism, although realists can 
certainly be ambivalent or sceptical towards liberalism. Rather, realism's quarrel is 
with the project of contemporary liberal political philosophy, and with what many 
realists perceive as the reality-warping or denying aspects of that project.
8
 For 
example, and as we shall shortly see elucidated in Chantal Mouffe's thought, the 
tendency to view existing politics through a moral lens can both distort our 
perception of political reality and push us towards political extremes. Rather than 
seeing those with whom we disagree in politics as our opponents to be argued with 
and persuaded, a moralised view of politics suggests that we view them as essentially 
opposed to our moral projects, and thus as enemies to be destroyed. Similarly,  this 
moral lens can blind us towards the forms of hegemony, normalisation, and coercion 
implicit in our own conceptions of political morality.    
 
3. Agonistic democracy  
The agonist approach to democratic politics represents a substantial attempt to 
theorise democratic politics along realist lines of concern, for agonism focuses on 
those aspects of politics about which realists have had most to say, such as the 
seeming permanence of political conflict and compulsion. Indeed, agonism may 
itself be classed a specifically democratic form of political realism. My objective 
here is not to engage in an overview and comprehensive critique of agonism, 
however, but to show that the agonist approach to democratic politics possesses 
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 "Reality" is, of course, an contestable notion. Two observers may witness the same event and 
come to radically different conclusions about it. This is allied to the Kantian insight that the way we 
see the world is not independent from our own conceptual apparatus; that is, we cannot avoid 
seeing the world through our own peculiarly tinted lenses. Similarly, the way "reality" is experienced 
by most (perhaps all) human beings is itself a product of ideological structures and historically 
contingent institutions, and via a nexus of interrelated discourses.     
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several problems of its own. I engage with the work of one agonist in particular, that 
of Chantal Mouffe.
9
 While agonism is complex and multifaceted political philosophy 
advanced by several thinkers who differ from each other in important respects, 
Mouffe's work nevertheless encompasses the central features of the agonist approach 
to democratic  politics, as well as providing one of the earliest voices calling for a 
greater emphasis on politics and critiquing  the preoccupation of political theory with  
moral philosophy (see Mouffe, 1993). (William Galston even goes so far as to call 
Mouffe a "leading arch-realist" (2010: 396) in his influential survey of the realist 
movement.) Mouffe's agonism thus encapsulates both the possibilities and 
challenges of the agonist approach to democratic politics for realist political thought. 
In this section I elaborate the main features of Mouffe's work as demonstrated in her 
writings from over several decades. I then outline several problems with the agonist 
model which should direct political realists to a consideration of alternative realist 
approaches to democratic politics.   
 In brief, Mouffe shares with other realists a scepticism of contemporary 
liberal philosophy. "What has been celebrated as a revival of political philosophy in 
the last decades" she  writes, "is in fact a mere extension of moral philosophy; it is 
moral reasoning applied to the treatment of political institutions" (Mouffe, 1993: 
147). For Mouffe, then, the entire discipline of contemporary political theory serves 
as a misnomer as it studiously  avoids an engagement with what she calls "the 
political"; that is, "the dimension of antagonism" which she takes "to be constitutive 
of human societies" (Mouffe, 2005: 9). Her particular targets here are Kantian 
liberals who see moral philosophy and political philosophy as coextensive. The 
danger, for Mouffe, is that we have entered into an era where legitimate antagonism 
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 For detailed critical engagement of agonism and Mouffe, see Knops (2007) and Fossen (2008).  
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is neglected by mainstream politicians and actively denied by liberal political 
theorists,  focusing instead on the morality of rational consensus. She identifies the 
alienation experienced by many citizens of liberal democracies from the political 
process as a   symptom of this neglect. Moreover, she suggests that conceiving of 
politics in moral terms can be potentially disastrous for democratic politics. She 
writes, "when opponents  are defined not in political but in moral terms, they cannot 
be envisaged as an 'adversary' but  only as an 'enemy'" (ibid: 76).  When combined 
with mainstream political theory's denial of the emotional or affective dimension of 
politics, which Mouffe conceives as necessary for meaningful political participation, 
this creates fertile conditions for extremist movements and populist demagogues to 
harness to dynamics of politics. 
 Against this dark background, Mouffe advocates her theory of agonistic 
pluralism.   That is, a model of democratic politics which seeks to tame the 
antagonism inherent to political life by transforming it into agonism, or adversarial 
competition. On this account, adversaries are "defined in a paradoxical way as 
'friendly enemies', that is, persons who      are friends because they share a common 
symbolic space but also enemies because they   want to organise this common 
symbolic space in a different way" (Mouffe, 2000: 13). For Mouffe, politics both 
intersects with and is antithetical to "the political". Again, "by 'the political' I refer to  
the dimension of antagonism that is inherent in human relations", a dimension which 
"can take many forms and emerge in different types of social relations" (ibid: 101). 
By contrast, politics "indicates the ensemble of practices, discourses, and institutions 
which seek to establish a certain order and organise human coexistence in conditions 
that are always potentially conflictual because they are affected by the dimension of 
'the political'" (ibid: 101). According to Mouffe, then, we are always sitting atop a 
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potentially explosive powder keg of political conflict. The task of democratic politics 
is to constantly domesticate these antagonistic  forces, for "when the channels are not 
available through which conflicts could take an 'agonistic' form, those conflicts tend 
to emerge on the antagonistic mode" (Mouffe, 2005: 5).      
 From this reading, agonism, or at least Mouffe's brand of it, may appear 
highly appealing to the realist. Mouffe does, after all, presage much of the 
dissatisfaction of  current realists with the dominant approaches to contemporary 
political thought. She attaches great significance to the place of conflict and 
antagonism in politics, the role of emotions, and is keenly aware of hegemonic 
power relations and the reality of political exclusion veiled in talk of rational 
consensus. Moreover, she advocates a positive theory which addresses these issues 
and has, in many respects, proven highly prescient of developments in real politics.
10
  
 Although there is much to admire in Mouffe's work, her agonistic pluralism 
falls   prey to its own forms of unrealism. Take, for example, her recurrent focus on 
what she   terms "the political", that is, the ever-present antagonistic dimension of 
human life. At various points she describes it as "constitutive of human societies", 
"ineradicable",  "inherent to politics", and eventually elevates it to the status of the 
human condition itself. (Mouffe, 2005: 119, 130). And yet, Mouffe  does very little 
to substantiate this series of claims. Precisely what is present in the psychological 
make-up of human beings that makes antagonism so pervasive, and its  veracity as 
an empirical claim, goes largely unexamined; Mouffe simply takes it as axiomatic. 
To be sure, Mouffe is certainly correct in asserting that antagonism plays a recurrent 
role in politics, and in her diagnosis that liberal political theory has remained    blind 
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 For example, Mouffe predicts with startling accuracy the demise of "third way" political discourse 
and the rise of right-wing populist movements linked to the dissatisfaction of many citizens with 
current representative systems. See C. Mouffe (2005), esp. Chapter 5.  
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to this aspect of political life for far too long. However, her work is at its least 
convincing when she stresses the exhaustive and omnipresent role of antagonism in 
determining the conditions of political life. Politics, particularly of a democratic 
stamp,     may be just as concerned with cooperation and conciliation than with 
adversarial contestation. Despite her own critique of essentialism regarding a 
necessary connection between liberalism and democracy, then, Mouffe repeatedly 
falls prey to her own form of  essentialism about politics (Mouffe, 2000: 11). 
 Secondly, Mouffe's agonistic pluralism gives a privileged place to the 
emotions. Indeed, she believes that by moving between accounts of rational 
calculation on the one   hand, and of moral deliberation on the other, democratic 
theory "is unable to acknowledge the role of 'passions' as one of the main moving 
forces in the field of politics and finds     itself disarmed when faced with its diverse 
manifestations" (Mouffe, 2005: 24). Such passions, Mouffe suggests, tend to be 
located in particular collective identities. Far from being atavistic features of a more 
insular, pre-rational age, as liberals tend to think of them, such identities and the 
passions they produce are needed to maintain democracy as a way of life. "By 
privileging rationality" she writes "both the deliberative and the aggregative 
perspectives leave aside a central element which is the crucial role played by 
passions and affects in securing allegiance to democratic values" (Mouffe, 2000: 95). 
Moreover, "to mobilise passions towards  democratic designs, democratic politics 
must have a partisan character." (ibid: 6). That is, politics must be gladiatorial to 
harness citizens' political passions and make them productive. In order to do this, 
democratic politics must be adversarial and offer citizens distinctive   partisan 
identities. It is this which Mouffe sees as put under threat by the increasingly 
47 
 
interchangeable and managerial character of political parties, and by the 
preoccupation of liberal democratic theorists with models of rational consensus.  
   This focus on the centrality of the emotions and the return of partisanship to 
the analysis of democratic politics is certainly welcome from a realist perspective. 
However, what is less welcome is the absence of any recognition of the negative 
consequences of passionate engagement in politics. Given Mouffe's intellectual debts 
to Carl Schmitt, this absence is all the more noticeable. Mouffe, of course, repudiates 
Schmitt's infamous celebration of antagonism in politics, and her agonistic pluralism 
is a response to her clear worries over Schmitt's forceful challenge to the viability of 
liberal democracy (see Mouffe, 1999). Agonistic contestation is supposed to act as a 
release-valve for the emotional antagonism which  Mouffe detects in human social 
life. But it could equally cause democratic politics to 'overheat', in the sense of 
contributing to the sorts of political breakdown which Mouffe clearly wishes to 
avoid. Anger and fear, after all, are notoriously unstable emotions, and  often a 
reaffirming of collective identities is precisely the last thing which situations of 
political conflict call for (Dryzek, 2005). Rather than taming antagonism, then, a 
politics which prizes passions and collective identities (at least, in an unqualified 
sense) could easily become unduly conflict-ridden and dysfunctional.       
 Thirdly, while Mouffe's attempts to return the focus of democratic theory to 
an adversarial mode of politics informed by and harnessing political emotions are 
certainly warranted, this comes at the expense of privileging certain forms of 
contestation over    others. For example, Mouffe frequently derides aggregative 
theories of democracy which conceive of citizens purely as bearers of material 
interests. When citizens "are treated as consumers in the political marketplace" then 
"there is nothing surprising about the low     level of participation in the democratic 
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process found in many Western societies today" (Mouffe, 1993: 120). Such 
approaches are politically immobilising because "in order to act politically people 
need to be able to identify with a collective identity which provides an idea of 
themselves they can valorise" (Mouffe, 2005: 25).  
 There is undoubtedly some truth to Mouffe's criticisms here: democratic 
theories which conceive of citizens as pure economic agents do indeed come with a 
motivational deficit. However, Mouffe overlooks the fact that citizens, aside from 
being many other things, are also bearers of interests, economic or otherwise. This is 
a far from unintelligible    way of conceiving political contestation, and is arguably a 
necessity for any plausible political analysis. Hence, while Mouffe lauds the idea of 
a more integrated Europe as a necessary counterweight to the power of transnational 
capitalism, she also decries the European states' competition to advance their own 
interests. "If, instead of competing   among themselves in order to establish the more 
attractive deals for transnational corporations, the different European states would 
agree on common policies, another type    of globalisation could be possible." 
(Mouffe, 2000: 127). Rather than an aberration which promotes political apathy, this 
looks, ironically, like the sort of adversarial politics which Mouffe praises,   albeit 
conducted at the international level. That is, a politics of adversaries who view each 
other as legitimate competitors, not as mortal enemies to be destroyed. We can 
imagine a similar scenario at the sub-national level. Of course, to envisage political 
conflict only in terms of material interests would be descriptively inadequate and 
normatively sterile. However, to leave out interests altogether, both as a dimension 
of and reason for political contestation, is a clear departure from realism.  
 Fourthly, it is far from clear that Mouffe's challenge to the prevailing modes 
of  liberal political philosophy is successful, and Mouffe's theory of agonistic 
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pluralism may ultimately be much closer to it than she recognises. To address the 
first point: as we have seen, Mouffe deploys several uncharitable descriptions of 
what she terms "liberal rationalism", which is broadly Kantian in inspiration. She 
repeatedly castigates the two contemporary exemplars of this tradition, John Rawls 
and J rgen Habermas, for multiple failures, including the idea of rational consensus. 
Such a consensus "can lead to violence being unrecognised and hidden behind 
appeals to 'rationality' as is often the case in liberal thinking which disguises the 
necessary frontiers and forms of exclusion behind pretences     of 'neutrality'" (ibid: 
22). In other words, liberal theorists are guilty of the strategic deployment of reason 
because they fail to recognise the innately antagonistic character of political life. 
Moreover, one of this tradition's "main shortcomings is precisely that it tends to 
erase the very place of the adversary, thereby expelling any opposition from the 
democratic public sphere" (ibid: 14).         
 Once again, Mouffe's criticisms in this area carry some truth. In particular, 
Habermas's theory of communicative discourse has been roundly criticised, notably 
from difference democrats such as Iris Marion Young, for its privileging of certain a 
type of     speech, and thus a certain group of speakers, above others (Young, 1996). 
Mouffe's critique of Rawls, however, is puzzling given the latter's prolonged 
engagement with the fact of democratic pluralism. Indeed, it is this issue which 
motivates much of Rawls's later work (Rawls, 2005). Given Rawls's preoccupation 
with how societies characterised by differences in moral and religious outlooks could 
remain stable while adhering to liberal-democratic values, we   might reasonably 
expect Mouffe to substantiate her complaints. But such a substantiation never 
arrives. Now, Mouffe might object that Rawls fails to provide a schematic for how 
different groups may carry on adversarial democratic politics within his theoretical 
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framework. But neither, we ought to remind ourselves, does Mouffe's agonism. It is 
unclear, then, why agonistic pluralism should hold any advantage. Moreover, this 
characterisation of liberal political theory may not be a straw man argument, but it is  
certainly one which obscures as much as it illuminates (Parkin, 2011).  
 To address the second point: while she criticises liberal political theory, 
Mouffe herself is not opposed to liberalism. On the contrary, she thinks it is an 
urgent task for  political theory to "disassociate" liberal ideals such as individual 
freedom and personal autonomy "from other discourses to which they have been 
articulated and to rescue     political liberalism from its association with economic 
liberalism" (Mouffe, 1993: 7). Elsewhere, she approvingly reminds us that "liberal-
democratic institutions should not be taken for granted: it is always necessary to 
fortify and defend them" (Mouffe, 2000: 4). Mouffe defines liberalism as "a 
philosophical discourse with many variants, united not by a common essence but by 
a multiplicity of what Wittgenstein called 'family resemblances'" (Mouffe, 2005: 10). 
 The allusion to Wittgenstein is revealing here. Mouffe again enlists his help 
in criticising rationalist modes of political philosophy which attempt to formulate 
governing principles from some a priori standpoint, making use of Wittgenstein's 
conception of practices and language-games. She cites with approval his point that 
"the forms of life in which we find ourselves are themselves held together by a 
network of precontractual agreements, without which there would be no possibility 
of mutual understanding or therefore, of disagreement" (Mouffe, 2000: 64). From 
this insight, she asserts that "liberal democratic  principles can only be defended as 
being constitutive of our forms of life, and we should    not try to ground our 
commitment to them on something supposedly safer", such as the Rawlsian "original 
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position" or the Habermasian "ideal speech situation",  both of which aspire to 
universal validity (ibid: 66).  
 This means, however, that while Mouffe criticises liberal political theorists 
such as Rawls for relying on an idealised form of consensus, her agonistic pluralism 
relies on   similar agreements over democratic values and "forms of life".  Mouffe 
herself recognises this, commenting that she sees her agonistic pluralism "as inspired 
by a Wittgensteinian  mode of theorising and as attempting to develop what I take to 
be one of his fundamental insights: grasping what it means to follow a rule" (ibid: 
71). This rule-following is mirrored by agonistic pluralism's own form of exclusion, 
when she says that "a democratic society   cannot treat those who put its basic 
institutions into question as legitimate adversaries" (Mouffe, 2005: 120). Mouffe's 
attempts to place her agonistic pluralism on her own form of consensus, and 
concomitant drawing of her own parameters of inclusion/exclusion, are not, of 
course, inherently objectionable. We are, however, a long way from her strident 
critique of mainstream political philosophy. Indeed, when combined with Mouffe's 
own fidelity to liberalism and democracy, agonistic pluralism appears as simply one 
form of liberal pluralism, resting on less securely explicated foundations.    
  In sum, the agonistic pluralism endorsed by Mouffe runs up against serious  
challenges in accomplishing its goals. To remind ourselves, agonistic pluralism (i) 
falls prey to its own form of essentialism, taking  antagonism to be the essence of 
political life; (ii) elevates the emotions without any consideration of their destructive 
potential; (iii) theorises adversarial conflict in a limited and incomplete manner; (iv) 
encounters problems in its challenge to mainstream political philosophy; and (v) has 
difficulty extricating itself from the liberal moralist paradigm. I now turn to an 
alternative realist model of democratic politics, to see if it fares any better. 
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4. Competitive elitism 
I have surveyed the agonistic model of democracy, exemplified by the work of 
Chantal Mouffe. I now turn to the elitist model of democracy. This conception of 
democracy may be styled as a marketplace, in which political elites, in the form of  
politicians and parties, take the place of firms competing with one another in an 
economy, and citizens take the  place of consumers with votes instead of monetary 
resources. This conception has gone under a variety of names and inspired a  variety 
of distinct models.
11
 For simplicity, I refer here to the conception through its 
principal exponent, the economist Joseph Schumpeter.
12
  I will first sketch the 
outlines of Schumpeter's theory of democracy, then proceed to assess the elitist 
model from a realist perspective.  
 Schumpeter's theory of democracy appears in his 1943 book Capitalism, 
Socialism andDemocracy, most of which is given over to a polemical critique of 
Marxism (Schumpeter, 1967). In the portion of the book occupied with democratic 
theory, Schumpeter makes it clear that his  main target is what he terms the "classical 
doctrine" of democracy, which postulates the existence of a common good that 
democracy must track. Schumpeter argued robustly   against such a conception of 
democracy, claiming there is "no such thing as a uniquely determined common good 
that all people could agree on or be made to agree on by the  force of rational 
argument" (ibid: 154). Under the modern conditions of social pluralism, argued 
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 For example, Downs (1957), which takes Schumpeter's insights to heart; and much of the later 
literature on social choice theory, such as Riker (1982). Two of the most recent appropriations of 
Schumpeter are I. Shapiro (2003) Green (2010). Shapiro and Green respectively employ Schumpeter 
in the service of non-domination and plebiscitarian democratic alternatives. 
12
 Although Schumpeter is credited with elaborating the economic model, the idea of modelling 
democratic politics on economic activity was first proposed by the economist Harold Hotelling 
(1929). 
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Schumpeter, any attempt to uncover some common good for the whole of society 
was fundamentally misconceived. Even under a principle of majority rule, "the will 
of the majority is the will of the majority and not the will of 'the people'. The latter is 
a mosaic    that the former completely fails to 'represent'" (ibid: 177). 
 Moreover, "even if a sufficiently definite common good" such as a principle 
of   utility maximisation "proved acceptable to all, this would not imply equally 
definite    answers to individual issues" (ibid: 155). The application of universal 
maxims to particular circumstances would lead to disagreement even amongst 
experts about how best to      achieve the desired outcome. "Health might be desired 
by all, yet people would still    disagree on vaccination and vasectomy" (ibid). 
Furthermore, Schumpeter argued that the   classical theory of democracy ascribed to 
citizens, in both their individual and collective forms, "an independence and a 
rational quality that are altogether unrealistic" (ibid: 157). In his  view, the average 
citizen has "a reduced sense of reality", and therefore "a reduced sense      of 
responsibility" and an "absence of effective volition" owing to the remoteness of  
momentous national political issues from ordinary people's life experience. The 
private citizen "is a member of an unworkable committee, the committee of the 
whole nation, and this why he expends less disciplined effort on mastering a political 
problem than he    expends on a game of bridge" (ibid: 165).  
 Against the classical doctrine, Schumpeter argued for his own democratic 
theory which he suggested was "much truer to life" than the illusions propounded by 
classical theorists (ibid: 173). On his model of democracy, the people were assigned 
a much more passive     role in governing; their role was "to produce a government, 
or else an intermediate body which in turn will produce a national executive". 
Schumpeter defined democracy as "that institutional arrangement for arriving at 
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political decisions in which individuals acquire      the power to decide by means of a 
competitive struggle for the people's vote" (ibid: 173-174). In other words, 
democracy is the method by which the people select their rulers, who are better 
equipped, in terms of both intellect and propensity, to decide on political matters 
than ordinary citizens. The analogue is that of a market for votes: politicians are akin 
to entrepreneurs who have an incentive to be responsive to the demands of the 
electorate. Indeed, according to Schumpeter, if we wish to think about democracy, 
the competitive struggle provides a distinct theoretical advantage; while economic 
activity arises from people's basic demands for food, clothing, shelter, and so on, an 
economist wishing to     study modern commercial activity would do better to 
examine the struggle for profits and market shares. Similarly, while human beings 
have basic problems of social organisation, political theorists wishing to understand 
modern democracy would do better to examine      the struggle for votes. "The social 
function is fulfilled, as it were, incidentally." (ibid: 187)  
 What, then, does Schumpeter's elitist theory of democracy have to 
recommend it from a realist perspective? It is a theory which consciously eschews a 
moralised conception of democratic politics, repudiating the abstract and unreal 
character of much democratic theory. It offers a theory of incentives for the 
disciplining of political power, making politicians responsive to voters' interests, 
with constraints in that the people can evict governments which prove unresponsive. 
As such, Schumpeter's thought stands in the tradition of Madison and Weber. Why, 
then, might we have reason to be sceptical of elitist democracy? 
 Firstly, the modelling of democratic politics on market competition does 
provide some benefits, such as a renewed focus on power, self-interest and 
institutional design.  However, it risks obscuring as much as it illuminates. 
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Schumpeter's democratic theory    never claims to offer a conception of "the 
political", as with Mouffe's, but it does attribute   an instrumentalist conception of 
rationality to all political actors. While such a conception may be at home in the 
economy, in the realm of democratic politics it accounts for only a fraction of 
political activity. In short, while politics may resemble the economy in some 
features, political motivations cannot be assimilated to economic ones. Emotions and 
normative principles which might motivate citizens to engage in and with politics are 
relegated by Schumpeter to the private sphere, and treated only as exogenous 
preferences.  
 This is evidenced most clearly in Schumpeter's dismissive treatment of 
political parties. While Edmund Burke defined a party as a group of men united to 
promote the   public welfare on some principle on which they agree, Schumpeter 
dismisses this as a tempting but dangerous rationalisation. All parties will "at any 
given time, provide themselves with a stock of principles" which "may be as 
characteristic of the party that adopts them and as important for its success as the 
brands of goods a department store      sells are characteristic of it and important for 
its success" (ibid: 188). Just we do not define a department store in terms of the 
particular brands it sells, we cannot, says Schumpeter,  define a party in terms of its 
principles. A political party, then, is merely "a group whose members propose to act 
in concert in the competitive struggle for political power" (ibid).     Parties are thus 
conceived in instrumental terms as power-seeking factions. We might plausibly 
arrive at such a definition if we view parties solely from the perspective of their 
outward effects. But this, of course, neglects the principles which animate parties 
and motivate their members. Parties, unlike factions, do not seek power for its own 
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sake, and  their members are motivated by conceptions of justice and the good 
society at least as     much as by securing their own material interests.    
 Second, Schumpeter spends much time puncturing what he sees as the myth 
of the rational economic actor. Contrary to what the economists suggest, people's 
"wants are nothing like as definite and their actions upon those wants nothing like as 
rational and  prompt" as their theories make out. Instead, "they are so amenable to 
the influence of advertising and other methods of persuasion that producers often 
seem to dictate to them instead of being directed by them" (ibid: 161). That is, 
consumers are so heavily susceptible to business-driven suggestions, their desires 
nothing more "than an indeterminate bundle of vague impressions playing about 
given slogans", that their demand for goods is often extremely inchoate and 
susceptible to persuasion (ibid: 157). Enterprising producers, on the other    hand, do 
not wait for demand to come to them; they seek it out and, with the aid of      modern 
advertising, create demand which would not otherwise exist, manipulating 
consumers' desires and expectations. 
    Given Schumpeter's assessment of the competencies of the average 
economic    actor and the behaviour of the typical capitalist firm, it is, then, unclear 
why he thinks  citizens and political parties would behave any differently in the 
political marketplace for votes.
13
 Entrepreneurial politicians are surely just as likely 
to manipulate the wishes of   citizens with the aid of sophisticated political 
advertising and partisan media than to be responsive to citizens' given policy 
preferences. Indeed, it appears as if Schumpeter anticipates this when he writes 
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 This analogy must be distinguished from the notion of citizens literally buying and selling votes to 
one another. Although this idea never enters Schumpeter's theory, it is not altogether clear that 
Schumpeter would be opposed to it; economic consumers, after all, have vastly unequal wealth and 
resources at their disposal. For discussion, see Brennan (2011). 
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"Newspaper readers, radio audiences, members of a party even if not physically 
gathered together are terribly easy to work up into a psychological crowd and into a 
state of frenzy", where any attempt at argument "only spurs the animal spirits" 
(Schumpeter, 1967: 161). However, Schumpeter's theory pays scant attention to the 
dangers of mass democracy and demagogic manipulation. His remarks on the role of 
political leadership perhaps shed some light on why he does not dwell on this. 
According to Schumpeter,  group volitions "do not as a rule assert themselves 
directly. Even if strong and definite  they remain latent, often for decades, until they 
are called to life by some political leader  who turns them into political factors" (ibid: 
175). In other words, while citizen's preferences are essentially passive, they can be 
activated by skilled political leaders. The people's  preferences will thus always 
remain their own, relying on leaders to translate them into political action. While this 
conception of the catalytic interaction between politicians and citizens is perhaps 
more subtle than it appeared at first, we may nevertheless think it somewhat naïve. 
The desires and expectations of the public do not so much resemble an already 
written text which politicians merely read and respond to, as a text which is 
constantly in the process of being rewritten, at least in part, by political leaders and      
parties.  And, in pluralistic societies, it will often say divergent and conflicting 
things.   
 Thirdly, we encounter further problems when we follow Schumpeter's 
economic analogy to its logical consequences. One well-rehearsed objection to 
conceiving of democratic politics as a market is that, when viewed in these terms, it 
is a highly anti-competitive market. In many Western democracies, electoral systems 
are dominated by a  small number of large parties, with other small parties capturing 
relatively few seats in    legislatures and low percentages of the national vote. Large 
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parties tend to maintain prohibitive entry costs, such as expensive electioneering 
strategies and campaign advertisements, as well as excluding smaller parties from 
national debates. This is a long  way from the micro-economic ideal of perfectly 
competitive markets, more closely resembling oligopolistic competition. In such 
imperfectly competitive markets, therefore,   the sense in which parties prove 
responsive to citizens' policy preferences is deeply compromised.  
 However, contemporary advocates of Schumpeter's theory of democracy 
have defended it against such accusations. Ian Shapiro, for example, has suggested 
that "the difficulty lies not with the Schumpeterian analogy but rather with the failure 
to press it sufficiently far" (Shapiro, 2003: 62). In a competitive economy, after all, 
firms attempt to outmanoeuvre each other, increasing their market shares and, if they 
can, become monopolies, just as  parties seek to increase their percentages of the 
national vote. But firms do not regulate themselves, and it is a mistake, says Shapiro, 
to think that parties will succeed where capitalist firms have fallen short. This 
propensity of a competitive system to undermine itself is, writes Shapiro, "one of the 
reasons that markets stand in need of regulation by institutional players who are 
independent of the firms that operate in them" (ibid: 62). Just as governmental 
institutions provide regulatory oversight of markets and enforce anti-trust legislation 
to prevent oligopolies from forming, so too must political competition be regulated 
by independent bodies which stand outside this competitive struggle. For Shapiro, an 
independent judiciary serves such a regulatory purpose (ibid: 64).  
 However, Shapiro's conception of judiciaries as independent regulatory 
bodies, arbitrating competition between political parties, suffers from at least two 
failures of   realism. In practice, the idea of supreme courts as independent from the 
competitive  struggles of parties must be heavily qualified. In many constitutional 
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democracies with established processes of judicial review, such as the United States, 
judges serve lifetime appointments precisely to insulate them from threats and 
bribery. Once appointed, they have no professional disincentive to ruling impartially. 
But how are they appointed? Absent a system for electing judges (which runs 
counter to Shapiro's proposed role for  judges as standing outside the competitive 
struggle for power), politicians often appoint judges whom they believe will provide 
rulings favourable to their party. There are, of   course, examples of politicians being 
disappointed and frustrated by the rulings of their judicial appointments.
14
 However, 
given the heavily partisan nature of many judiciaries, it appears excessively 
optimistic to characterise them as truly independent of competitive politics.        
 Related to this failure, we may say that by investing such regulatory power in 
judiciaries as sites of political decision-making, Shapiro moves himself (and thus his   
defence of Schumpeter's theory of democracy) away from realism and towards views  
associated with arch-moralists John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin. Imbuing courts 
with authority to regulate competitive struggles for power does not simply transfer 
decision-making beyond the political sphere to legal, extra-political bodies. On the 
contrary, the   likely outcome will be an increased politicisation of judiciaries. When 
governmental institutions tasked with regulating the economy fail to perform their 
function, they are  subject to public controversy, along with concomitant scrutiny 
and reorganisation by politicians. When judiciaries fail to perform their function of 
regulating the political marketplace, who is responsible for their oversight and 
                                                          
14
 See, for example, Theodore Roosevelt's famous description of his first judicial appointee, Oliver 
Wendell Holmes: "I could carve out of a banana a judge with more backbone than that." Ironically, 
the comment relates to Holmes's ruling against the largest American anti-trust case of the time, 
United States v. Northern Securities. See T.S. Purdum (2005) "Presidents, Picking Judges, Can Have 
Backfires", in The New York Times, 
www.nytimes.com/2005/07/05/politics/politicsspecial1/05history.html?oref=login&_r=0 [last 
accessed 28th Feb. 2015].  
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reorganisation? In other words,   who regulates the regulators? Politics, we may say, 
has simply been displaced from one sphere into another.  
 Fourthly, supposing that we follow Shapiro's suggestion for the application of 
economic anti-trust legislation to the realm of political parties, to prevent parties 
from forming oligopolies and thus undermining electoral competition. Presumably, 
besides lowering barriers to entry into the political marketplace, there would be an 
injunction to prevent parties from growing too large and crowding out its 
competitors. But how large is  too large? The answer, it seems, will depend on 
demonstrable evidence that one party's competitors are being excluded from the 
political marketplace. But this appears highly   arbitrary. The burden would be 
placed on regulatory bodies applying political anti-trust legislation to essentially 
prove a counterfactual claim: namely, that if a certain party were   not so large, did 
not spend x amount on advertising, leafleting, and so on, then citizens   would vote 
for some alternatives.
15
 If we take citizens' policy preferences as given, as 
Schumpeter advises, then this seems an unlikely possibility.  
 Leaving aside the question of how regulatory bodies would meet this 
justificatory burden, we may still wonder along what lines political parties would be 
broken up. Two possibilities present themselves: either according to some fraction of 
the oligopolistic party's total share of the national vote, or according to the 
ideological composition of the oligopolistic party. Both present coherency problems. 
To take the latter first, it is worth noting that on a strict reading of Schumpeter's 
                                                          
15
 This attempts to sidestep the question of according to what criteria party "size" would be 
measured or defined, for example: the number of registered party members; the number of active 
party members; the size of financial contributions; the number and plurality of financial 
contributors; the number of seats held in the national legislature; the percentage of the vote at the 
previous election; the level of public support according to the latest polling data; and the ability to 
field candidates in every electoral constituency.  
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theory this possibility would be rejected, because, as I noted earlier, Schumpeter 
denies that parties possess any core principles  integral to their identity. Assuming, 
however, that partisans have normative convictions beyond their own self-interest, 
what would be the likely consequences of breaking up parties according to their 
ideological wings?  
 I think it is plausible to claim that many large national parties are unofficial   
coalitions of aligned ideologies and interests (for example, libertarians and 
conservatives, socialists and environmentalists, and so on) which are not necessarily 
united but share elective affinities. If large parties housing each of these ideologies 
were dissolved, with smaller, ideologically 'pure' parties taking their place, then 
citizens would have a much clearer set of policy options to choose from at elections. 
However, unless the electoral  system had a very low minimum requirement for the 
number legislative seats held for   parties to form governments, then national 
governments would likely be coalitions formed between various small parties. 
During coalition negotiations, each party would likely be forced to compromise 
some of its preferred policies in exchange for inclusion in the government. (Bellamy, 
2012). This, of course, takes us back to where we started from: instead of one large 
party governing as an unofficial coalition, there is an official coalition of small 
parties. Unless Shapiro (and Schumpeter) wish to propose a ban on coalition 
government, this application of anti-trust policy looks nonsensical.  
 Instead of breaking up oligopolistic parties according to their ideological 
bases, then, regulators of the political marketplace might do better to simply dissolve 
them according to a given fraction of the party's total share of the national vote. 
Instead of one large party with fifty percent of the vote, we will have five smaller 
parties, with each nominally holding ten percent of the vote. In this case, it seems 
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likely that each of these smaller parties would promote largely identical policies to 
the predecessor party, because they know that those policies had previously captured 
a large number of citizens' votes.   Each small party would essentially be a smaller 
version of the dissolved party, trying to return to their previous position of the share 
of the national vote. Not only would citizens likely be unable to distinguish between 
these successor parties, but any benefit of the continuous enforcement of anti-trust 
legislation seems largely ephemeral. Political parties grow and are dissolved, but 
continue to offer citizens the same bundles of policies  throughout this cycle.  
 In sum, the elitist model of democracy, or at least that version proposed by 
Schumpeter and his followers, has serious deficiencies, and not only from a realist 
perspective. Schumpeter's theory (i) fails to account for any motivations other than 
self-interest; (ii) pays insufficient attention to the dangers of demagogic leadership, 
and potentially encourages it; (iii) offers an unsatisfactory account of the regulation 
of electoral competition; and (iv) does not, in its contemporary variant, provide 
coherent remedies for limiting exclusionary tendencies in democratic electoral 
politics.  I now turn to the final the deliberative theory of democracy. 
 
5. Deliberative democracy  
In the cases of the previous realist theories of democracy which I have surveyed in 
this chapter, rather than attempting to canvas and engage with the whole sweep of 
these   respective theories, for ease of presentation I instead focused on those 
theorists (Chantal Mouffe and Schumpeter and Shapiro, respectively) whom I took 
to be exemplary representatives of each tradition. In the case of the deliberative 
theory of democracy, however, I cannot follow this path. This is because, in my 
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judgement, no one thinker  provides an adequate representation of the many and 
competing trends within the  deliberative democratic literature. To be sure, the 
deliberative model has its exemplary theorists; Jürgen Habermas and, in perhaps a 
lesser vein, John Rawls stand as obvious choices. However, the plurality and 
evolution of the many threads within deliberative  democracy would mean that to 
focus on any single theorist would leave a substantial remainder. My plan for this 
section, then, is to briefly survey several statements in the    recent  literature and 
provide a snapshot of the current state of the theory. (Inevitably, this will also 
involve being quire selective in my coverage, although less so than if I were to   
focus on any one deliberative theorist.) Then, I proceed to outline some reasons for 
the apparent tension between deliberative democracy and political realism. I then 
suggest that this tension may  not be as important as it appears, and that deliberative 
democracy can    meet the challenge of political realism successfully. I conclude by 
indicating the specific challenges of realism which will be addressed in subsequent 
chapters, and the general deliberative democratic perspective from which these 
challenges will be addressed.    
 It is almost two decades now since James Bohman proclaimed that 
deliberative democracy had "come of age" (Bohman, 1998). In the subsequent 
period, the theory of deliberative democracy has undergone substantial changes. In 
its origins, deliberative democracy  defined itself in opposition to elitist and rational 
choice theories of democracy, which emphasised voting, interest aggregation, and 
negotiation. Deliberative democracy, on the other hand, emphasised rational 
communication amongst citizens when arriving at    decisions which ought to be 
acceptable to all. In the words of John Dryzek, deliberative democracy "represents a 
renewed concern with the authenticity of democracy: the degree to which democratic 
64 
 
control is substantive rather than symbolic, and engaged by competent citizens" 
(Dryzek, 2000: 1). Accordingly, deliberation "as a social process is distinct from 
other kinds of communication in that deliberators are amenable to changing their 
judgements, preferences, and views during the course of their interactions, which 
involve persuasion rather than coercion, manipulation, or deception" (ibid).  
 The early phases of deliberative democratic scholarship focused on small-
scale institutional forums which could best approximate the ideal conditions of 
public reason      and communicative rationality advocated in the major philosophical 
statements on deliberation. However, in recent years deliberative theorists have since 
turned their   attentions back to the public sphere, in the hopes of fostering more 
deliberative forms of political speech in mass democratic settings. The key theorists 
here are Jane Mansbridge, John Parkinson, and John Dryzek, all of whom now 
advocate a "systemic" approach to deliberative theory, viewing general 
communicative interactions within the polity in        terms of their capacity to foster 
deliberation (Mansbridge et al, 2012; Dryzek, 2010).  
 Now, I noted at the beginning of this chapter that the theory of deliberative 
democracy and political realism can appear to be in tension with one another. Where  
agonism and competitive elitism seem to emerge in a very natural fashion from 
political realism, deliberative democracy seems both alien and hostile to the concerns 
of realism,     and vice versa. But why is this the case? The most straightforward 
answer is probably that realist political thinkers have placed strong emphasis on 
those aspects of politics which deliberative theorists have tended to minimise or have 
traditionally failed to address in careful detail, such as those surrounding the exercise 
of political power, the ubiquitous  nature of political conflict, and the public 
assertion of material interests. By itself, however, the fact that both sides focus on 
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different areas of democratic politics does not tell us a great deal about why they 
may be in tension. (Indeed, it might just as well indicate that they complement one 
another.) The source of this apparent tension can instead be traced to the  fact that 
much deliberative democratic theory appears to belong to that form of political 
philosophy which political realism has set itself against. As we saw in section two of 
this chapter, the realist movement emerged principally as a critique of political 
philosophy  adopting an "ethics first" approach to political theorising. Realism 
departs in significant  ways from the mannerisms of this approach. The points of 
tension between deliberative  democracy and realism may thus be captured under 
three separate headings: rationalism, utopianism, and moralism. I now address each 
in turn, suggesting reasons why these   tensions may not be as significant as they first 
appear. My treatment of these points will       be brief, however, as they will be 
elaborated in greater detail in later chapters.  
 
5.1. Rationalism 
Theories of deliberative democracy have often been portrayed as unduly rationalist 
in character. For example, we saw earlier in this chapter that one of Chantal Mouffe's 
criticism of liberal theories of democracy was that they depressed citizen 
participation by ignoring    the "affective element" of democratic politics. Similar 
criticisms have been levelled by feminist critics against much liberal political theory 
and by difference theorists against deliberative democracy in particular, such as 
Martha Nussbaum (2000) and Iris Marion Young (2000). The criticism here is that 
much contemporary political theory reproduces, often by omission, the early-modern 
division between reason and the passions while rendering the latter subordinate to 
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the former. This philosophical division has, its realist critics contend, contributed to 
the political subordination of social groups who are less  willing or capable of 
participating forms of rationalised discourse, as well as leading to democratic 
theories which lack the ability to motivate citizens to participate in politics.  
 As  we shall see in chapter two, where I embark on a discussion of 
deliberative rhetoric, these criticisms have much purchase when applied to liberal 
political theorists in general. However, it is less clear that they have so much 
significance when levelled at theories of deliberative democracy. Deliberative 
theorists are not the intellectual offspring of liberal moralism   alone, but can call on 
a variety of theoretical sources and traditions. Indeed, and as we shall see, historical 
advocates of political deliberation considered the passions to be of great importance, 
and contemporary advocates of deliberative democracy have freely drawn from 
figures such as Aristotle (O'Neill, 2002; Yack, 2006), Cicero (Garsten, 2006) and 
Hume (Krause, 2008). Moreover, as I discuss in the following chapter, where this 
tension persists, it can be lessened by appeal to alternative forms of political speech.  
 
5.2. Utopianism 
Realist theorists of politics often take their moralist opponents to task for utopianism   
(Geuss, 2010; Honig and Stears, 2011) and for succumbing to an excessive idealism  
about politics. In other words, liberal moralists often begin their theoretical 
reflections by constructing ideal models of political society and then set about 
applying these models to  real politics. This inevitably, the realists charge, leads to a 
perspective divorced from the contingent realities of modern political practice. Now, 
this point of tension does appear to apply to much of the literature in deliberative 
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democratic theory, which proceeds from idealised accounts of deliberation and 
political arguments. Deliberative theorists then engineer institutions modelled after 
their ideals, but which only obtain on a small scale.  These forum-based attempts at 
deliberation have been roundly criticised by political realists (Shapiro, 1999, 2005) 
for their inefficacy at meeting the demands of real politics.  
 Moreover, they give rise to the view that, far from offering a better form of 
politics, deliberative democracy simply displaces politics to other areas when 
deciding on issues like who    participates in deliberative forums and which issues 
are discussed. In a similar vein,    political realists may criticise the unrealistic 
picture many deliberative democrats have of political participation. That is, in 
assuming conditions of political stability, material affluence, and the widespread 
possession of the sorts of civic virtues which allow for    greater levels of 
participation, deliberative democrats offer a picture of political conditions which 
rarely, if ever, obtain in practice. As such, deliberative democracy may appear to be 
an ideal theory which has little or no purchase under conditions which are far from 
ideal  (Honig, 2009; Stears, 2010).    
 As we shall see in chapters three and five, where I embark on discussions 
about political leadership and emergency conditions, respectively, deliberative 
democracy need   not be viewed in this utopian light. Indeed, many deliberative 
democrats have begun formulating theories about deliberation in less than ideal 
contexts (Fung, 2005; Stears,   2010), while the literature on deliberative democracy 
has increasingly focused on the possibilities for political deliberation at the large-
scale in  modern, mass democratic settings (Parkinson, 2006; Dryzek, 2010). Indeed, 
the recent systemic turn in deliberative theory     has been concerned with theorising 
deliberation across entire societies and in non-ideal circumstances. Similarly, while it 
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may also be charged that deliberative democracy lacks   any account of political 
agency, moves have also been made in this direction (Stears, 2010). Indeed, on these 
scores realism and deliberative democracy are closer than they been for some time. I 
contribute to this burgeoning project in chapters three and four. 
 
5.3. Moralism 
This point of tension between political realists and deliberative theorists cuts to the 
core of the apparent antipathy between the two camps. Namely, it is a difference 
over where  theorists should trace the sources of political normativity. For many 
realists, political philosophy ought to receive its normative dimension by 
interrogating the standards internal   to politics as an activity, which include the 
requirements for stability and legitimacy (Williams, 2005). For deliberative 
democrats, however, the typical move has been to understand deliberative theory as 
more or less continuous with mainstream political philosophy, which adopts the 
"ethics-first" approach by appealing to an extra-political morality for normative 
guidance, and in many cases find inspiration from liberal theorists working firmly 
within this moralist tradition (for example, Cohen, 1989).  
 In their current form, this is probably the most divisive fault line between the 
two literatures. Much deliberative democratic theory does proceed from moralist 
accounts of   pre-political rights of freedom of speech and association, drawn 
principally from this literature. However, there are many exceptions to this. As 
mentioned above, deliberative democrats are not only the offspring of liberal 
moralists, and call upon many different traditions on which to base their normative 
arguments for deliberation, such as critical   theory (Dryzek, 2000; Rostball, 2008) 
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and civic republicanism, which do not obey the     clear. Moreover,  there is no 
requirement that one must subscribe to a liberal moralist  position to appreciate the 
importance of political deliberation. We need not, in other words, look outside 
politics for a normative argument for deliberation.  
 
5.4. The deliberative response 
Finally, let me explicate briefly how the contents of the subsequent chapters relate to 
the challenge which realism poses for deliberative democracy. I have already 
indicated at   several points how they connect with my overall argument that realism 
and deliberative democracy are compatible. Realism directs us towards a concern for 
the overly rationalist character of much deliberative theory, and how the norms of 
speech propagated by the  theory can prove restrictive for political communication 
and oppressive of certain groups. This directs us towards the practice of rhetoric, as 
discussed in chapter two. Furthermore, realism leads us to be concerned by the 
utopian character of deliberative theory and its lack of an account of political agency. 
I attempt to remedy this in chapter three with my discussion  of leadership. The 
agonist and competitive elitist models of democratic politics covered in this chapter 
highlighted the importance for realists of democratic competition and contestation, 
and this can often seem to be lacking in accounts of deliberative democracy. Chapter 
four seeks to show how conflict and deliberation are not mutually exclusive by 
discussing the roles for deliberation in political parties and partisanship. And a 
concern that deliberative democracy is impotent in less than ideal circumstances 
animates chapter five, in which I discuss the spaces for political deliberation in 
emergency conditions.  
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 This last subject allows me to offer a reminder of the general perspective on 
politics and deliberative democracy which underlies my argument. I noted above that 
a concern for deliberation in mass democratic settings has lead some theorists to 
endorse a systemic approach in evaluating the quality and magnitude of deliberation 
spread across societies.  This is not the approach I shall take. The systemic approach, 
I think, adopts too much of a totalising tendency, which means that every aspect of 
democratic politics is evaluated in terms of its contribution to deliberation. This 
overly instrumental approach is important  when it comes to my discussion of 
political leadership. Instead, I  adopt a general strategy of comparative evaluation. 
That is, I assume that circumstances in which there is more and better deliberation is 
normatively superior to one which there is less and worse deliberation.
16
 The scope 
of this strategy is not, as I have already explained, limited to institutional sites of 
deliberation, but neither does it seek to assimilate the democratic polity in its entirety 
to deliberative norms.   
 As I intimated in my introduction, this strategy was owes a great deal to the 
work of Amartya Sen on justice (Sen, 2006). While an ideal theory of deliberative 
democracy may be sufficient for one to make comparisons between circumstances 
which approximate to the ideal to greater or lesser degrees, it is not necessary for one 
to do so. For example, we can judge that a society with universal provision of 
healthcare is more just (at least along this one dimension) than a society without such 
provision, without a conception of a perfectly just society. Similarly, we can 
recognise a society with conditions of greater public deliberation - for example, one 
with extensive constitutional freedoms of speech and association -  without recourse 
                                                          
16
 Of course, what counts as "better" or "worse" deliberation will depend greatly upon the context in 
which it occurs, and I will not attempt to specify this independently or in advance of an appraisal of 
the contexts examined here. 
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to some deliberative ideal. It also owes something to Bonnie Honig's thoughts on the 
paradox of politics: the chicken and egg problem of how we are to achieve ideal 
institutions in the absence of ideal citizens (Honig, 2007; 2009). The response which 
I suggest here is that we can think in terms of better and worse states of affairs, or 
the extent and quality of deliberation, without  recourse to an ideal. The advantage of 
conceiving of deliberative reforms to politics in  this way is that it allows for 
incremental change, rather than wholesale revolution. If we follow Max Weber's 
dictum, that politics "means slow, strong drilling through hard boards, with a 
combination of passion and a sense of judgement" (Weber, 1994: 369), then this may 
be the  most appropriate way to proceed.   
 
6. Conclusion  
In this chapter, I have attempted to make preliminary steps in arguing that the theory 
of deliberative democracy is compatible with political realism. While the agonist and 
competitive elitist approaches to democracy initially seem more promising as realist     
models of democratic politics, I have attempted to show that they have their own 
internal problems, and that this points us towards alternative models of democracy. I 
began by elucidating the key features of political realism, including its turn away 
from ideal theory   and focus on the autonomy and dangers of politics. I then 
outlined the agonist position of Chantal Mouffe and the competitive elitism of 
Joseph Scumpeter and Ian Shapiro, noting problems with each approach. I then 
moved to discuss the apparent tension between the theory of deliberative democracy 
and realism, highlighting three points of tension. This tension, I suggested, is not as 
significant as it may appear initially. Deliberative democracy, I contend, can 
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accommodate the challenges which realism sets forth. I address these  challenges in 
the following chapters.   
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Chapter 2 
Deliberative Rhetoric 
 
1. Introduction 
The realist approach to political theory urges us to take note of the existing practices 
of democratic politics, which take place in circumstances of deep disagreement. 
Citizens in democracies disagree over moral values and the common good, and how 
these can better realised in legislation and public policy. This has also long been 
apparent to theorists of deliberative democracy. However, deliberative theorists have 
tended to overlook and trivialise the means by which political persuasion - and thus 
deliberation, understood as a process of opinion and will formation - actually occurs 
in democratic societies. Instead,    they turn towards idealised models of 
communication and to institutional forums which insulate citizens from the wider 
discourses of the democratic public sphere. In contrast, political persuasion in 
democracies largely proceeds by means of political rhetoric. The pursuit of greater 
realism thus leads us to consider the compatibility of deliberative democracy and 
political rhetoric. 
 Rhetoric has received relatively little attention in contemporary political 
theory. This is, however, gradually starting to change. Recent years have seen a 
renewal of interest in rhetoric among political theorists, with a proliferation of books 
and articles on the topic (Young, 1996, 2000; Abizadeh, 2001, 2007; O'Neill, 2002; 
Fontana, Nederman, and Remer, 2004; Garsten, 2006, 2011; Yack, 2006; Chambers, 
2009; and Dryzek, 2010). This renewed focus in rhetoric is partly due to its recovery 
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as a tradition in  the history of political thought (Skinner, 1996; Garsten, 2006), but 
due also to increasing dissatisfaction with dominant accounts of political argument 
found within theories of deliberative democracy. Indeed, rhetoric has often been 
presented as an alternative or corrective to traditional accounts of democratic 
deliberation (see Young, 1996; Shiffman, 2004; Bentley, 2004) which appear 
utopian or excessively rationalist. Rhetoric may therefore be viewed as a challenge 
to deliberative democracy from a realist approach to democratic politics; a challenge 
which I contest in this chapter. My goal here is to offer an account of deliberative 
rhetoric, demonstrating the compatibility of deliberative democracy with rhetorical 
forms of political argument.    
 The structure of this chapter is as follows: I begin by elucidating the 
prevailing accounts of political argument within the literature on deliberative 
democracy. These accounts are, as I will show, heavily influenced by Rawls's idea of 
public reason and Habermas's ideal public discourse, both of which draw from an 
anti-rhetorical vision of deliberation found in Plato and Kant. I argue that these 
modes of political argument are inadequate on at least three fronts: they provide 
inducements to insincerity to citizens engaging in political deliberation; they are ill-
suited for judging the highly technical arguments made by experts and political 
actors in modern democratic societies, which are characterised by complexity and 
deep divisions of intellectual labour; and they exclude appeals to emotions in 
political argument, thus suffering a motivational deficit and a misunderstanding of 
the nature of deliberation itself. I move to a discussion of the realist  account of 
deliberative rhetoric offered by Aristotle, showing that it can respond to the 
objections levelled at the Kantian accounts of deliberation found in Rawls and 
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Habermas. I demonstrate the mutual compatibility of rhetoric, deliberation, and 
realism, as well as the benefits for realists of an integrated research agenda.    
 Before embarking on this discussion, however, I ought to stipulate a working 
definition of rhetoric. The term is used in many different ways, and in many different 
contexts. In everyday speech, for instance, the term is often used to indicate a form 
of    shallow or deceptive language, devoid of real meaning or content. At other 
times, it may be deployed positively to refer to the eloquence of a speaker. I resist 
here the temptation of  some postmodern theorists to class all speech as rhetorical; 
that is, as a mask for prevailing structures of power. As John O'Neill points out, "If 
one took seriously what they are saying in their theories, one could not take seriously 
their acts of saying them" (O'Neill, 2002: 225). Instead I follow Aristotle in defining 
rhetoric as "an ability, in each particular case, to see the available means of 
persuasion", or simply as speech which aims at persuasion (Aristotle, 1991: 36). As 
such, rhetoric can be contrasted with other forms of speech, including   dialectic 
(which aims at truth) and discussion (which is simply the exchange of information).          
 
2. Kantian forms of argument  
In this section I explicate two political theories which have both inherited the 
Kantian       ideal of the free public use of reason, and have exercised great influence 
on theories of deliberative democracy; namely Rawls's idea of public reason and 
Habermas's ideal of communicative action. The prescribed forms of political 
argument which appear in both Rawls's and Habermas's theories exemplify the 
suspicion of rhetoric which dominates contemporary liberal theory. And although 
Rawls's and Habermas's thought differs in significant and important ways, they both 
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display certain features which might be     described as anti-rhetorical, rationalist, or 
neo-Kantian. For Bryan Garsten, for example, Rawls and Habermas are the 
successors to an anti-rhetorical tradition of political thought which finds its early-
modern expression in Hobbes, and is transmitted into late modernity   via the social 
contract theories of Rousseau and Kant (Garsten, 2006). John O'Neill goes further in 
tracing the roots of the Kantian suspicion of rhetoric to Plato (O'Neill, 2002).    Both 
authors argue for an Aristotelian (and in Garsten's case Ciceronian) alternative to this 
anti-rhetorical tradition. While I both endorse the anti-Kantian arguments of O'Neill 
and Garsten and share their general strategy, I cleave closer to the interpretation of 
Aristotle   offered by Yack (2006), which draws parallels between Aristotle's 
political thought and contemporary realism. I will elucidate this at a later stage.   
 
2.1. Rawls's idea of public reason 
On Rawls's account, political argument proceeds by means of public reason. He 
writes, "Public reason is characteristic of a democratic people: it is the reason of its 
citizens, of those sharing the status of equal citizenship" (Rawls, 2005: 213). 
Democratic societies, thinks  Rawls, are characterised by pluralism of values, 
religions, private associations, and comprehensive worldviews about the greatest 
good for ourselves and for humanity in  general. Rawls describes these as the 
"background culture" of a democratic civil society, which includes such associations 
as churches and universities, scientific societies and professional groups (ibid: 220). 
Against this background culture stands the "public political  culture", which is the 
domain of public reason. Given this pluralism of views on the highest goods for 
society (or, as Rawls refers to them, comprehensive doctrines) the problem of 
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democratic societies is how to achieve a political society which could be described 
as legitimate and just. As members of a democratic society, citizens must exercise 
coercive power over one another in the form of legislation but not do so arbitrarily, 
as would be the case if the advocates of one comprehensive doctrine simply imposed 
it on those other members of society who did not share it. Moreover, for Rawls, 
democratic societies are   more than simply a modus vivendi, or a power-sharing 
arrangement which allows the    parties to a conflict a break from hostilities (ibid: 
218). How, then, may citizens from such diverse backgrounds wield coercive power 
over one another in ways which they could recognise as legitimate? The idea of 
public reason is Rawls's answer to this question.        
 What is the idea of public reason? Rather than simply argue with one another        
from within our comprehensive worldviews, Rawls argues that when citizens engage 
in political argument they should justify their decisions according to reasons which 
those    subject to them could reasonably accept. As he puts it, the point of the ideal 
of public    reason is that citizens "conduct their fundamental discussions within the 
framework of     what each regards as a political conception of justice based on 
values that the others can reasonably be expected to endorse and each is, in good 
faith, prepared to defend that conception so understood" (ibid: 226). In other words, 
we do not simply argue from our sectional interests or worldviews (religious or 
secular) when we could not reasonably expect our interlocutors to accept the reasons 
we present to them. For example, in debates on the  legality of controversial issues 
such as abortion or same-sex marriage, those presenting arguments to the public 
could not simply appeal to the authority of a religious text or  their own personal 
religious convictions, because these are reasons which they cannot reasonably expect 
others to accept. Rather, they must appeal to arguments located within society's 
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public political culture, such as a constitution, which citizens as equals can 
reasonably be expected to endorse. This form of argument is underscored by a "duty 
of  civility" which involves "a willingness to listen to others and a fairmindedness in 
deciding when accommodations to their views should reasonably be made" (ibid: 
217).    
 This is not to suggest, however, that comprehensive doctrines play no role in   
political argument for Rawls. It is to be expected, after all, that people's deepest 
moral convictions and worldviews will have some bearing on the arguments which 
they advance in public. To illustrate this, Rawls draws a distinction between two 
views of public reason, the "exclusive" and the "inclusive" views. On the former 
account, the reasons provided in the public forum must always be in terms of a 
political conception, and reasons derived from comprehensive doctrines must never 
intrude into political argument. The public reasons supported by these doctrines may 
be provided, but never the doctrines themselves. On the latter view, citizens may be 
allowed "in certain situations, to present what they regard as the basis of the political 
values rooted in their comprehensive doctrines", with the proviso that they justify 
their decisions in due course with sufficient public reasons (ibid: 247). Rawls 
himself admits that he inclined initially to  the "exclusive" view, but was persuaded 
of the importance of the less restrictive view given the examples of abolitionist and 
desegregationist movements whose arguments were rooted in appeals to religious 
values. Rawls thus advocates the "inclusive" view  because of its greater flexibility 
and long-term prospects for securing legitimacy.  
 According to Rawls, public reason qualifies as public in at least three ways: 
firstly, it is the reason of citizens, and therefore it is reason as a property of the 
public; second, the subject of public reason "is the good of the public and matters of 
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fundamental justice"; and third, "its nature and content is public, being given by the 
ideals and principles expressed by society's conception of political justice, and  
conducted open to view on that basis" (ibid: 213). That is, public reason is both 
located within the political domain and is therefore open to public view. Moreover, it 
is important to note here that Rawls contrasts public reason strongly with rhetoric, 
which he identifies as unreasoned. He writes, "all ways of reasoning . . . must 
acknowledge some common elements: the concept of judgement, principles of 
inference, and rules of evidence, and much else, otherwise they would not be ways 
of reasoning but perhaps rhetoric or  means of persuasion". Public reason, he asserts, 
is "concerned with reason, not simply with discourse" (ibid: 220).    
 The criterion of public reason applies to citizens engaged in political 
advocacy as  well as candidates for public office, members of political parties and 
associations (ibid:  215). It  applies also to legislators, chief executives, and 
government officials. Those to whom it applies with the greatest force, according to 
Rawls, are judges. As I have already noted, Rawls views the U.S. supreme court as 
an exemplar of public reason (ibid: 216). Indeed, he goes to great lengths to argue 
not only that the supreme court as a body is well-suited to public reason, but that  
public reason is well-suited to the supreme court. The publicly reasoned 
deliberations of the judges provide the model upon which Rawls suggests citizens 
should base their own deliberations. "To check whether we are following public 
reason" he suggests, "we might ask: how would our argument strike us presented in 
the  form of a supreme court opinion?" (ibid: 254). The significance attached by 
Rawls to this judicial    form of reasoning as a model for public argument is highly 
suggestive, and I return to it later.  
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 The influence which Rawls's idea of public reason has exercised on theories 
of deliberative democracy is enormous. Rawls himself claims the idea of public 
reason as one of "three essential elements in deliberative democracy" (ibid: 448). 
(The other two being the knowledge and desire of citizens to conduct themselves in 
accordance with the criterion of public   reason, and the presence of democratic 
institutions which specify the proper setting of deliberative legislative bodies.) In 
brief, Rawls's influence can be most clearly seen in   Joshua Cohen's formulation of 
democratic legitimacy, as well as Amy Gutmann and     Dennis Thompson's criterion 
of deliberative reciprocity.  
   
2.2. Habermas's ideal public discourse 
Jürgen Habermas stands alongside Rawls as a political philosopher who has 
exercised a profound influence on the terms of debate within deliberative democratic 
theory. Unlike Rawls, however, Habermas approaches the subject not from the 
liberal but the radical democratic tradition, finding his intellectual roots in the 
Frankfurt School of critical social theory. While Rawls provides an account of 
political deliberation which derives its legitimacy from a democratic political 
culture, Habermas bases his model of deliberative argument on the norms implicit in 
the structure of language itself. Despite these great differences in approach, however, 
Habermas arrives at a destination very similar to that of Rawls, endorsing a 
rationalist and unduly restrictive conception of deliberative argument which 
reproduces the Kantian anti-rhetorical vision of politics. Thus, he properly stands 
alongside Rawls as a contemporary opponent of rhetoric.   
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 Habermas's account of the form of political argument appropriate to 
deliberative democracy rests on his division between instrumental and strategic 
forms of rationality on  the one hand, and communicative rationality and forms of 
action on the other. The former two are 'success-orientated' forms of rationality 
which aim at successful technical interventions in the physical world and at 
influencing others for the achievement of some end, respectively.  Communicative 
speech, in contrast, aims at mutual understanding or agreement between two 
interlocutors regarding some aspect of the world. On this account, rhetoric is easily 
identified with modes of strategic rather than communicative action, as it seeks to 
move an audience rather than to arrive at mutual understanding (see Abizadeh, 
2007). Moreover, for Habermas modernity is the product of an ongoing process of 
rationalisation  and social differentiation. The modern democratic public sphere, 
which    once proliferated forms of communicative action, has been steadily 
colonised by the instrumental-strategic rationalities of the market on the one side and 
the bureaucratic apparatus of the state on the other. The challenge, for Habermas, is 
how to preserve communicative forms of discourse which can exercise some 
controlling influence over the state in modern democratic societies. Thus, rhetorical 
forms of speech, which include  appeals to extra-rational aspects of human life, such 
as desire and affection, are therefore excluded from ideal deliberative politics. 
 
3.  Problems with the Kantian approach 
Having sketched the most relevant and influential features of the Kantian forms of      
political argument, exemplified by Rawls's idea of public reason and Habermas's 
ideal communicative discourse, I now move to elucidate some criticisms of this form 
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of      political argument, which, I believe, make it unsuitable to expand the horizons 
of  deliberation in mass democratic settings. The criticisms are threefold: that 
Kantian forms     of public argument invite citizens and public officials to be 
dishonest or inauthentic in      their deliberations; that they deny the significance of 
testimony and are thus untenable in modern democratic societies; and that they 
overlook the proper role played by the     emotions in deliberation.  
 Before I turn to each of these critiques, however, I wish to be clear about one   
critique from the rhetorical perspective which I am not making and do not endorse. 
That      is, the strong rhetorical criticism which argues that all speech is necessarily 
rhetorical, including Habermas's ideal discourse and arguments from Rawls's public 
reason. One  version of this criticism is advanced by Iris Marion Young, when she 
contends that  Habermas simply favours one form of rhetorical speech over others, 
and that this form  turns out to favour the norms of speech practised by the dominant 
social group:  well-educated men used to analytical debate (Dryzek, 2000: Ch.3). As 
I have already indicated in my definition of rhetoric, I reject this strong rhetorical 
criticism. For one thing, it may be rebutted on the grounds that it demonstrates a 
performative contradiction; namely, if all speech is an  exercise in rhetorical strategy, 
then the criticism should be afforded no higher status than the norms which it 
criticises. For another, accepting that all speech is rhetorical, and by implication 
strategic, is to concede too much to the critics of rhetoric who, as we   shall see, 
argue that rhetoric is unreasoned sophistry. It is important, therefore, to    distinguish 
rhetoric from merely strategic speech.  
 Similarly, this strong rhetorical critique may provoke the suspicion that 
Rawls proposes a form of rhetoric with his idea of public reason. After all, it might 
be said that not offering others reasons which they could not accept and instead 
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presenting   them with reasons they could accept or not reasonably reject, is simply 
good rhetorical practice. If we wish to persuade others, then it is surely necessary to 
offer them reasons acceptable to them? This is, of course, perfectly correct. 
However, as we have seen, Rawls himself draws a contrast between public reason 
and rhetoric, or "means of   persuasion". In making arguments from public reason, 
we do not, according to Rawls,   merely seek to persuade others, but to offer specific 
kinds of reasons in the hope of generating persuasion. I am agnostic, therefore, as to 
whether Rawls advances public reason as a form of rhetoric (although he would 
certainly deny this position) or as non-rhetorical form of persuasion. If the former, it 
is a form of rhetoric constrained by a  quite demanding set of moral injunctions. The 
telos of public reason, moreover, is not simply persuasion, but to offer acceptable 
reasons to others and thus conform with the criterion of political legitimacy. In this 
way, arguments made from public reason are distinguished from general rhetoric.  
 Having thus considered these preliminary concerns, I now turn to the more 
substantive critiques of the Kantian form of political argument inherited by Rawls 
and Habermas.  
 
3.1. Insincerity in political argument 
 Firstly, the Kantian forms of argument, particularly the idea of public reason    
adopted by Rawls, introduce a form of dishonesty or insincerity into public political   
arguments. Put simply, they require citizens to offer reasons to one another by which         
they are not motivated and of which they are not convinced. In demanding we refrain       
from offering arguments located from within our comprehensive doctrines or 
sectional interests, and instead offer reasons which we believe others could accept, 
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public reason invites us to mask our true beliefs and convictions from others in the 
hope of persuading   them to adopt some policy, the merits of which we believe to be 
quite different from  those which we advance in public. In this way, it asks us to 
argue insincerely with our   fellow citizens. Consider, for example, the case of an 
anti-abortion activist whose comprehensive doctrine informs her view that every 
foetus has a right to life equal to  that of a fully developed human being. In adhering 
to public reason, she could not present these religious convictions to others as a form 
of political argument, but could  instead only advance arguments which others who 
did not share her convictions may accept, such as biological arguments of the 
arbitrariness in drawing any line in the development of the foetus between 
conception and birth. In this way, public reason invites her to be insincere in 
presenting her true beliefs to others (Schwartzman, 2011).   
 Now, this is not to deny that we may also have reasons for endorsing 
arguments advanced from public reason, but those reasons will spring from our own 
comprehensive doctrines. Furthermore, if we endorse the policy on publicly reasoned 
grounds, it is likely that this will be a product of our comprehensive doctrines, which  
produce bias in selection arguments. This charge applies equally to both the 
"inclusive" and "exclusive" views of public reason, as the latter holds that, while we 
may introduce non-public reasons found in our comprehensive doctrines, these must 
be supported in due course with adequate public reasons. For instance, the American 
abolitionist and desegregationist movements, which provide Rawls's favoured 
examples of "inclusive" public reason, did not appeal  to Christian reasons alone, but 
also supplied arguments which appealed to the American constitution and 
declaration of independence. Arguments, that is, which all American citizens could 
reasonably be expected to endorse.         
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 This line of criticism can take at least three forms. Firstly, by translating the 
convictions found within their comprehensive doctrines into the language of public       
reason, citizens' views are distorted and misrepresented. In other words, while the    
arguments presented in public are rooted in citizens' comprehensive doctrines, they              
fail to adequately represent either the citizen's positions or the depth of conviction 
with  which they are held. The arguments presented in public do not capture what 
she really   thinks and why (Wolgast, 1994). Secondly, when one is constructing a 
public political conception of justice which others could reasonably be expected to 
endorse, one will nevertheless structure this to reflect one's deepest commitments 
held within our comprehensive doctrines. This may be done on an unconscious level. 
However, our comprehensive  doctrines will inevitably influence and colour our 
public political   arguments, pushing us towards certain arguments rather than others 
(Schwartzman, 2011: 376). Thirdly, if we are unable to translate our comprehensive 
worldviews into any public political argument, we may simply advance arguments 
which we believe others will find acceptable even if we do not (Wolgast, 1994; 
Murphy, 1998). Thus, public reason induces us to misrepresent ourselves and to 
mislead others about our deepest commitments. In sum, then, we might say that the 
demands of public reason threaten the integrity of citizens. Far from creating a more 
open and civil atmosphere, public reason leads to insincerity and misrepresentation.  
     Advocates of public reason as a mode of political argument anticipate this 
objection, however. Typically, they attempt to bypass this difficulty by incorporating 
a    norm of sincerity into their accounts. Rawls, for instance, stipulates that citizens 
must  be willing to defend their public political arguments "in good faith" (Rawls, 
2005: 226). On the "inclusive" view of public reason, citizens are permitted to 
introduce arguments grounded from within their comprehensive doctrines if they 
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supply public reasons which they   sincerely believe. Moreover, deliberative 
democrats heavily influenced by Kantian forms of   argument, such as Joshua Cohen, 
have followed theorists of public reason in stipulating norms of sincerity within their 
theories.  
 These attempts fail, I think, on at least three counts. Firstly, they are overly 
ambiguous in their specifications. Even if citizens sincerely endorse the political      
arguments which they advance in public, the degree to which they must be 
convinced        and motivated by those arguments is not clear. It also not clear if 
public reasons they sincerely endorse are the only reasons which they are allowed to 
contribute to public argument and deliberation. If so, this limits the arguments which 
may feed into public deliberation severely. Secondly, these stipulations for sincerity 
norms stand in need of    justification. They are typically included as addenda to 
theories of public reason proper,  and therefore appear quite arbitrary. Moreover, it is 
not clear why, from the point of   view of public reason, sincerity is important. All 
that matters on the public reason   account is that citizens are supplied with adequate 
public reasons for any policy or   decision. The theory itself says nothing about why 
these reasons must be sincerely endorsed by the speaker. Thirdly, taken as a whole, 
the theory of public reason appears overly prescriptive and demanding. It is 
excessive, we may think, for citizens to take public reason's criteria into account 
before making any public political utterance. This appears to be a recipe for 
declining political engagement, rather than robust public discussion. Similarly, the 
stipulations for sincerity may themselves be too demanding on epistemic or 
psychological grounds. It is incredibly difficult, we may think, to have the certainty 
of our own beliefs in order to be truly sincere. Our beliefs may rest on partial or 
implausible premises which, on reflection, we may not be sure of (Markovits, 2006).  
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 Taken together, we can therefore say that public reason accounts of political  
argument propagated by the Kantian model threaten the integrity of citizens and the 
authenticity of public deliberation. In driving a wedge between citizen's beliefs and 
convictions, and those which can be advocated in public, public reason arguments 
thus induce dishonesty and are characterised by strategic speech. Attempts to 
mitigate this failure by introducing norms of sincerity into their accounts of political 
argument are unsatisfactory for reasons shown above.  
 
3.2. Failures of judgement 
 The second criticism which may be levelled at the Kantian form of political    
argument is that it propounds an outmoded picture of reason and epistemic authority, 
influenced by Kant's idea of enlightenment. For Kant, to be autonomous was to be        
guided by reason. "For reason has no dictatorial authority; its verdict is always 
simply the agreement of free citizens, of whom each must be permitted to express, 
without let or hindrance, his objections or even his veto." Enlightenment, according 
to Kant, is   "man's emergence from his self-incurred immaturity. Immaturity is the 
inability to use   one's own understanding without the guidance of another" (Kant, 
1991: 54-55). In other words, in order to exercise our reason, and thus our capacity 
for freedom, we should have the courage to think for ourselves and not rely upon the 
judgements of others. This does not mean,  however, that we judge matters in 
isolation. The power of judgement is not simply an application of universal maxims, 
but is necessarily social because we compare our judgements with others to secure 
conditions of objectivity and avoid bias. In fulfilling our capacities as autonomous 
agents, then, we necessarily seek independent - rather than isolated - judgement.  
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 This model of enlightenment judgement is, I think, reproduced within 
modern accounts of public political argument, and reoccurs with particular force in 
Habermas's    dictum that within an ideal discourse "no force except that of the better 
argument is exercised" (Habermas, 1975: 108). Freedom, for Habermas, is found in 
the exercise of reason unblemished by the presence of power or coercion. Similarly, 
for Rawls we must look to the public  reasons which we are offered rather than any 
other considerations, such as a speaker's character. Attacks on a speaker's character, 
according to Rawls, amount to no less than "an intellectual declaration of war" which 
undermines the certain "good faith" which we must carry with us into the political 
realm (Rawls, 1989: 233-255).  
 The problem with this picture of reasoned judgement is that it is no longer a   
plausible method (if, indeed, it ever was) of evaluating public political arguments 
and of arriving at our own considered judgements. We live in mass democratic 
societies characterised by social and economic complexity and radical divisions of 
intellectual labour. In our world, public arguments are often framed in terms of 
complex issues which citizens often lack the epistemic resources, such as advanced 
technical education and training, to apprehend and evaluate. Consider, for example, 
an outbreak of the Ebola virus in West Africa which threatens to spread to 
neighbouring countries, causing  fears of a global pandemic. Citizens may be 
worried about the possibility of the spread  of the disease to their country and their 
risk of infection, and will in all probability  receive contradictory reports and medical 
advice on what precautions, if any, they  should take. How would an advocate of the 
Kantian model of enlightenment respond to citizens worries here? The exhortation to 
have the courage to exercise one's faculty for independent judgement, to not rely on 
the testimony of experts, and to reach our own understanding, will in these 
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circumstances seem highly inadequate. The inevitable response by citizens here is: 
"This isn't a matter of intellectual courage. I lack the  technical training to use my 
own understanding in this case. It's simply outside the  scope of my knowledge and 
competence" (O'Neill, 2002: 257-260).    
 Therefore, in circumstances such as the above, pace Habermas, citizens lack 
the necessary intellectual apparatus to recognise which argument is superior, even if 
all the details are presented to them. Without extensive training, citizens are 
extremely unlikely to be able to offer credible evaluations of policy arguments, such 
as the benefits of  Greece exiting or remaining within the European Union, or the 
drawbacks of a new technology which promises to reduce the Western nations' 
consumption of global oil   reserves, to take just two prominent examples. In the 
Ebola case, concerned citizens  would lack the requisite knowledge of the disease, 
the rate of infection, population movements, and so on, to be able to assess and 
critique the advice of experts, much less make any credible judgement on their own. 
The account provided by the Kantian model of reasoned discourse as exemplified by 
the exchange of arguments offers an excessively intellectualised and incomplete 
picture of deliberation. Rather than simply listening to more arguments, citizens will 
be better placed to ask whether they can trust    those who offer them. I return to this 
point in the following sections.  
 
3.3. Reason v. the emotions  
 The final criticism of the Kantian form of argument which I will elucidate 
here concerns the reproduction of the dichotomy between reason and the emotions. 
On the  Kantian account, recall, autonomy is ensured when we are guided by reason 
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and only   reason. Appeals to the emotions are concerned with pleasure and pain, and 
lack any  cognitive dimension. Therefore, when we are motivated by the emotions, 
rather than    reason, we surrender our autonomy. Rhetoric has been traditionally 
associated with manipulation of the emotions, and thus as opposed to reason and 
freedom. In the         Western philosophical tradition which flows through Kant to 
contemporary theorists of deliberative democracy, then, rhetoric and the emotions 
have long been associated with coercion and unreason. For instance, recall Rawls's 
drawing of the  distinction between reason on the one hand and rhetoric or 
unreasoned discourse on the other. This dichotomy is also articulated with clarity in 
Habermas's account of the ideal speech   situation, where the only force which 
moves us is the better argument. Habermas reworks the traditional dichotomy 
between reason and emotion in the forms of communicative and strategic or 
instrumental action (Abizadeh, 2007; Krause, 2008).  
 Moreover, even theorists of deliberative democracy interested in expanding 
their  accounts of deliberation democratic to incorporate rhetoric similarly reproduce 
this familiar dichotomy. For example, Gutmann and Thompson appreciated the role 
of Senator Carol Moseley Braun's dramatic rhetoric on the floor of the Senate in 
1993, as this served to draw attention towards an amendment which would renew the 
patent on the insignia of the Confederate flag (Gutmann and Thompson, 1996: 135-
137). They  describe this as a "non-deliberative" means to a deliberative end, rhetoric 
acceptable for its instrumental role in  provoking politicians who would otherwise 
have paid no attention to the issue. While  Braun's rhetoric acted to facilitate 
deliberation, it was not a part of the deliberation itself. Similarly, in his account of 
the role of rhetoric within a deliberative system, John Dryzek remarks that "there 
may be occasions when categorically ugly rhetoric produces good systemic results" 
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(Dryzek, 2010: 333). Dryzek cites the example of the populist Australian politician 
Pauline Hanson, who appealed to working-class Australians resentful of free trade 
and immigration policies in the 1990s. Hanson's rhetoric was crude and, Dryzek 
suggests, "not averse to racial stereotyping" (ibid: 334). The result of her rhetoric, 
however, was the inclusion of previously marginalised discourses of working-class 
alienation and the mobilisation of counter-discourses. Overall, the deliberative effect 
of Hanson's rhetoric was positive,  but its benefit was purely instrumental. Like 
Braun's rhetoric, it was not a part of deliberation itself.                
 This tendency on the part of deliberative theorists to offer rhetoric only an 
instrumental role in facilitating deliberation, and so reproducing the Kantian 
dichotomy between reason and the emotions, is troubling on two counts. Firstly, the 
instrumental or supplemental role accorded to rhetoric precludes any meaningful 
evaluation of rhetoric    itself beyond its outcomes, which may be simply arbitrary 
and not what the speaker  intended. As Dryzek admits, we cannot, on his account, 
"read off the systemic effects of rhetoric from the intentions of the speaker". This is 
inadequate inasmuch as it neither  offers guidance to political actors on which 
utterances contribute to deliberation nor to citizens on how best to evaluate the 
deliberative value of rhetoric, which may be  uncertain despite the character of both 
the content of the political argument and the motivations of the speaker. Secondly, in 
reproducing the dichotomy between reason and emotion, theorists overlook the role 
of emotion within deliberation and exclude rhetoric   as a form of reasoning. It is to 
this possibility which I now turn.   
 
4. The rhetorical alternative 
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In the above analysis I ascribed the suspicion of rhetoric which underscores much 
contemporary political philosophy to the great influence of Immanuel Kant's critical 
philosophy and model of enlightenment. It is through Kant, I claim, that both Rawls 
and Habermas inherit their hostility to rhetoric as a form of political argument, 
seeing it as unreasoned and manipulative discourse. While this is certainly true, the 
suspicions of  rhetoric by philosophers did not begin with Kant. Indeed, rhetoric has 
long occupied a suspect position within many of the canonical texts of the history of 
Western political  thought preceding Kant. This anti-rhetorical attitude can, I think, 
ultimately be traced       back to Plato's political philosophy. Plato provided a critique 
of the rhetoricians of his own   time in the Gorgias, famously comparing rhetoric to 
cookery, as while both practices    appear to involve an amount of technical 
knowledge, this an illusion. In reality, claims    Plato, skill in both rhetoric and 
cookery may be acquired by an unreflective process of habituation. All one needs to 
become an excellent rhetorician, according to Plato, is "a    mind which is good at 
guessing, some courage, and a natural talent for interacting with people" (Plato, 
1997: 798). Rhetoric is therefore "the kind of persuasion which is designed to 
produce conviction, but not to educate people" (ibid).  It is also worth noting that the 
hostility towards rhetoric was of a piece with Plato's general critique of democratic 
politics; as the rule of     the many, democracy relies upon public speeches designed 
to persuade the many. The contemporary suspicion of rhetoric thus finds a direct 
ancestor in Plato's arguments      against democracy in general.   
 Plato's anti-democratic objections to rhetoric appear just as applicable to our 
own  time as to ancient Athens. The modern democratic public sphere is, after all, 
characterised by unreasoned discourse, facilitated by modern innovations such as 
twenty-four hour television news broadcasting and the omnipresence of social 
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media. The rhetorical discourse within contemporary democracies appears just as 
empty and manipulative as Plato suspected. Moreover, alternative modes of public 
political argument, such as those advanced by Kantians such as Rawls and 
Habermas, appear to suffer from their own shortcomings     whilst also seeming 
deeply unsuited to modern democratic settings, characterised by  complex divisions 
of intellectual labour and arguments which increasingly call upon technical expertise 
for credible evaluation. In the following section, I demonstrate that    those wishing 
to promote a more deliberative form of politics would do well to adopt something 
like Aristotle's defence of rhetoric.  
 
4.1. Aristotle's account of rhetoric 
 It is here that I turn to Plato's contemporary and a critical ally of democratic     
politics, Aristotle. In contrast to Plato, Aristotle elaborated a philosophical defence 
of rhetoric. In doing so, however, he neither simply endorsed nor sought to 
rehabilitate the   form of rhetoric against which Plato argued. The sophists whom 
Plato critiqued were, claimed Aristotle, indeed guilty of practising a form of 
unreasoned rhetoric which was corrosive to the health of the democratic polity. But it 
was a mistake, he maintained, to abandon rhetoric in its entirety for this reason. 
Rhetoric, thought Aristotle, was not antithetical to reason in the way in which Plato 
believed. On the contrary, rhetoric compromised several forms of reasoning which 
were commonly employed in different settings within democratic societies. In this 
section I explore the general contours of Aristotle's account of rhetoric, before 
moving, in the following section, to elaborate his account of deliberative rhetoric in 
particular.  
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 I have already suggested that Aristotle is a political realist, and this is neither 
an  otiose nor an anachronistic claim. Although he is commonly excluded from 
registers of canonical realist thinkers, Aristotle was, in many ways, the first realist 
political thinker. As Bernard Yack puts it, Aristotle "is a political realist, at least in 
the sense that the late Bernard Williams gives to that term: someone for whom 
political morality is grounded in the basic social relationships and expectations that 
structure political like" (Yack, 2006: 419). Indeed, Aristotle's negative reaction to 
what he saw as the excessive abstraction and moralism of Plato's philosophy mirrors 
the contemporary realist critique of liberal political theory. The       neglect which 
Aristotle has received from political realists is, I suspect, due to the     emphasis he 
places of the life of virtue and the human good as the end of politics. Thus,       he is 
often confused with proponents of what Bernard Williams described as political 
moralists: those who seek to apply externally formulated moral principles to politics 
(Williams, 2005: 1-3). However, this impression is mistaken. Aristotle famously 
begins by "setting down the appearances" and "working through the puzzles" which 
they present. Aristotle thus presents political realists with an intellectual achievement 
of enduring importance. He also advocated a form of political deliberation which 
centred upon the practice of rhetoric. In these ways, his theory of politics is a 
significant resource for contemporary realists. (I am not, of course, suggesting that 
such an interpretation of Aristotle's political thought is uncontroversial. See Larmore 
(2013) for an opposing view.)   
  For Aristotle, rhetoric is "an ability, in each particular case, to see the 
available means of persuasion" (Aristotle, 1991: 36); a definition which I have 
already endorsed. Where Plato criticised rhetoric by claiming it as the counterpart of 
cookery, learned by unreasoned habituation, Aristotle claimed rhetoric is actually the 
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counterpart of dialectic,  "for both are concerned with such things as are, to a certain 
extent, within the knowledge of all people and belong to no separately defined 
sciences" (ibid: 28-29). Where Plato claimed rhetoric involves no technical 
knowledge because it lacks any definite subject matter (such as, for example, the art 
of medicine and the subject of health), Aristotle thus observed that neither had 
dialectic any particular subject matter, and could claim no monopoly on   reasoned 
argument. Rhetoric is therefore a second-order discipline similar to dialectic.   Where 
dialectic proceeds through dialogical exchange and is concerned with establishing   
the validity of arguments, rhetoric is a monological form of speech practiced in 
public assemblies and concerned with the persuasive force of arguments. Rhetoric is 
thus not inimical to reason.  
 Furthermore, Aristotle identified three distinctive types of rhetoric,  "for such 
is the number of classes to which hearers of speeches belong" (ibid: 47). These are 
forensic, epideictic, and deliberative rhetoric. When we are concerned with legal 
judgements, we turn to forensic rhetoric. In this case the audiences acts as the judge 
of some past action, and speakers aim to persuade them, for example, of a person's 
guilt or innocence, or of the   justice and injustice of past actions. When concerned 
with matters of praise and shame, or reward and censure, we turn to epideictic 
rhetoric. In this case the audience does not  make a judgement about some past or 
future action, instead acts as a spectator. Examples of this  form of rhetoric may 
include Pericles's funeral oration for the casualties of the  Peloponnesian War. 
Finally, when concerned with matters of public policy, we turn to deliberative 
rhetoric, which aims to persuade us that one course or another will better promote 
the common good. In this case, the audience acts as the judge of a proposed future 
action.     
96 
 
 Moreover, Aristotle suggests that rhetoric has three types of proof - that is,       
grounds for persuasion - available to it. These are: the character (ethos) of the 
speaker, winning the trust of an audience; being moved by appeals to the emotions 
(pathos); and by the coherence of the argument (logos) itself (ibid: 37). This  
contrasts with Plato's account   of rhetoric as devoid of reason. For Aristotle, on the 
contrary, rhetoric may contain rational arguments. Unlike dialectic, however, it does 
not solely rely on logic, appealing to non-rational factors like the emotions and 
character. This is because the telos of rhetoric is persuasion, rather than truth. The 
rhetorical arts seek to employ all available means of persuasion, including reason. 
Furthermore, although each of the three proofs can be   deployed independently, they 
are not mutually exclusive and are often combined. A      person on trial, for 
example, will be concerned not only to establish her innocence but       also her good 
character. 
 It is the forensic form of rhetoric which Aristotle associates most closely to 
the sophistry identified by Plato. The democratic reforms of ancient Athens produced 
a culture of litigiousness, and this provided fertile ground for manipulative forms of 
rhetoric and legal chicanery (Christ, 1998). The Athenian courts thus tended to 
produce demagogues who focused on promoting their own private advantage, often 
seeking to manipulate the laws and legal processes, as they constantly brought cases 
against one another and defended themselves in court. It is little surprise, then, that 
Aristotle contends that "although the method of deliberative and judicial speaking is 
the same . . . deliberative subjects are finer and more important to the state than 
private transactions" (Aristotle, 1991: 32). For   Aristotle, therefore, rhetoric which 
concerns itself with the advancement of private interests  is subordinate to that which 
concerns itself with advancing  the common good and public advantage.  
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 In endorsing Aristotle's position that rhetoric might employ rational 
argument, I  am not denying that there are, of course, better and worse rhetoric. 
Indeed, Aristotle himself does not deny this. As I indicated, Plato's view of rhetoric 
as a pathology of  democratic regimes remains apposite for our contemporary 
politics. However, for Plato, rhetoric was uniform in its unreasoned character. 
Rhetoric, I contend, can take a myriad of forms, some more reasoned than others. 
We are more than familiar in our political    discourse with politicians employing 
rhetorical strategies to portray their opponents as untrustworthy by comparing them 
spuriously with dictators, or by inducing unwarranted anger amongst citizens at a 
suspect but guiltless minority. Such rhetoric, I maintain, does   not exhaust the 
prospects for appeals to emotion and character in political argument. Rather than 
being undesirable distractions from public reasoning, they are often necessary        
guides to decide upon future actions. (This is especially true in situations where time 
and knowledge are limited.) Instead of seeking to banish rhetoric, advocates of 
greater deliberation in democratic politics ought to provide accounts of institutions 
and practices which encourage higher forms of rhetoric. In seeking to promote 
deliberation,  we cannot afford to ignore rhetoric. For Aristotle, the method by which 
citizens  communicate our reasoning over the common good to one another is 
deliberative rhetoric, and it is to this which I now turn.  
 
4.2. Aristotle's deliberative rhetoric  
For Aristotle, deliberative rhetoric is the means by which citizens provide one 
another      with reasons about matters of common concern. It is, in other words, the 
way in which      they reason together and conduct their collective deliberation. As 
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such, it occupies a     central place in his theory of politics. I propose it here as an 
attractive alternative to contemporary accounts of deliberation which inherit much of 
the Kantian mode of      political argument. Where these accounts fall short, as I 
examined above, Aristotle's    account of deliberative rhetoric provides us with an 
alternative mode of public political argument, one which is closer to our current 
democratic practice and offers greater          scope  for expanding deliberation within 
democratic politics. On the Aristotelian view, rhetoric encompasses appeals to 
reasoned argument, the emotions, and the character of       the speaker. I discuss each 
of these in turn.  
 In contrast to public reason accounts of political argument, the account of  
deliberative rhetoric proposed here may appear quite minimalist. Indeed, there are           
fewer provisos and criteria for acceptable public speech set out in advance. This is,   
however, a part of Aristotle's political realism: the parameters for and structure of 
deliberative rhetoric are specified by the structural relationships within which 
speaker        and audience find themselves. For Aristotle, it is the setting in which 
rhetoric occurs which   provides the limits on which policies may be enacted and 
precludes certain forms of argument (Yack, 2006: 422). The aim of deliberative 
rhetoric, recall, is to persuade others regarding which policies and laws will serve the 
common good or public advantage. This structures deliberative rhetoric by 
precluding explicitly self-interested arguments. If we wish to persuade others of our 
proposals, then we must frame them in terms of the common         good rather than 
our own interests if they are ever to be accepted (Elster, 1997). Here, deliberative 
rhetoric occupies a space similar to that of Rawlsian public reason. Unlike Aristotle's 
account of deliberative rhetoric, however, as we have seen, theories of public reason 
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make heavy weather of this position by specifying a raft of conditions, such as 
sincerity  and reasonableness, in advance.  
 Moreover, the mass democratic setting for deliberative rhetoric (something 
which Aristotle did not have to contend with) constrains the ambitions of what sorts 
of proposals can gain traction within the public sphere. For example, policies which 
entail considerable sacrifice for noble ends on the part of the democratic public will 
be unlikely to meet with approval. Unless one lives within a community of 
likeminded moralists who share religious convictions regarding the good to be 
achieved, then policies such as this will likely be unpopular. To invoke the general 
aphorism, a constitution is not, after all, a suicide pact. Furthermore, the democratic 
context of deliberative rhetoric precludes the speaker from taking an impartial 
perspective (at least when dealing with matters concerning her state and others) and 
disinterest in the outcome. In conflicts between rival nations or parties, or simply in 
competitions for advantage, citizens desire that (quite reasonably) their leaders attach 
greater weight and significance to their own side to a  dispute. Any leader who 
claimed to be impartial in a dispute between her own country  and another would not 
be a leader but an arbiter, and thus lack any resources for persuasion. Deliberative 
rhetorical arguments therefore must be couched in terms of the public good, as it is 
unreasonable to expect  citizens to act against their own interests or for democratic 
leaders be impartial between   their own people and the rest of humanity.      
  It is worth reappraising the model of public deliberation proposed by Rawls 
in     light of Aristotle's account of forensic rhetoric. For Rawls, recall, the U.S. 
supreme court provides the exemplar of his ideal of public reason, and when 
deliberating he exhorts   citizens to imagine themselves as producing opinions held 
up to judicial scrutiny. It is, therefore, plausible to claim that Rawls endorses a form 
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of deliberation modelled upon judicial reasoning. However, we can see now why this 
might be a poor model for deliberation. Firstly, while we seek impartiality and 
disinterestedness in judges to a case,    we do not see these qualities as desirable in 
political actors. Indeed, we expect our   politicians and fellow citizens to have an 
interest in the outcome of any deliberation concerning the common good. Denials of 
partiality and interest will therefore come across as evasive and insincere. Secondly, 
and most fundamentally, legal reasoning is concerned with actions which have 
already been performed. It is not a prospective,  future-orientated form of reasoning 
concerned with establishing which laws and policies   best serve the common good. 
Thirdly, legal reasoning is concerned with the application   of existing rules to cases. 
This is not adequate for prospective deliberation, concerned  with formulating and 
adapting laws and policies to changing circumstances. In sum, therefore, legal 
reasoning offers an inadequate model for deliberation.  
 Turning now to role of character and testimony, recall that for Kant epistemic        
self-sufficiency was a condition of autonomy. We exercise our autonomy through 
our capacity for independent reason, and when we rely on the judgements or 
testimony of   others, according to Kant, we forfeit our autonomy and return to a 
condition of       intellectual immaturity. This model of judgement, I suggested, was 
deeply implausible, despite its influence over contemporary deliberative democrats. 
We live in socially differentiated polities characterised by technical complexity and 
divisions of intellectual labour, and are more dependent upon our fellow citizens' 
judgements and technical  knowhow now than ever before. Rather than be urged to 
use our own (inevitably   inadequate) understanding to arrive at judgements over 
matters of common concern, we ought instead, I claimed, to look for reasons to trust 
those who make the arguments.  
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 Ironically, perhaps, Aristotle's account of deliberative rhetoric is more suited 
to       the evaluation of technical arguments in modern societies than many of the 
accounts of political argument offered by contemporary theorists (see O'Neill, 2002). 
In allowing appeals to character as one of the available means of persuasion, 
Aristotle provides an important resource for modern theories of public political 
argument. In doing so, Aristotle opens the door to discussions of the grounds on 
which we might trust various speakers and institutions. Let  me elucidate a case in 
which one's perspective of the credibility or trustworthiness of the speaker changers 
one's view of  the argument which they advance. Consider a scenario in which a 
politician provides persuasive arguments against the regulation of a particular 
industry, and, other things being equal, we are inclined to agree with his arguments. 
However, it soon emerges that politician has close ties to the industry, and has 
accepted significant donations and  personal favours from its members. How do we 
proceed in this case? What has changed  is not the reasons which the speaker has 
presented to the public, but our assessment of  his trustworthiness. If we are no 
longer inclined to accept his proposals favouring deregulation, it is because we view 
his interests out of alignment with our own, and his integrity as compromised. The 
arguments which he presents may still be framed in terms of the public good, but this 
is no longer a sufficient condition for our accepting his proposals.    
 Consider now the role of the emotions within deliberative rhetoric. I argued 
that contemporary theories of deliberation reproduce the implausible dichotomy 
between reason on the one hand and the emotions on the other. In opening the door 
to rhetoric, deliberative theorists see it as discharging a primarily instrumental role, 
whether in drawing attention to arguments or in motivating participation within 
public deliberation. While I do not deny the importance of either of these functions, 
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they do not offer an  adequate account of the proper role of the emotions within, 
rather than supplemental to, public deliberation. In doing so, they offer an 
impoverished account of the nature of deliberation itself. Moreover, by tacitly 
reproducing the dichotomy between reason (deliberation) and emotion (rhetoric) 
they suffer from a motivational deficit. How does Aristotle's account of deliberative 
rhetoric improve upon this picture?  
 Let us begin by examining the motivational function of deliberative rhetoric. 
In democratic polities we often have need of political leaders who can inspire us to 
action through their use of rhetoric.  For example, consider the speeches of Winston 
Churchill to the British public during the Second World War, or the words of Martin 
Luther King, Jr. to the assembled American public on the Mall in Washington D.C. 
during the struggle for civil rights. By appealing to our emotions, leaders who 
employ rhetoric can provide a valuable means of motivating democratic participation 
in mass democratic settings, which easily  promote apathy and political 
disengagement. This motivational defence of rhetoric has appeared to some (Garsten, 
2006: 174) to preserve the boundary between reasoned speech and appeals to 
emotion, offering a limited defence of rhetoric. This need not be the case, however. 
Motivational speech can also contain a reasoned component which interweaves with 
its emotional components, guiding and being guided in turn. A speech urging 
citizens to continue to engage in a peaceful struggle against injustice, for example, is 
likely to make appeal to those citizens' political identity, their affective attachments 
(such as friends, family, fellow activists), the character of their nation's laws, anger 
at ongoing injustice, and to draw attention to commonalities between those suffering 
and their fellow citizens. It is the integration of reason and emotion which makes the 
speech deliberative.  
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 Moreover, motivational rhetoric need not always aim at moving citizens 
towards action by eliciting strong emotions; it can also serve to calm citizens already 
motivated to  act, directing them away from certain courses of action and towards 
others. Take, for example, Robert Kennedy's speech in 1968 on the assassination of 
Martin Luther King Jr. in the city of Indianapolis. Kennedy informed his audience 
that he had just learnt of King's death, and used his speech to call for an end to 
further interracial violence, reminding his predominantly African-American audience 
that his brother had also been murdered by a white man. Kennedy thus affirmed 
personal and political commonalities with his audience, spoke of King's love of 
peace, appealed to their sense of justice, and indicated the negative consequences of 
violent reprisals and racial polarisation. While the speech acted as an effective 
eulogy for King, it also served a deliberative purpose in offering arguments 
grounded in both reason and the emotions against further violence, thus moving the   
audience  in one direction rather than another.
17
     
 Furthermore, rather than viewed in a strictly non-cognitive light, as the 
Kantian is inclined to do, an Aristotelian account of rhetoric which incorporates 
appeals to emotion allow us to see the ways the emotions are underpinned by beliefs 
about factual states of affairs and therefore guided by reason. For example, we feel 
anger if we believe that we   have been wronged, and regret if we believe that we 
have failed in some way. As such, the emotions are amenable to rational persuasion 
and criticism, because new information may come to light which dissolves or 
transforms these emotional states. If I learn that no malice was intended in someone's 
harmful actions, then my feelings of anger may subside; if I become convinced that 
no  action on my part could have altered a tragic outcome, then my regret lessens. 
                                                          
17
 The full speech is available to view online at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j6mxL2cqxrA 
[last accessed 7th September 2015]. 
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Our beliefs can correspond to reasoned states, being appropriate or inappropriate, 
excessive or deficient, felt at the right time or the wrong time, and so on.   Thus, in 
the case of what Bernard Williams called "thick ethical concepts" the dichotomy  
between reason and emotion is undermined (Williams, 2006).  
 The emotions can also act as signposts for establishing priorities within 
deliberation. For example, a general feeling of injustice might lead the youth of a 
country to support a   war against a foreign power, over other considerations such as 
the financial and human   costs. Similarly, a parent's concern for her children serving 
in the military may highlight reasons against taking military action. These emotional 
signposts do not reflect unconscious biases in a similar way to the effects of 
comprehensive doctrines on public reasons, because they are acknowledged openly 
and  serve to prioritise certain ends. Similarly, as Sharon Krause has argued, when 
attending to moral sentiments we can fulfil the deliberative   practice of reciprocity 
as perspective-taking (Krause, 2008: 165). That is, by cultivating     our emotional 
capacities for sympathy and empathy we can enter into others' points of    views and 
take their experiences into account. Once again, Martin Luther King's rhetoric proves 
instructive here. King's political speeches connected the feelings of African-
Americans living under segregation to concerns shared by the majority white 
population, such as basic security and freedom, as well as the common values of 
liberty and equality embedded in the American constitution (ibid: 164). By doing so, 
King expanded the majority's circles of sympathy to include a previously 
marginalised group. 
 In sum, an Aristotelian account of rhetoric which is deliberative in nature, as 
it   incorporates logical reasoning which works in tandem with appeals to the 
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emotions of an audience and the moral character of the speaker, overcomes the 
difficulties associated with other, more rationalist, forms of political argument.  
 
5. Conclusion  
In this chapter, I have attempted to point towards an alternative account of political 
deliberation to those offered by mainstream liberal political philosophy. My purpose 
in   doing so has been to reconcile deliberation with a realist account of democratic 
politics, which directs us towards the reality that much political argument is 
conducted through rhetoric. As we have seen, theorists of deliberative democracy 
typically exclude rhetoric  from the proper bounds of deliberation, adopting 
implicitly the anti-rhetorical visions of politics offered by Plato and Kant. Rhetoric is 
assumed to be non-cognitive in character, associated with manipulation and a lack of 
freedom. At best, it plays a supportive or instrumental role in accounts of democratic 
deliberation, but cannot itself be deliberative.  The challenge, therefore, has been to 
preserve the role of democratic deliberation whilst avoiding the anti-rhetorical 
accounts of democratic politics.  
 I began by illuminating the dominant philosophical approaches to 
deliberation in democratic politics. These were John Rawls's idea of public reason 
and Jürgen Habermas's ideal speech situation, both of which are heavily influenced 
by the anti-rhetorical Kantian vision of politics. These approaches suffer from 
manifold failings, I argued, including: providing inducements to insincerity in 
political argument; providing inadequate resources for citizens to judge the 
arguments presented to them by technical experts and political  actors; and excluding 
appeals to the emotions, which produced motivational deficits and incomplete 
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understandings of the process of deliberation itself. Then, drawing upon Aristotle's 
account of deliberative rhetoric, I proposed an alternative to this traditional  Kantian 
picture of political deliberation which avoided these substantial pitfalls by   
accepting appeals to character and the emotions as well as rational argumentation. 
This alternative account is better suited to the realities of democratic politics in both 
Aristotle's time and our own, as befitting the realist character of his political thought.  
 By offering this rhetorical account of deliberation, however, I am not 
suggesting    that rhetoric is entirely harmless or without danger. Aristotle himself 
concedes that deviant forms of rhetoric often abound in democracies, and Plato's 
diagnosis of deviant forms of rhetoric holds just as true for our time as for ancient 
Athens. This problem will not be   solved, however, by shunning rhetoric altogether 
or relegating it to a second-best, as deliberative theorists have done all too often. If 
we wish to increase the chances of real deliberation in democracies, we must 
recognise that the practice of persuasion lies at the   core of democratic politics 
which takes place in circumstances of disagreement. The challenge for deliberative 
theorists is to avoid a politics dominated by unreasoned forms of persuasion. That 
cannot be achieved if we blind ourselves to the reasons which move democratic 
citizens in the real world.     
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Chapter 3 
Deliberative Leadership 
 
1. Introduction 
In this chapter I explore the idea of political leadership and its relation to democratic 
deliberation. My focus on political realism directs us towards political leadership, 
and political agency more broadly, as both contemporary realists and their historical    
antecedents have reflected in sustained and innovative ways upon the purposes and   
character of political leadership (see Williams, 1978; Philp, 2007). For instance,   
Machiavelli, is principally famous for his meditations on the role of leadership and     
political morality in sixteenth century Italy. Similarly, Max Weber's description of 
the vocation of politics provides a wellspring to which contemporary realists have 
often  returned, as we shall see later in this chapter. Perhaps less obviously, David 
Hume's writings on political history have also been mined for their insights by 
realists interested in the   subject of leadership (Sabl, 2009; 2012). It is a 
longstanding feature of political realism, therefore, that it seeks to place leadership at 
the centre of the theoretical agenda.   
 Why should this be so? Why has political leadership proven such an 
attractive  and significant theme for advocates of realist political thought? It would 
be churlish  indeed to deny the importance of leadership within politics. The history 
of the twentieth century provides ample evidence of the influence leaders can exert, 
for good or ill, over political circumstances. It is not an overstatement to observe, 
with John Kane and Haig Patapan, that "there is hardly a problem or conflict 
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anywhere in the world whose cause  is not attributed, at least in part, to poor 
leadership" (Kane and Patapan, 2012: 13). While political leaders are frequently (and 
often deservedly) derided and met with cynicism, if not outright contempt, from  
citizens, this does not alter the enduring and often pivotal importance of leadership. 
Indeed, one might claim that the perennial disappointment felt by citizens towards 
political leaders simply reflects the value which many implicitly attach to leadership, 
the standards which it is hoped leaders will live up to, and the goals which many 
hope that leaders will achieve. Citizens of democratic regimes are not above calling 
for strong leaders in times of crisis, whilst simultaneously diagnosing the crisis itself 
as a  product of weak or unimaginative leadership. Political leadership, it seems, is 
both the problem and the solution to much of the world's ills.  
 Moreover, the outcomes of political processes and the character of political 
societies depend to a great extent on the quality of leadership available. For example, 
it does not require much historical imagination to accept that without the leadership 
of Abraham Lincoln, the American civil war would have reached a very different 
conclusion. Similarly, without the leadership of Nelson Mandela and F.W. de Klerk, 
it is not    implausible to claim that the dismantling of the South African apartheid 
regime would  either have not occurred as peacefully or perhaps not occurred at all. 
We begin to see,  then, why political  leadership is of such importance for realists.  
    What is leadership? The definition provided by Mark Philp is difficult to 
improve upon. A leader, he writes, is someone "who sets the pattern of action for 
others" (Philp,  2007: 77). Similarly, a political leader is someone who does so "by 
claiming a right to rule or by acting in ways that contest that right, its extent, limits, 
or exercise; or by seeking to influence the authoritative allocation of values 
conducted within a state". This expansive definition allows for the fact that political 
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leaders may set patterns of action for others by many means, including charisma, 
persuasion, incentives, and coercion, as well appeals to expertise, tradition, or 
divinely mandated forms of authority. The great benefit of Philp's definition is that is 
purely descriptive. This is to be contrasted with much of the existing literature in 
leadership studies, which offers overly moralised definitions of leadership, to the 
extent that 'bad leadership' often appears as oxymoronic (see Helms,  2014: 51-52). 
For example, the political scientist James M. Burns denies Adolf Hitler the status of 
leader, characterising him instead as "an absolute wielder of brutal power" (Burns, 
1978: 19, 27). This ethically loaded conception of leadership denies that political 
leaders, properly understood, may exercise their power to accomplish morally 
abhorrent goals. Leaders, in this conception, are inherently virtuous and seek only 
good for their subjects. However, there seems to be no special reason to grant 
leadership such privileged status.   After all, even morally vicious leaders like Hitler 
rarely exercise brute coercion alone,    either to gain and maintain their power or to 
accomplish their goals. Instead, they rely  upon a mixture of persuasion, incentives, 
and coercion. To deny the persuasive power exercised by many morally abhorrent 
leaders would be to inadequately understand the characters of both bad (in the form, 
say, of demagogic populism) and good political leadership.      
 In offering a definition which allows for the possibility of both good and bad   
political leadership, this raises the question of how we are to differentiate between 
good     and bad leaders. Put another way, on what grounds are we to evaluate 
political leadership? One approach, perhaps favoured by practitioners of non-ideal 
theory, may be to simply to ask how well political leaders have brought about certain 
antecedently specified moral   objectives (such as moving a society closer to an ideal 
of justice) within a similarly   specified set of normative constraints (such as 
110 
 
respecting individual rights, democratic procedures, and so on). This approach is 
inadequate because it fails to appreciate that leadership is heavily dependent upon 
context. The actions of political leaders only have  meaning within their contingent 
historical circumstances, where the content of their  decisions will depend on those 
circumstances. Leaders also have to attract and motivate followers. They must 
persuade others to act in the pursuit of goals which are only  meaningful within 
certain cultural context. The pursuit of a philosophical ideal of justice which lacks 
any referent within a society is thus an unhelpful approach to evaluating the conduct 
of political leaders.  
 Similarly, an overly instrumental view of leadership neglects that certain 
political leaders may be talented or competent leaders who nevertheless failed to 
realise their    ultimate goals. This may be due to a multitude of factors, ranging from 
inherited political circumstances (such as costly foreign wars and a poor economy) to 
other factors beyond  their control, such as the judgements of future generations. 
Good leaders may simply be afflicted by bad luck, and conversely, bad leaders may 
benefit from good luck. The achievement of any set of goals, therefore, should not 
provide the grounds on which we evaluate political leadership. A  degree of success 
is necessary for good leadership, of  course, but it is not pivotal in distinguishing 
between better or worse leaders. Rather, the appropriate standards for evaluating 
political leaders are those of character, virtues, and judgement, as well as the 
consequences of their actions; standards which we might characterise as both 
internal and external to the practice of leadership. Moreover, these standards will 
vary depending upon the contexts in which  leaders operate. Democratic regimes, for 
example, require political leaders to deploy persuasion more often than  coercion. 
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They also require leaders to foster and develop capacities for democratic 
deliberation, and is upon these requirements which I will presently focus.  
 This chapter has the following structure. Firstly, I begin by elucidating a 
potential problem for the possibility of deliberative democratic leadership. This is the 
apparent tension between, on the one hand, democracy and deliberation, which 
require norms of equality,    and, on the other, political leadership, which appears to 
assume a fundamental inequality between leaders and followers. I attempt to dissolve 
this tension before proceeding to the following section, where I discuss possible 
distinctions between good and bad political leadership, in particular, the qualities to 
be possessed by a deliberative democratic leader. Aside from the mere consideration 
of leadership, realism also directs us towards    considering the negative side of 
politics - that is, when political practices are corrupted      and have negative 
consequences. In the second part of this chapter, therefore, I discuss   forms of poor 
and deviant democratic leadership, before elucidating the more positive dispositions 
specific to deliberative democratic leadership. Finally, I move to discuss the sources 
of deliberative democratic leadership. This is an iteration of Bonnie Honig's paradox 
of politics: if deliberative participants are required for the formation of deliberative 
institutions and culture, then  equally those institutions and culture are required to 
mould citizens into deliberative participants (Honig, 2009: 13-16). Political 
leadership, I believe,  can help to establish the conditions necessary for deliberation, 
and thus temper the   circularity of the paradox. However, deliberative leaders must 
come from somewhere. Following Keohane (2014) I argue that the civil bodies of 
the democratic public sphere, including mass democratic parties, can play a 
significant role in inculcating the specific dispositions for deliberative leadership.  
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2. The problem of (deliberative) democratic leadership         
In their path-breaking book, The Democratic Leader, John Kane and Haig Patapan 
begin their account of leadership with puzzlement as to its absence from the agenda 
of contemporary democratic theory. This is, the authors suggest, due to an 
underlying       tension between two strains within modern liberal democracy: the 
practice of leadership    and popular sovereignty. Democrats, the authors contend, are 
naturally suspicious of  political leadership as harbouring elitist, anti-democratic 
tendencies. There is a mutual antipathy between leadership and democracy: the more 
strongly leaders lead, the less democratic they appear; the more they act like good 
democrats, the less they appear as political  leaders (Haig and Patapan, 2012: 15). 
The authors go on to argue that theorists on both sides of this divide - of  
participatory democrats on the one hand, and elite theorists on the other - have each 
attempted to  resolve this tension in favour of their own side. This, the authors 
believe, is mistaken; there is no getting around the tension between leadership and 
democracy. However, this tension can be made productive, as by occupying this 
precarious position between elitism and populism, leaders will be motivated to 
regularly renew their democratic legitimacy. In this section, I rearticulate this tension 
with reference to deliberative democracy. I attempt to show that, contrary to Haig 
and Patapan's thesis, there is no necessary incompatibility between leadership and 
(deliberative) democracy at the   conceptual level. At the level of practice, however, 
deliberative democrats have good    reasons to be wary of certain sorts of leadership, 
as I discuss in the next section. 
  To reiterate, Kane and Patapan argue that there is a fundamental tension in 
democratic societies between the felt need for political leadership and the principle 
of  popular sovereignty. Rather, than attempting to resolve this tension in favour of 
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either leadership or democracy, as elite theorists and participatory democrats have 
both   attempted respectively, they argue that the tension should be navigated in a 
manner   which is productive for democratic leadership. They write, "democrats who 
feel the  need for a leader must reconcile this with the belief that none among equals 
has any innate or inherent right to rule over others" (ibid: 15). The unspoken 
structure of their argument, therefore, relies on the following syllogism (see Galston, 
2014: 15-31), adjusted for a deliberative conception of democracy: 
 
 Premise (A): Deliberative democracy requires a norm of equality.  
 Premise (B): Political leadership undermines any norm of equality.  
 Conclusion (C): Therefore, deliberative democracy and political leadership 
are  conceptually incompatible and stand in practical tension.  
We can, in our case, break down premise (A) into two further premises: 
 Premise (A) i.: Democracy requires a norm of equality.  
 Premise (A) ii.: Deliberation requires a norm of equality.  
 
 Let us consider these premises in turn. What sort of equality does democracy   
require? Firstly, the circumstances of modern politics demonstrate that democratic     
societies can coexist with large degrees of economic inequality. There is no 
necessary practical linkage, therefore, between democracy so realised and 
eradicating large-scale inequalities in both wealth and income among citizens.
18
 The 
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 For an opposing view, see Cohen (1989a). 
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realisation of democracy does not mandate perfect economic equality or minimal 
inequalities. Moreover, political leadership does not conflict with demands for less 
material inequality. Leaders can, in principle, be drawn from plural social and 
economic strata. Of course, it is possible that certain forms of political leadership 
will exacerbate existing inequalities, and vice versa.  This may be especially the case 
if political leaders are drawn exclusively from a single   socio-economic pool, as 
Schumpeter thought likely and desirable. This narrowing of background may, 
however, serve to undermine good political leadership, as leaders will  serve a 
smaller constituency and become less responsive to the wider polity. Political 
leadership and a commitment to economic equality, therefore, are not incompatible.     
Indeed, if there is any truth to this analysis, then economic equality and the quality of 
leadership exist in a mutually supportive relationship: the more materially unequal a 
society, the lower the quality of democratic leadership.  
  Secondly, let us consider the moral equality of citizens, as equal subjects 
under  the law and whose voices carry equal weight in democratic decision making. 
We might plausibly claim that this form of equality is essential to democracy, and 
grounds any conception of popular sovereignty. Democracy, by its nature, rejects 
forms of political subordination and hierarchy, especially those deemed "natural" or 
divinely mandated.    Stated thusly, "Democracy is at root a revolt against the rank 
ordering of society . . . .   The levelling instinct of democracy is principally directed 
against the arrogance of  inherited or entrenched power" (Kane and Patapan, cited in 
Galston, 2014: 21).  Organisations which reject or cannot support this principle, such 
as the military and the bureaucratic civil service, relying on strict hierarchies of 
command, we rightly call undemocratic. It is this democratic imperative to treat all 
citizens as political equals which gives rise to the predicament articulated by Kane 
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and Patapan; the belief that "none among equals has any innate or inherent right to 
rule over others" (Galston, 2014: 16). Political leadership implies such an inequality 
of political position. Thus, their argument goes, leadership and democracy are 
antithetical to one another.            
 This position, so formulated, appears prima facie convincing. However, it 
quickly collapses when we consider that there is no incompatibility between treating 
citizens as  moral equals, or as equals under the law, and recognising that citizens 
have natural inequalities in abilities and talents. The former specifies that my life, 
my projects and concerns, count no more or less than anyone else's. The latter 
acknowledges that some citizens may have special talents for governing, be good at 
persuading others and skilled  at building coalitions of interests. They may simply be 
more interested in politics than many others. While we remain formal political 
equals, therefore, as expressed by the  maxim "one person, one vote", informally 
some will be more capable, more informed, and more astute in political matters than 
others. Political leadership is not inconsistent   with this formal equality. Indeed, it 
seeks to take advantage of the informal inequality, putting those with greater aptitude 
for politics at the service of the people at large.  
 One reason, perhaps, why Kane and Patapan confuse the issue is their curious    
choice of phrasing when formulating the apparent dilemma. The form of democratic   
equality specified here would indeed reject the notion that some citizens have any           
innate or inherent right to rule over others generated by natural inequalities in some 
capacities. Democratic leadership, however, is very different in this respect from, 
say, absolute monarchy. Leadership in a democracy relies upon persuasion more 
than coercion, upon consent more than supplication, and certainly rejects the 
structures of command, tradition, and subordination which are characterised by 
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claims of any inherent right to rule. Indeed, if any democratic leader attempted to 
make such a claim, or acted as if holding office was their inherent right, he would 
likely elicit the public response "Who does he  think he is? What makes him think 
he's any better than the rest of us?" Leadership in democracies, perhaps unlike other 
regimes, must exercise a type of humility (see Galston, 2014: 27) because leadership 
importantly turns on consent and the volitions of followers. If the people refuse to 
follow or endorse a leader, then he or she ceases to be a leader. Leadership, 
therefore, is not incompatible with democratic equality.  
 Let us now turn to the second premise regarding deliberation and equality. 
Does deliberation require a norm of equality if it is to proceed? Again, we must first 
ask:     equality of what? Democratic deliberation of the small-scale forum model 
(for example, citizens' juries, citizens' panels, deliberative events, and so on) is 
sometimes conceived as requiring equality between participants in the sense that 
each lacks the ability to exercise coercive power over the others (Mansbridge et al, 
2010). This appears to mandate a form of economic equality, meaning that 
participants will not simply be able to coercive one another with economic incentives 
before their deliberation, or between their deliberation and voting (see Christiano, 
1997; Knight and Johnson, 1997). However, this ideal of a lack of any coercive 
power is just that: an ideal, and one which it is difficult, perhaps impossible, to attain 
in practice. This is especially the case once we  move from discussing deliberation in 
smaller venues to deliberation across the wider public sphere. More important than 
(but related to) background conditions of equality is the sense among participants 
that they are formal equals and treat one another as such.  That is, that they employ 
practices of mutual respect, civility, and reciprocity. But  "power" may be 
understood here as charisma or the capacity for great moral sympathy. Natural 
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inequalities will always have a bearing on deliberation, then, just as much as 
economic inequalities. This does not mean that such   inequalities ought not to be 
minimised wherever possible, but simply that any regulative  ideal is impossible to 
achieve in practice.  
 Moreover, the portrait of deliberative democracy as a form of participatory  
democracy offered by Kane and Patapan is outmoded in two respects, and this drives       
them towards the conclusion that deliberative democracy is conceptually 
incompatible      with leadership. According to them, "the aim of deliberative 
democracy is to make policy amenable not just to popular deliberation but to a 
popular vote. In other words, democratic deliberation (as opposed to mere political 
deliberation amongst many citizens) must incline towards some form of direct 
democracy rather than the representative form" (Kane and Patapan, 2012: 22). 
Similarly, they find fault with the deliberative democratic recourse to regulated 
speech. "It is ironic" they write "that democrats in their flight from elitist  leadership 
with its connotations of authoritarianism and mass exclusion, and in their desire to 
include all  equally in political decision-making, should stumble on the same 
necessity for imposing  strict limits on the voices that will be permitted in debate" 
(ibid: 23). In other words, by focusing the model of political argument offered by 
theorists of public reason (such as Rawls) deliberative democrats seeking to resolve 
the tension between popular sovereignty and leadership arrive at something 
resembling the elitist models of democracy, by virtue of the fact that they rely on a 
restricted and restrictive mode of political     argument.   
 The characteristic features which Kane and Patapan attribute to deliberative 
democracy, then, are: (i) that deliberative democracy is guided by an ideal of direct 
democracy, opening decision-making up to the public rather than restricting it to 
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elite legislatures; and (ii) that strict norms of speech are imposed on democratic 
deliberation  under the banner of "reasonableness", adhering to Rawlsian models of 
public reason          and Habermasian models of communicative action. As we have 
already seen, however, neither of these assumptions necessarily holds true. Taking 
the latter first, deliberative democracy, as I argued in a previous chapter, can and 
should disregard those models of political argument founded on a Kantian distinction 
between reason and rhetoric, opting instead for a rhetorical approach to deliberation 
which is more suitable to the modern democratic public sphere. This rhetorical 
approach jettisons the aristocratic tendency     within deliberative democracy, which 
I noted in chapter one as a flaw in theories of deliberation, while allowing an obvious 
role for political leaders as democratic orators practising deliberative rhetoric. This is 
in line with the argument made by Iris Marion   Young (1996, 2000) that 
argumentative norms which rely on "dispassionate rationality" favour particular 
groups. A rhetorical approach to deliberation, however, proves more      open to a 
variety of styles of communication, such as storytelling and greeting.  
 Secondly, deliberative theorists have long accepted the need for 
representative   bodies. Indeed, the term "deliberative democracy" was first coined 
by Joseph Bessette to describe the deliberative role of representative legislatures (see 
also Habermas, 1996), and while this meaning has been expanded to include the 
deliberations of citizens in the mass public sphere, it has not been supplanted.   
Deliberations within the legislature and the public sphere are instead more usually 
conceived as complimentary practices, with the latter exercising a "steering" effect 
on the former (ibid). Moreover, there remains the argument from necessity. The 
number and frequency with which laws are passed in complex, democratic societies 
(the British parliament passes over one hundred new pieces of legislation each year, 
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on average; the Australian parliament passes close to two hundred), and the range of 
expertise which is  called for, necessitate a representative legislature, rather   than 
opening every decision to public deliberation and referendum. We may also have   
reason to think that direct democracies are not the exemplars of good deliberation 
which   they are sometimes taken to be, as they involve unmediated power structures 
which may   give rise to hegemonic individuals and group polarisation.    
 Deliberative democracy, therefore, is not as necessarily wedded to either of 
the features which underwrite a commitment to economic and communicative 
equality as Kane and Patapan argue. Their argument for the conceptual 
incompatibility between leadership and democracy, then, begins to appear less 
persuasive. This is not to deny that,    in practice, leadership and deliberative 
democracy may be in tension with one another,   given the psychology of democratic 
regimes (see Galston, 2014). Importantly, however, there is nothing necessary about 
this tension, as it does not spring from the conceptual antipathy which   Kane and 
Patapan suggest. Instead, we must disambiguate "leadership" and begin to analyse 
forms of good and bad leadership, some forms of which will stand in practical 
tension with democracy and deliberation. The challenge for deliberative theorists is 
to discover ways of promoting good (that is, deliberative) leadership whilst avoiding 
bad    (anti-deliberative) leadership. Firstly, however, we must be clear on what these 
forms of leadership look like. I examine this in the following section.  
 
3. Deliberative democratic leadership  
How can democratic leaders engage in deliberation in modern democratic politics? 
One answer to this question is for leaders to promote or facilitate deliberation 
120 
 
through their policies and capacities for persuasion. However, this is quite different 
from playing a constitutive role in public deliberations. A central motivation of this 
chapter has been to  resist this tendency towards non-ideal theorising, and to offer 
instead a distinctively realist account of deliberative democratic leadership; one 
which evaluates leadership in the    context of political circumstances and which 
makes virtues of character central to any analysis. I  have already answered this 
question partially in my discussion of deliberative rhetoric in chapter three: if 
rhetoric can be inherently deliberative, then democratic leaders can occupy a central 
role within the deliberative process. By speaking to the people,  submitting 
arguments for their collective judgement, leaders can exercise a capacity for 
deliberative agency. In this section, I attempt to develop this conception of 
deliberative leadership more fully.  
     Let me begin by disambiguating the notion of democratic leadership. As I 
have mentioned at several points, we can distinguish between good and bad 
leadership, and I   shall elucidate this distinction here. What counts as a good 
political leader, however,         will differ significantly between democratic and non-
democratic societies, and even       within these categories there is likely to be much 
variation depending upon particular historical circumstances, such as a public 
political culture which strongly emphasises individual rights (invoking claims to 
particular rights will have a peculiar force in the    United States, for example) or the 
presence of a long-standing and internecine political conflict. Even though political 
leadership is heavily dependent on contingent historical context for its meaning and 
content, we can, however, make some broad generalisations without losing much in 
the way of analytical precision. I focus here on bad political leadership, following 
the well-trodden realist strategy of awarding priority to negative dimensions of 
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political reality. In understanding what things look like when things go    wrong, we 
can better identify circumstances where things are going well.  
 Political leadership may be bad in at least two ways: firstly, leaders might be 
ineffective or inefficient in pursuing and achieving their goals; they may fail to 
articulate their plans or objectives to supporters and the public; they may be unequal 
to the task of persuading large audiences, and so on. In short, they may be deficient 
political leaders. Secondly, leaders may be bad in the sense that they pursue goals 
which are harmful politically and morally abhorrent, or employ means in the pursuit 
of these goals which  violate norms of good conduct; for example, by sanctioning the 
use of torture and assassination. (There is a question, of course, as to whether the 
structure of politics will necessarily require behaviour of this latter sort. This is the 
famous "dirty hands" thesis,      that it can sometimes be right to do wrong. I do not 
attempt a response to this here.        Again, context is paramount. A leader with noble 
political ends may be convinced of the necessity of torture, and may or may not be 
undone as a consequence.) We might call    leaders who fall into the first category of 
badness simply "deficient" leaders, and those  within the second category as 
"deviant" leaders. These two categories are not mutually exclusive, of course. A 
leader may have sinister designs but be utterly inept at realising   them (in which 
case, we have little to worry about). Similarly, the analogues for good   leaders 
translate into categories of competence and nobility. Taken together, these four 
leadership categories may be laid out in a schematic form. It appears, then, that the      
challenge for democratic theorists is to favour leadership which is both "non-
deviant"  and "non-deficient" while finding ways of limiting leadership which is 
"deviant" but  "non-deficient". To speak more plainly, we want to find ways of 
122 
 
avoiding the worst case scenario of leaders who are both malign and highly 
competent.  
 Having elucidated the forms of bad leadership, I now want to develop two 
forms of each with respect to deliberative democracy. I begin with deliberative 
democratic  leadership which is deficient in some regard. Following the analysis 
offered by Runciman (2012: 63-64), we might say that, firstly, a leader is not acting 
in a deliberative fashion when he merely facilitates or promotes deliberation amongst 
others, acting merely as a coordinator for the deliberations or as an arbiter between 
participants. This is neither deliberative nor does it reflect any competent form of 
leadership. Democratic leaders cannot act as if they are merely institutional 
engineers, who simply stand back and do not participate once they have completed 
the forums in which others will. This is not leadership except in the most 
technocratic sense. As Runciman notes, such a leader will likely provoke the 
response "If he is not willing to be proactive, then he should stand aside for someone 
who is!" Secondly, a democratic leader cannot simply participate in the deliberative 
process as any other participant. Leaders and citizens may be formal equals, but 
leadership requires taking matters in hand to an extent which is not required from 
most citizens. A democratic leader who does not offer any guidance whatsoever over 
the deliberative process is therefore not really a leader. Instead, they are simply 
another participant; one voice amongst many in the deliberative process.           
 Both of these forms of democratic leadership are deficient in both 
deliberative  and leadership components: the former because the leader does not 
become involved in deliberation in any capacity other than facilitation, the latter 
because the leader becomes too involved in the deliberation, simply becoming 
another voice within the deliberative process. In contrast to both of these forms, we 
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might instead think of a deliberative democratic leader as, in Runciman's terms, "a 
kind of guide to the conversation" (ibid: 64).  In  other words, as someone who tries 
to move the deliberation in a certain direction in     order to increase the likelihood of 
achieving a certain outcome. Deliberative democratic leaders must orientate public 
deliberations and exercise a steering effect, to borrow a Habermasian phrase, albeit a 
necessarily imperfect and imprecise one. (This chimes well   with my discussion of 
deliberative rhetoric. This kind of rhetoric provides the tools  which democratic 
leaders can use to guide deliberation, and which citizens can employ to assess 
arguments made by leaders.)  
 I turn now to the two forms of what might be called "deviant" democratic    
leadership. Consider first the type, which we might call democratic populism. This 
form of leadership is characterised by pandering or flattery. A leader who panders to 
his constituents or followers simply caters to their existing prejudices and desires, no 
matter   how irrational or ill-formed. He may, for instance, reassure them that they 
are the greatest people in the world, and are endlessly innovative, virtuous, and wise 
in their opinions. When a political crisis occurs, he deflects any blame onto other 
groups distant in time and space: onto foreigners, immigrants, anonymous 
bureaucrats, past generations, even his predecessors in office. The people are 
infinitely wise, he will claim, so how can they be responsible? He crafts his speech 
thusly with the aim of seeking to gain or maintain his  power in office, which offers 
him status, privilege, and influence unavailable to him elsewhere. Clearly, this form 
of leadership departs from deliberative standards. The leader neither induces 
reflection on the part of his audience, nor does he seek to alter their preferences. He 
does not speak to persuade, only to flatter for his own gain. For him, deliberation is 
besides the point. His sole purpose is to achieve power, and the people are simply a 
124 
 
means to that goal. This form of democratic leader subverts the deliberative   process 
for their own self-interest.  
 Secondly, consider a type of leadership we might call democratic elitism. 
This form of leadership is not characterised by mere antipathy towards the people's 
existing beliefs and preferences, but by their manipulation and displacement. This 
type of leader seeks to persuade the public to adopt his private goals and preferences 
as their own, whether or not they align with the common good (if they do, it is 
simply a coincidence). He will employ every means at his disposal to accomplish 
this. He will, if necessary, cajole, shame, and pander to the people; he will 
misrepresent facts and events and offer a selective view of history, all to his own 
purposes. The archetypical democratic leader of this sort is the character of Ahab 
from Herman Melville's novel Moby-Dick. Although Ahab already occupies the 
office of ship's captain, his crew increasingly wishes to return to port, and without 
their allegiance his own private crusade against the white whale will be swiftly 
undermined. Through a process of shaming and cajoling, he convinces a majority of 
the Pequod's crew of the merit of further pursuit, despite the misgivings voiced by 
various members of the crew. Of course, the story ends with the destruction of the 
ship and the majority of its crew, including its captain (Melville, 1992 [1851]). This 
form of democratic leadership also subverts deliberative processes in favour of the  
leader's self-interest, although it is more corruptive in that the leader replaces the 
public's preferences with his own rather than merely reinforcing existing preferences.   
 What is to be learnt from these examples of deviant, anti-deliberative 
leadership? Firstly, we must recall an observation made in chapter three on the use of 
deliberative rhetoric, which is that political arguments made to the public will tend 
towards the common good. The assumption underlying this claim is that no political 
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community would adopt a proposal which prima facie runs counter to its own 
interests. The second example presented here is a deviant case, demonstrating that 
the people can be driven to adopt negative outcomes by a skilled manipulator. It 
reminds us of the importance of the tools which deliberative rhetoric lays at the feet 
of citizens for assessing leaders' arguments and motivations.  
 Secondly, deliberative democratic leaders must embody an ethos of  public-
spiritedness. That is, they must be motivated by the pursuit the common good (as 
they see it) rather than their own self-interest. Thirdly, if we place the two anti-
deliberative forms of leadership at opposite ends of a continuum, where at one end 
citizens' preferences remain static, and at the other they are completely displaced, it 
is plausible to say that a good deliberative outcome will appear somewhere in the 
middle of this continuum, between the two deviant forms of leadership. Successful 
deliberative leadership will transform citizens' preferences rather than simply 
reinforce them, but neither will those preferences have been altered to the extent of 
being completely displaced. They will, in an important sense, remain the citizens' 
preferences, not the leader's. This can be demonstrated by the fact that the final 
preferences will not align perfectly with the leader's; they will have been 
transformed to an extent, but not completely. Deliberative leaders act as guides for 
the public, but are also constrained in their actions and arguments by the public's 
existing preferences and settled convictions. The goal here, as in all democratic 
deliberation, is to let the people transform themselves. Deliberative leaders are 
ultimately only a means towards that end.   
 At the beginning of this chapter, I suggested the appropriate means of 
evaluating political leaders was by an examination of the virtues of character which 
they exemplified, rather than merely their success in achieving their external goals. 
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Success is, of course, important in politics. When establishing models for 
deliberative democratic leadership, however, we should examine both the internal 
and external purposes to the practices of democratic leadership (see MacIntyre, 
1981). To employ an analogous example, a surgeon may be skilled in the practice of 
surgery and perform their task to the highest standard. Nevertheless, the surgery may 
fail to achieve the external standard by which surgery is  judged (the health of the 
patient), even though the surgeon has achieved the internal  standards by which 
surgery as a practice can also be judged (that is, expertise in surgical skills). In the 
case of deliberative democratic leadership, exemplifying certain political virtues 
constitutes the internal end of leadership, while achieving one's desired goal of 
moving the deliberation in a specific direction constitutes the external standard by 
which deliberative leadership may be judged. I shall now proceed to outline what I 
take these internal virtues to be. 
 Firstly, a deliberative leader must display a willingness to compromise and to    
change one's mind. This demonstrates the capacity to neither hold one's convictions 
too closely, so that one never compromises, nor to hold one's convictions too lightly, 
so that   they are cast aside whenever politically expedient. In other words, the 
deliberative leader must navigate through a complex web of principles and 
contingencies in the course of political action, whilst all the while remaining 
responsive to both. This chimes with Max Weber's argument that good political 
leaders must be sensitive to both an ethics of conviction and an ethics of 
consequences. If a leader appears immune either to principles (or convictions), or to 
changes in practical circumstances, or to both, then the perception of the leader as 
reasonable and therefore trustworthy is undermined, and consequently so is the 
ability to persuade others and move deliberations in a desired direction. 
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 Secondly, deliberative leaders must demonstrate a capacity for coalition-
building   and conciliation. This is necessary for guiding of deliberation, where one 
can display  abilities to balance competing interests and to achieve consensus among 
dissenting        parties as to the worthiness of some goal in order to pursue the 
common good. Thirdly, deliberative leaders must have the ability to both persuade 
other citizens and to motivate  their followers. They achieve this, in part, by a 
command of the skills of deliberative  rhetoric, and also by articulating a society's 
public political culture. Fourthly, leaders  should accustom themselves to practicing 
what William Galston terms "democratic   humility". That is, "the belief that the 
legitimacy of your power ultimately depends on the   will of the people and not just 
on your own merit" (Galston, 2014). Finally, deliberative leaders ought to develop 
their capacities for political judgement. Judgement is "a distinctive mental capacity 
or skill, a way of approaching deliberation and decision-making that combines 
experience, intuition, and intelligence" (Keohane, 2010). To take just one example, a 
developed faculty of judgement would allow us to recognise good timing, when 
circumstances align for an action to be taken, rather than merely impose policies in 
unpropitious circumstances.  
 
4. The sources of deliberative leadership 
In seeking a more deliberative democratic politics, theorists of deliberative 
democracy  should be aware of, and learn to navigate, what Bonnie Honig has 
termed the "paradox of  politics" (Honig, 2007, 2009). That is, the problem that "the 
creation of an ideal democracy must at least partially be dependent upon the 
existence of a number of 'ideal democratisers' in the much less than ideal present" 
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(Stears, 2010: 10-11). A more deliberative democratic politics must depend for its 
realisation on political agents who are themselves (at least partially) constituted by 
deliberative democratic institutions and culture. The more deliberative the 
democratic institutions and public culture, the greater the capacities for deliberation 
fostered amongst citizens and leaders. And the greater the dispositions for 
deliberation, the greater the common propensity to construct and maintain 
deliberative institutions and sustain a deliberative democratic culture. As Honig 
notes, this presents a "chicken-and-egg" paradox: both deliberative institutions and 
deliberative citizens presuppose the existence of the other for their own existence. 
When confronted by the circularity of this paradox, how might the process of 
deliberative democratisation be initiated?   
 One answer is that it requires political agents with at least minimal 
deliberative capabilities, and a willingness to further those deliberative ends (see 
Fung, 2005; Stears, 2010). The practice of democratic leadership is one plausible 
starting point for such a process. It is certainly the starting point for Rousseau who in 
his discussion of political founding, which Honig draws from, makes central the 
enigmatic figure of the lawgiver as "the engineer who invents the machine" 
(Rousseau, 1986: 84). But where are these deliberative democratic leaders to be 
found in modern societies? In this section, I follow Keohane in emphasising and 
exposing the important role which civil society plays in fostering the skills needed 
for democratic leadership, and for habituating citizens into forms of democratic 
participation (Keohane, 2014). Rather than merely democratic practice, however, I 
wish to emphasise here the specifically deliberative role which the civil associations 
of the public sphere, including mass political parties, can play in fostering 
deliberative leadership.   
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 Democratic theorists since Alexis de Tocqueville have observed the 
formative  role which civil society plays in sustaining a democratic ethos amongst 
citizens. Civic associations - including community groups, professional associations, 
and trade unions - provide opportunities for citizens to gain experience of leadership. 
Civil society (or, to employ Habermas's phrase, "the public sphere") may be defined 
as that galaxy of social groups and associations which stand independently from both 
the market and the state, although they can (for instance, in the cases trade unions, 
lobby groups, and professional associations) provide links to both, and thus play a 
mediating role between those other spheres of social life. Although citizens may 
participate in civic associations, however, not every participant can be described as a 
leader. Whilst deliberative theorists have observed that citizens can be organised into 
small deliberating groups, can participate in civic  exercises such as deliberative 
budgeting, and frequently and spontaneously form  groups  such as neighbourhood 
associations in order to participate in civic governance, these associations do not, 
however, organise themselves. "In order to make decisions or take action," writes 
Keohane "deliberative assemblies and neighbourhood groups need organisation, 
options proposed, and implementation of decisions, which are all aspects of 
leadership"  (ibid: 72).  
 In other words, even the most participatory forms of governance require 
some minority of participants to take the initiative in organising the group, setting its 
agenda, settling internal disputes, and determining which means will best accomplish 
deliberative ends. Leaders perform this vital role. Furthermore, as collective 
enterprises, all civic associations require a division of labour. After all, not everyone 
has either the time, inclination, or ability to build an organisation from the ground 
up, or to maintain that organisation by occupying leadership roles within it (though 
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they might, of course, be motivated to participate in other ways and contribute 
different sets of expertise). Citizen-participants can become leaders through natural 
talents or good luck, but also through training and acquired skills. It is through the 
acquisition of experience and knowledge that human beings gradually become 
proficient in any activity, and political leadership is no different. Therefore, it is 
primarily through the medium of the civil associations of the democratic public 
sphere that citizen-participants can acquire expertise and develop their faculties of 
leadership. In this way, democratic leaders are made, not simply born. In an 
Aristotelian sense, citizens become leaders by habituating themselves to the virtues 
of leadership. Speaking more plainly, they cultivate habits and intuitions through 
regular exercise in the practice of civic leadership; they become leaders by acting as 
if they were already leaders, in order to more fully discharge the leadership roles 
they occupy.   
 It is in this way that civic associations provide citizens the experience of what 
Aristotle called "ruling and being ruled in turn", albeit on a micro-scale. Civic 
groups   and associations are characterised, in part, in the featuring of offices such as 
treasurer, secretary, and so on. It is through occupying these offices - and, just as 
importantly, by persuading fellow members that they ought to occupy these offices - 
that citizens gain experience of democratic governance and the struggle for power. 
Both achieving and maintaining office require would-be leaders to persuade other 
citizens of their abilities,  goals, and good intentions, and to compromise with other 
participants in order to realise  one's goals and to forge consensus over issues in the 
face of disagreement. In short, associations of civil society provide citizens with the 
opportunity to experience something like political rule. Furthermore, by rotating the 
holders of offices, citizens gain an appreciation for what is entailed in followership 
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or being ruled. That is, participants learn how to hold leaders accountable, and to 
observe the mechanisms of power. We can,  therefore, endorse Keohane's claim that, 
"leadership in civil society is a school for  democratic leadership" (Keohane, 2014: 
78). As one prominent example of the role of civil society in the formation of 
democratic leadership, consider Barack Obama's years spent as a community 
organiser in the South Side of Chicago (Obama, 2007).  
 It is worthwhile, however, to not be too starry-eyed about the composition of    
democratic civil societies and the possibilities for leadership which they offer. As 
Keohane admits, the skills one acquires as treasurer of the local gardening club will 
not translate directly into national political leadership. The magnitude of the power 
exercised, the scope of the decisions made, the number of lives effected, the 
character of the offices involved, to name simply a few  features, are all enormously 
different. The civil society of the contemporary United States, moreover, displays 
not only such benign civic associations as trade unions, professional associations, 
social clubs, and charitable foundations, but also vocal and powerful lobbying 
groups who exert their influence on  behalf of sectional interests, such as the 
National Rifle Association. It also includes survivalist groups, fundamentalist 
churches which propagate anti-Semitism, openly racist activist groups like the Ku 
Klux Klan, and criminal organisations such as the Mafia. It   would be too 
implausible to exclude these groups from an analysis of the American public sphere, 
or to deny that such groups offer their members a sense of identity and belonging  
they would otherwise not experience, and the opportunity to develop their capacities 
for leadership. Obviously, such associations and the opportunities for leadership they 
provide  are far from desirable on a liberal democratic perspective ( Chambers and 
Kopstein, 2001). They neither foster values of equality and reciprocity, nor regard 
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non-members as equal citizens (or even equal human beings); nor are they likely to 
be democratic in their organisational structures, meaning that the process of gaining 
and maintaining office will likely be a struggle of a more brutal (or, at best, populist) 
kind. These groups are likely sources of bad leadership.   
 Thus, it is not enough to merely point towards civic associations as the 
sources for deliberative leadership, as they may also foster anti-deliberative 
leadership. If we wish to foster the former kind and minimise the latter, it becomes a 
question of which types of associations are most likely to do so. What I suggest here 
is that we find one answer to this question in the form of mass political parties. The 
modern party can not only develop the capacities of would-be leaders, but can 
develop them in such a way that they, suitably reformed, they are prime venues for 
fostering deliberative leadership. I expand upon this in the following chapter. In the 
remainder of this section, I sketch the singular importance of political parties as civic 
associations attuned to the affairs of democratic politics.  
 It is a commonplace that parties have long been absent from the research 
agenda of political theory. For example, Keohane proposes that we view "the 
constitutive elements of 'civil society' in a democracy along a continuum ranging 
from the largest . . . to those which involve only a few dozen people and rarely 
attempt to exercise any influence on politics" (Keohane, 2014: 75). In her catalogue 
of civil associations, she includes groups for professionals, such as the American Bar  
Association and the American Medical Association; trade unions; lobby groups, such 
as the National Rifle Association and the National Association for the Advancement 
of Coloured People; social groups, such as the Rotary club; educational institutions, 
including universities and colleges; charitable foundations; churches, synagogues, 
and mosques; and even local sports teams and the Girl Scouts. What is notable here 
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is not the vast panoply of  organisations which are included, but rather that political 
parties are not mentioned or alluded to in her discussion. While this may simply be a 
definitional matter (if one wishes to include only those groups which exist outside of 
and do not seek to be incorporated within the state, then parties will remain beyond 
the scope of civil society) it is nevertheless a striking absence, given that Keohane's 
discussion focuses on the role of civic associations in fostering political leadership. 
 Including parties within an account of the education of political leaders is 
more crucial in contemporary democracies than it has been in some time. 
Membership of mass political parties has been in decline for several decades, and 
parties themselves are notoriously unpopular among democratic electorates. 
According to Max Weber, however, parties offer a crucial mechanism for the 
training of political leaders in mass democratic settings (Weber, 1994). As David 
Runciman, invoking Weber, puts it: "the task of mastering mass political parties and 
powerful representative institutions was the guarantor of substantive leadership. The 
parties were formidable machines, which meant that no one could control them 
without possessing an equivalently formidable political skillset" (Runciman, 2014). 
In other words, there is a causal relationship between the presence of mass political 
parties in a democratic society and the quality of that society's political leadership. If 
we are to follow Weber's analysis, then we should expect a decline in the quality of 
leaders to follow from the declining fortunes of mass political parties. Instead of 
learning the skills of coordinating different interests and persuading mass audiences, 
political leaders practice a kind of "managerial politics", with their numbers drawn 
from "an ever narrower political class" (ibid). "The incentive to acquire wider 
experience of both politics and the world is absent because it is no longer so 
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necessary," writes Runciman. This is because "experience can be trumped by insider 
knowledge, which is easier to acquire" (ibid).  
 I find Weber's account of the significance of mass parties in fostering 
political leadership highly persuasive. Political parties are, after all, the principal 
players in the democratic contest for power, and field the vast majority of candidates 
for elected office. However, it may be objected that parties provide no training for 
leaders that cannot be acquired in other organisations, and that they simply discharge 
the function of supplying political candidates because they happen to dominate the 
political landscape, exercising monopoly power over this key area of political 
participation, acting as gatekeepers to  political power. While the latter claim may be 
plausible, in that modern parties posses the resources needed for political 
organisation which very few independent candidates can match, this does not negate 
the claim that they nevertheless provide special training for political leaders.  
 The former claim, moreover, is extremely dubious. Political parties provide 
opportunities for politically orientated leadership, opportunities which are largely 
unavailable in other civil associations. This is not to deny the preparatory role which 
those associations play in developing leadership capacities. However, the explicitly 
political education which parties provide is most efficacious in developing those 
capacities for good democratic, including deliberative, leadership. It is in the 
organisation of the mass political party, which includes a chorus of diverse and often 
dissenting voices which must be harmonised, that political leaders learn a sense of 
political responsibility (which Weber termed an "ethic of consequence") absent from 
other civic associations. After all, the management of even a relatively minor 
political party is a task of much more political consequence, and a much more 
135 
 
intrinsically political task, than managing the affairs of the local bowling club, for 
example.    
 Political parties also play a role in attuning leaders to the possibilities for 
specifically deliberative engagement with the democratic public, through their 
training in deliberative forms of rhetoric, and in cultivating the deliberative virtues 
which I outlined in the last section. I will sketch in greater detail the mechanisms by 
which this may occur in the following chapter. For now, though, it must suffice to 
claim that it is by leading the deliberative micro-public of the political party, leaders 
become accustomed to the deliberative potential which is latent within society at 
large. Parties are more than and are importantly different to other civic associations, 
because if they are to survive and achieve their objectives then they must avoid 
insularity. That is, they must avoid speaking only to themselves and must address 
themselves to society at large if they are to win power. Deliberative leaders must 
have a good knowledge of the lived realities of  those whom they desire to lead, but 
they must also transcend particular civic associations, because if they desire to lead, 
then they must address those with whom they disagree. This entails an education in 
the substance of deliberative democratic politics - namely, persuasion and 
compromise - which parties are well-placed to provide.   
 If we wish to foster more and better deliberative leadership, we have good 
reason to be concerned by the decline of modern political parties. Similarly, we have 
good reason to lament that the civic associations of democratic public spheres appear 
to have suffered a concomitant decline, according the political scientist Robert 
Putnam (2000). Putnam's analysis does not, however, suggest that citizens in 
Western liberal democracies have  become less interested in politics, however (see 
Hay, 2007). But instead of organised civic associations which provide the 
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opportunities for experiencing leadership, or of political parties which provide a 
more politically focussed training, modern democratic politics has seen the 
emergence of decentred social movements (such as the now famous "Occupy Wall 
Street" campaign) which claim to be without leaders. Such movements accept the 
false conclusion that leadership and democracy are antithetical. If their claims to be 
without leadership are true, then in lacking leadership, they also lack a sense of 
political responsibility, on the maxim that if everyone is in charge, then no one is in 
charge. Regardless of the efficacy of these movements at articulating and achieving 
their goals (though this is, not coincidentally, quite poor) such groups pose a 
challenge to the normal educative role of  civic associations and mass political 
parties; not because they seek to supplant it, but because they offer an alternate route 
of participation with few of the democratic benefits.  
 
5. Conclusion 
In this chapter I have attempted to sketch the idea of deliberative leadership and its 
relationship with democratic politics. A concern for political realism points us 
towards the practice of political leadership, because leadership involves the struggle 
for power and practices inherent to democratic politics, such as compromise and 
persuasion. This chapter advanced three separate but interlinked arguments. Firstly, 
that political leadership is compatible with democratic (and thus deliberative) norms 
of equality. I argued that there is no necessary antipathy between leadership and 
political equality, as natural inequalities do not entail a right to rule. Democratic 
leadership importantly turns on the consent of one's followers.  
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 I then moved to discuss the character of deliberative democratic leadership, 
contrasting it with two cases of anti-deliberative democratic leadership. Deliberative 
democratic leaders, I argued, must aim at moving deliberation in preferred direction 
and therefore at transforming the preferences of citizens, but must have care that the 
final preferences of any deliberative encounter can be said to properly belong to the 
citizens themselves, rather than imposed from outside. I suggested that the proper 
means of evaluating deliberative leadership was by consideration of deliberative 
virtues, rather than through any consequentialist account of promoting the overall 
level of deliberation in a polity.  
 Finally, I addressed the importance of the paradox of politics, as raised by 
Bonnie Honig: the problem, in this case, that deliberative citizens, on the one hand, 
and deliberative institutions and culture, on the other, both presuppose the existence 
of the other. This  presents a chicken-and-egg scenario, to which I argued 
deliberative leadership could offer a solution. Deliberative leadership can be found 
and developed in the civic associations of democratic civil society. Not all civil 
associations are good, or produce deliberative leadership, however. The problem for 
deliberative theorists is to find and promote those forms of organisation which 
promote deliberative leadership while minimising anti-deliberative leadership. I 
argued that mass political parties presented an answer to this problem, owing both to 
their outward-looking character and the presence of political  disagreement within 
parties.        
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Chapter 4 
Deliberative Partisanship 
 
1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I indicated that political parties were the most promising 
civil association for developing the capacity for deliberative leadership amongst 
democratic politicians. The time has now come to investigate political parties and 
partisanship more thoroughly. A concern for greater realism in political theory points 
us toward the fact of parties and partisanship. Democratic politics, after all, takes 
place under conditions of disagreement and conflict, and the most obvious sign of 
this is the existence of and competition between parties and their partisans. And 
despite the widely noted decline in citizen participation (Diamond and Gunther, 
2001; Hay, 2007; Mair, 2013) parties remain  the dominant and most visible agents 
of democratic politics conducted within the  nation-state. As we shall see, it falls to 
parties to organise politics for modern democracies, performing important but often 
overlooked functions in setting the terms of political discussion and by providing 
avenues for citizens to participate in self-rule. It behoves political realists, therefore,  
to take parties and partisanship seriously.  
 Despite the centrality of parties to the practice of modern democratic politics, 
however, political theorists have had little to say about either parties or partisanship. 
As Nancy Rosenblum puts it, parties are "the orphans of political philosophy", 
unloved and neglected (Rosenblum, 2009: 1). The reasons for this neglect are 
manifold, and include traditional divisions of intellectual labour between empirical 
political scientists and  normative political theorists (Johnson, 2006; Saward and van 
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Biezen, 2008). While the  deficit of party scholarship in political theory is beginning 
to be ameliorated (see most notably Goodin, 2008; Rosenblum, 2009; Ypi and 
White, 2010, 2011; Bader and Bonotti, 2014) both parties and partisanship remain 
underrepresented, especially in the growing literature on political realism. One aim 
of this chapter is to draw attention to parties and partisanship for realism, 
contributing to this ongoing remedial effort.  
 Parties and partisanship seem to pose a problem for the theory of deliberative 
democracy, however. With their traditional focus on the competition for votes and 
the collection of interests, parties seem better fitted to those accounts of democratic 
politics which emphasise political conflict and the competition of elites. Deliberative 
democracy focuses instead on discussion, conciliation, and the participation of 
citizens. Moreover, deliberative theorists have participated in the general neglect of 
parties, meaning that common ground between the two remains under-theorised. One 
early exception to this general trend is Joshua Cohen's early treatment of political 
parties, sketching the roles hich they might play in the maintenance of deliberative 
politics. Cohen claims that "it is difficult to see how [deliberative democracy] is 
possible in the absence of strong parties supported by public resources" (Cohen, 
1989a: 17-34). Elsewhere, he writes that "no plausible organisational alternative 
exists to parties as a way to organise large-scale political debate in ways that focus 
that debate on projects that advance the common good" (Cohen, 1989b: 40). 
Unfortunately, Cohen's flirtation with parties was short-lived, and he offered    little 
guidance on how parties and deliberation, two apparently conflicting elements of 
democratic politics, can be made compatible. My main aim in this chapter is to 
attend to    this problem. 
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 This chapter has the following structure: I begin by providing an account of 
the character of political parties, which I distinguish from political factions. A key 
reason, I believe, for the exclusion of parties from normative political theory is their 
traditional association with factions, historically viewed as the pathologies of 
democratic politics. Parties, I contend, appear to conflict with deliberation because of 
this common case of mistaken identity. Once political parties are considered as civil 
associations in their own right, which discharge important democratic functions, this 
tension is greatly lessened.    Once I have successfully disassociated parties from 
factions, I then move to examine the ways in which parties can realise their 
deliberative potential. I begin by suggesting several ways for parties to expand the 
opportunities for internal deliberation, including existing practices such as party 
conferences and the drafting of manifestos, as well as several institutional reforms 
orientated towards the promotion of intra-party deliberation. In   adopting these 
proposals, parties can go some way towards renewing their democratic credentials 
and deepening their legitimacy as political agents. I then move to consider the 
opportunities for deliberation arising from conflict between parties. In this section I 
elucidate how the strategic conflict amongst parties and partisans can be conducive 
to greater deliberation, and also consider questions of partisan strategy and regulated 
rivalry.  
  Before beginning this discussion I must clarify two points: one definitional, 
the   other methodological. Firstly, I use the term 'partisan' here to refer only to that 
form of partisanship which is generated by political parties. Partisanship can, of 
course, exist independently of parties; one can be a partisan of a cause, a movement, 
or of sectional   interests. I am, however, less interested in partisanship per se than 
with that form of partisanship generated by political parties. Secondly, following on 
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from my discussion of deliberative leadership, my approach in the evaluation of 
parties and partisanship from a deliberative perspective is not to adopt a purely 
instrumentalist view. That is, I am not concerned here with how parties contribute to 
deliberation by fostering it as an external consequence of their activities. Similarly, I 
am not proposing to transplant deliberative institutions and practices onto the 
anatomy of parties. Instead, deliberation must be endogenous to the existing 
practices of parties. In other words, I look at parties and assess their capacities for 
deliberation, rather than attempting to fit parties to some deliberative ideal. In order 
to see how parties might be, we must first see them for what they are.     
 
2. The character of political parties 
In this section I provide an overview of the character of parties and partisanship. I  
distinguish political parties from their close relations, political factions. Parties are a 
distinctively modern form of political organisation which both transcend factions 
while remaining closely intertwined. The key distinction between parties and 
factions, I argue, is that parties seek to justify themselves publicly, addressing 
political society rather than  merely their own members. Once I have disassociated 
parties and factions, I then move to consider the democratic functions which parties 
and partisanship discharge in modern democracies characterised by mass settings, 
social differentiation, and complexity. 
 The etymological derivation of the word 'party' is from the Latin verb partire, 
meaning 'to divide' (Sartori, 1976: 4). This meaning remains apposite within modern 
democratic settings: parties represent political divisions within society. This raises 
the question, do political parties simply mirror social and economic divisions, or do 
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they contribute to creating and reinforcing such divisions? David Hume was clear on 
this point: "Nothing is more usual than to see parties, which have begun upon a real 
difference,  continue even after that  difference is lost. When men are once enlisted 
on opposite sides, they contract an affection to the persons with whom they are 
united, and an animosity against their antagonists: And these passions they often 
transmit to their posterity" (Hume, 1994:  35). According to Hume, then, parties do 
not merely reflect but create and reinforce cleavages that outlast the original subject 
of dispute, which are then replicated across generations. On this account, parties 
resemble viruses which invade the body politic and exacerbate existing illnesses, 
then reproduce to create more and worse symptoms. This view of parties as threats to 
health of political society echoes that of Hobbes, who, though not using the term 
parties, declared that "corporations make lesser commonwealths in the bowels of the 
greater, like worms in the bowels of a natural man" (Hobbes, 1951: 357). Whilst  
Hume believed these corporations an unfortunate but tolerable consequence of free 
government, Hobbes was far less generous. On his account, such corporations must 
be suppressed or expelled from the commonwealth, lest they prove to be sources of 
sedition   and civil strife.  
 Although successive figures in the history of political thought have rarely 
been as severe as Hobbes in proscribing parties, hostility has been a persistent theme. 
Despite the pervasive loathing to which parties have been generally subjected, 
however, it is worth recalling that in the English sense of the term 'party', parties may 
be viewed as parts of the body politic, rather than foreign bodies exercising a malign 
influence from within political society. Thus, there is a sense of pluralism inherent in 
the concept of political party. However, parties could still be viewed as undesirable 
parts, as they tended to arise as  vehicles for the assertion of sectional interests. For 
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this reason, parties were more at home in the mid-twentieth century school of 
'pluralist democracy', which stressed the significance of 'intermediary associations' 
between the state and society, and of plural centres of political power and influence, 
than in deliberative democratic theory (Dahl, 1956). Even within pluralist theory, 
however, parties have not received extensive treatment. For example, they are 
conspicuously absent from the list of such 'intermediary associations' compiled by    
David Held, which includes groups such as "community associations, religious 
groups,    trade unions, and business organisations" (Held, 2006: 158).  
 One key reason, I contend, for parties' bad reputation throughout the history 
of political thought is their traditional running together with political factions. Hume, 
for example, tended to use the terms 'party' and 'faction' interchangeably. Similarly, 
Hume's predecessor Lord Bolingbroke wrote in his 1738 essay The Idea of a Patriot 
King that "Governing by party . . . must always end in the government of a faction. . 
. . Party is a political evil, and faction is the worst of all parties" (Bolingbroke, cited 
in Sartori, 1976: 6-7). The etymological derivation for the word 'faction' comes from 
the Latin verb facere,  meaning 'to do' or 'to act'. James Madison famously defined 
faction as "a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the 
whole, who are united and activated by some common impulse of passion, or of 
interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate 
interests of the community" (Madison, 2003). Madison proposed that the only sure 
way to avoid the evil of faction was to remove their source,  which would mean 
curtailing liberty and inequalities of property. Clearly this was not desirable. This 
lead him to propose that their worst effects could be moderated by an extended 
republic, which would ensure the proliferation of many and diverse factions, 
meaning no one faction could dominate the others.      
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 Are parties effectively identical to factions? Clearly for Hume, political 
parties and political factions were synonymous. While Hume was the first to develop 
a typology of different types of party, sorting them into groups of interest, affection, 
and principle, it appears that he conceived of parties as simply factions by another 
name. Bolingbroke, in contrast, seemingly drew a distinction between the two: while 
parties were not always factions, every party would deteriorate into a faction 
eventually. But what is it that distinguishes faction-parties from non-faction-parties?  
  Consider Edmund Burke's classic description of the political party as "a 
body of   men united, for promoting by their joint endeavours the national interest, 
upon some particular principle upon which they are all agreed" (Burke, 1993). 
Burke's definition of  party is remarkable as the first effort not only to disassociate 
parties with factions but to conceptualise parties in a positive manner. What 
distinguishes parties from factions, according to Burke, is not simply an emphasis on 
high principle in the case of parties and base interests in the case of factions. As 
Hume knew, factions could also be animated by some "impulse of passion", just as 
parties may be moved by interests. Rather, parties and factions diverged according to 
which interests they promote and which passions they represented. Parties are not 
simply moderated factions, nor are factions simply extreme parties: the difference is 
one of category rather than scale. According to Madison, factions represent their 
interests and their interests alone, even if a faction were to comprise a  majority of 
the population. This is to be contrasted with Burke's definition of party, in    which 
parties pursue the common good or "national interest" on the basis of common 
principle. Parties and factions diverge, then, as parties claim to represent and pursue 
the common good for society as a whole, rather than some one section of it. Parties 
differ from factions in being conscious of their status as mere parts working to 
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benefit the whole.  Parties are therefore not so much "worms in the bowels" as the 
sense organs of the commonwealth.  
 One may object that this description assigns parties too noble a role to play in 
democratic politics. Given what we can observe of parties and their partisans on a 
daily  basis, is it really plausible to define parties in terms of striving for the common 
good?      Even if this is how parties define themselves, might not such high-minded 
appeals to the common good easily mask sectional interests? Even the most 
politically innocent citizen  may grow suspicious when the interests that parties 
assign to society as a whole always     coincide with those of the party itself. Clearly, 
parties can and frequently do act in their     own interests and in the interests of their 
supporters, and sometimes at the expense of   society as a whole. However, this 
distinction between parties and factions holds for two reasons:  
 Firstly, it is plausible to claim that partisans sincerely believe their interests 
are identical to, or at least aligned with, those of the polity as a whole. It is rare for 
committed     partisans to simply plead their own self-interest as a justification for 
their party's policies. Social democrats, for example, sincerely believe that the 
transfer of wealth from higher to lower income groups will benefit the stability and 
prosperity of society as a whole, while advocates of deregulated markets sincerely 
believe them to be the most effective mechanism   for lifting many people out of 
poverty. This is not to portray partisans as moral angels, incapable of self-serving 
behaviour. Clearly, many are all too capable. This does not, however, lead us to 
conclude that they are guilty of insincerity. They may be mistaken in their beliefs, or 
may simply be deceiving themselves, but this does not mean they are attempting to 
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deceive others.
19
 Short of evidence of corruption and duplicity, we ought to   take 
partisans at their word.  
  Secondly, political parties typically appeal to normative principles to ground 
their claims and to justify their policies. This is absent from the behaviour of 
factions. Where the latter seek only to advance their own self-interest, the former 
offer public and normative justifications for their  aims and conduct. Such 
justifications need not boil down to crass utilitarian calculus; for example, that some 
citizens must be made to suffer so that a great many more will benefit. Rather, public 
justifications by parties are usually (though not always) framed in terms of 
advancing the long-run interests of the polity as a whole; for example, that some 
citizens must carry the burdens of greater taxation or economic uncertainty today, so 
that there will be greater prosperity for all tomorrow. Or, more normatively, that a 
party's policies better articulate the values latent within a society's   history and 
constitution. In contrast, factions offer no such justifications, and do not    identify 
with any interests other than their own. Parties are self-consciously parts of the 
whole. While they cannot plausible speak for the whole (though many claim to) they 
do address themselves to the whole. This is not to say that the justifications offered 
by parties will always be attractive or convincing, however. To invoke the most 
famous example, the National Socialist party offered justifications for itself 
grounded in an ideology of racial domination and conquest, as well as a particular 
                                                          
19
 This is a phenomenon most recently evident in British politics, with parties engaged in elaborate 
public relations exercises to recast themselves as representatives of the British public as a whole. 
See, for example, Conservative party leader David Cameron's language of "togetherness" in his 2009 
party conference speech (full text available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2009/oct/08/david-cameron-speech-in-full, last accessed 
27th April, 2014) or the former Labour party leader Ed Miliband's attempts to re-launch his party as 
"One Nation" Labour (see  http://www.labour.org.uk/ed-miliband-speech-fabian-one-nation-labour-
change, last accessed 27th April, 2014).  
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conception of which groups constituted (and which were excluded from) the German 
'Volk'.  
 As I have attempted to make clear, parties are not factions. Parties eschew the   
pursuit of narrow self-interest typically associated with factions in favour of a 
broader conception of the common good, while justifying their policies with 
universalised claims based on normative principles. As such, parties are open to 
democratic deliberation,   rejecting the anti-deliberative elements of factions. Of 
course, we are free to reject their justifications as unconvincing or their conceptions 
of the common good as mistaken or unduly narrow. But this should not obscure the 
fact that there is no necessary antipathy between parties and deliberation. 
Furthermore, this is not to say that all parties are  necessarily beneficial to the health 
of democratic politics. Parties come in a panoply of  forms, marching under different 
principles and ideologies; some of which have proved disastrous to the well-being of 
democratic regimes. As with my discussions of political rhetoric and leadership, we 
must abandon the language of absolute principles and speak instead of better or 
worse; and think of ways to foster the best while marginalising the worst. That is the 
reality of democratic politics, and it is not before time for political theorists to 
engage with it.  
2.2. The functions of parties 
The discussion thus far has, I hope, gone some way towards providing a conceptual  
definition of political parties, and to disassociate parties from political factions. Now 
that much of the brush has been cleared, I can clarify the beneficial functions which 
parties and partisanship discharge for democratic politics.  
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 Firstly, we can say that parties play an organisational role for democratic 
politics. Most obviously, parties supply the candidates who stand for political office 
and populate the elected offices of the state. Without parties to perform this function, 
political offices would most likely be filled by independents. While many critics of 
parties would find this an attractive alternative, we have good reason to be glad that 
parties perform this organisational role. For one thing, independents tend to be much 
less political engaged than partisans, and tend to have a much weaker knowledge of 
and appreciation for politics (Rosenblum, 2014: 275). For another, without party 
divisions democratic politics would revolve to a greater extent around the personal 
values and charisma of the candidates, thus inciting demagoguery and 'personality 
politics' to an even greater degree (Goodin, 2008). Moreover, parties organise not 
only the candidates for office but also the terms of political discourse. Without 
parties, then, democratic politics would be much more chaotic and disorganised. 
 Secondly, parties perform a motivational function for democratic politics. As 
Ypi and White put it, parties "have the capacity to generate a sense of political 
collectivity among citizens, both by articulating political identities and ... by 
projecting a sense of common purpose in pursuit of a political project" (White and 
Ypi, 2010: 815). Parties possess the means to generate democratic participation 
among citizens by formulating a political identity and employing rhetoric to motivate 
supporters. Thirdly, parties perform a representative function for democratic 
citizens. Parties seek to represent the views of their members and the interests of 
society at large. Indeed, the views which parties represent do not simply reflect self-
interest, but typically concern what is in society's best interests. Parties thus 
represent discourses of opinion as well as the interests of various socioeconomic 
groups.   
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 Fourthly, political parties are responsive to public opinion. If parties wish to 
achieve and retain power, then they must attend to the public mood and to the 
existing preference structures of citizens. This does not mean that parties must be 
subservient to the whims of public opinion, but the nature of democratic politics 
requires them to know the state of popular opinion and not ride roughshod over the 
views of their electors. Thus, parties are essential for ensuring minimally responsive 
government. Fifthly, parties also provide public policies which they seek to enact. 
They have consolidated programmes which citizens can choose between, and 
provide justifications for these policies in light of certain animating principles. If a 
legislature were composed entirely of independent politicians, then the public could 
not truly decide on a government, because there could be as many reasons for a piece 
of legislation as there were independents (Goodin, 2008). Parties, therefore, are 
necessary for the possibility of popular self-government in modern democracies.     
 
3. Deliberation within parties 
In this section I suggest several practical reforms for parties to expand their 
capacities for internal deliberation. The idea here is not merely to graft deliberative 
democratic practices, such as deliberative polls, onto the structures of political 
parties so they might better promote deliberative values. Rather, my immediate aim 
is to propose ways in which parties can deepen and extend their existing deliberative 
capacities. We have already encountered one such practice in the previous chapter: 
the role of parties in fostering deliberative leadership. My overarching aim in this 
chapter is to offer an account of political parties which exercise their full deliberative 
potential. To that end, I make five proposals as to how parties can reform their 
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internal governance in order to maximise their deliberative potential. These 
proposals are concerned with the production of manifestos, party conventions and 
conferences, the ongoing process of internal deliberation, the selection of party 
leaders, and  reform of the office of party whips. I examine each in turn.  
 
3.1. Party Manifestos 
Party manifesto documents are typically statements of political intent, combining an 
expression of a party's current ideational position with more concrete proposals for 
public policy. As such, they bind the universalist principles of the party to particular 
political circumstances. Moreover, manifestos are only issued periodically, acting as 
a reflection of the values and concerns of the current party leadership. In Britain, 
party manifestos are typically issued in the period prior to an election, whereas in the 
United States party policies tend to accrue over time, with fewer examples of 
specific manifestos or an explicit statement of party proposals (a notable exception 
may be the Republican party's "Contract with America", issued in the mid 1990s). 
Manifestos may thus be described as an assemblage of particular 'campaign 
promises'.  
 Party manifestos are to be distinguished from party constitutions: manifestos 
do not detail the organisational structure of a party; they provide no rules for party 
governance; and they are less reliable guides to a party's identity and ideological 
commitments. Party constitutions remain relatively stable over time, whereas 
manifestos are rewritten episodically. Party constitutions are certainly open to 
amendment by party councils and leaders (see, for example, Tony Blair's notorious 
rewriting of Clause IV of the British Labour party's constitution, the section which 
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details the aims and values of the party, removing the party's commitment to state 
ownership of industry).  
 Several normative questions present themselves. By whom exactly should 
party manifestos be written? On what criteria should the deliberative quality of 
manifestos be judged? What procedures of ratification (if any) are needed to 
legitimise manifestos? And should manifesto commitments be binding on partisans? 
Let me propose answers to each of these questions which emphasise the role of 
deliberation among partisans.  
 Although party manifestos are issued nominally by the party as a whole, in 
practice they are often written by the party leaders, along with their chief strategists, 
policy advisors, and in consultation with high-ranking members of the party 
hierarchy. While leaders and their key followers are the ones to produce manifestos 
by virtue of the size of modern political parties (manifestos cannot, after all, literally 
be written by every member of the party) and by the fact that they have been 
democratically elected (rather than, say, assigned by lot) by partisans to lead their 
party, there is nevertheless a strong case for greater involvement of partisans in the 
production of manifestos. This role may be purely consultative, or it may take the 
form of a veto over policies which do not meet with the majority of partisans' 
approval. Greater democratisation within parties, however, should also be 
accompanied by an increase in the opportunities for partisans to deliberate with one 
another over the contents of their party's manifesto, both before and after its 
production by the party's leadership. The process by which manifestos are conceived 
and produced is thus amenable to deliberative reforms.  
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 This can be accomplished by greater interaction between party leadership and 
party members in sequenced moments of deliberation. Party leaders can initiate 
deliberation by making several proposals on the policies to be pursued by the party 
over a given time-scale. Partisan delegates can then respond by deliberating over 
whether the proposals are fair, representative, and reflective of their interests. They 
can then expand or narrow down the range of proposals to more accurately conform 
to their preferences. Party leaders can then respond, and so on until an equilibrium 
point of mutual compromise is reached. When disagreement occurs, the emphasis 
should be on the leader to persuade his partisans of the necessity or desirability of 
the proposal. This is, after all, the key function of deliberative leadership. 
Furthermore, if the leader's manifesto proposals are found to be unsupportable by a 
majority of partisans, then this will trigger a leadership contest.  
 Underlying this institutional practice is a conception of the character of 
manifestos. Namely, manifestos are interpretations of the core normative principles 
found within the party's governing constitution and articulate policies that would best 
realise these principles under contingent political circumstances. The manner in 
which these core principles are interpreted can be worked out in a deliberative 
fashion by processes such as that sketched above. This conception of party 
manifestos provides an important motivational link between the normative principles 
which a party affirms and its immediate political strategy. The normative criteria 
under which party manifestos may be evaluated are as follows: (a) the policies 
proposed in party manifestos must articulate the normative principles embedded 
within a party's constitution, and (b) the policies put forward must relate these 
normative principles to contingent political circumstances, judging the range of 
feasible policies. The production of party manifestos is thus an exercise in practical 
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reasoning under less than ideal conditions. Moreover, manifestos do not necessarily 
have to reflect consensus among partisans on the party's guiding principles and 
political strategy, but may instead represent a convergence between multiple 
interpretations of key values and principles upon a set of policies. The question of 
what binding force manifesto commitments should have on party leaders (for 
example, whether leaders should be removed if they fail to pursue these 
commitments in practice) is, I think, one best left to the internal deliberations of 
partisans themselves. 
   
3.2. Party Conferences and Conventions 
It might be supposed that, if partisans are to engage in meaningful deliberation, then 
there is no better site for this to occur than party conferences, given the policy-
setting functions of such events and the fact that party delegates can physically come 
together in small enough numbers to suit forum-based models of deliberation (see 
Fishkin, 1991; Ackerman and Fishkin, 2004). Any concerns regarding the quality of 
the deliberation would therefore be similar to the standard concerns regarding 
traditional small-group deliberation, such as the agenda being dominated by a few 
participants. While it certainly remains the case that the familiar pathologies of 
deliberation are likely to recur within party conferences, the setting provides a 
different concern. Namely, that a large degree of consensus will already obtain 
amongst the party delegates. The implication here is that deliberation is redundant if 
there is an existing consensus amongst the participants.    
 This concern is, of course, dependent upon the particular composition of a 
given party. The size and social diversity of party membership will likely serve to 
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differentiate between those parties which possess greater ideological homogeneity 
and those comprised of more heterogeneous memberships. Generally speaking, the 
larger the party, the more diverse its membership. However, even in smaller and 
more homogenous parties, this concern risks becoming overstated. Parties that are 
based on individual issues and possessing a strong identity, such as environmentalist 
and nationalist parties, will, I suspect, likely still feature memberships who hold 
diverse interpretations of those values and identities. Likewise, parties based on 
collections of group interest will have members who may have fewer interests in 
common than they at first realise. Moreover, this concern only obtains if we view the 
purpose of democratic deliberation as forming consensus, or if we employ consensus 
as a regulative ideal for deliberation. There is, however, no deliberative democratic 
requirement for doing so (see Dryzek, 2010). Deliberation can serve not only to 
bring about a closer agreement, but to uncover areas of disagreement between 
participants. Democratic deliberation can thus serve a critical purpose, by bringing 
about a greater awareness in participants of their core values and interests.  
 A different concern here is that if deliberation is not orientated towards 
achieving consensus, then it may prove corrosive of partisans' bonds of shared 
values, interests, and objectives. Deliberation may end up fracturing political parties, 
rather than making them more cohesive. However, there are three reasons for 
doubting this concern; first, simply because deliberation is not orientated towards 
consensus, that does not entail an orientation in the opposite direction towards 
dissensus. It may be equally as likely that partisans will simply exchange reasons as 
to why they converge on a similar position, with their existing preference structures 
remaining unchanged but with a greater understanding of their nature and 
consequences of their beliefs. Second, deliberation may reveal divergences in the 
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interests and values of the participants, but as the deliberation proceeds these 
differences may soften and be brought towards a closer harmony. The shape of the 
deliberation in this case will thus be parabolic. And third, even if the deliberation 
ends with strong disagreement, participants may feel they have gained a greater 
understanding of their fellow partisans interests, beliefs, and characters. Such an 
understanding will likely foster a sense of trust and solidarity amongst participants 
over repeated deliberations.       
 What other pathologies might deliberation in party conference settings be 
especially vulnerable to? One such pathology to which partisan settings may be 
particularly prone is what Cass Sunstein has termed "the law of group polarisation" 
(Sunstein, 2002). Stated simply, group polarisation means that "members of a 
deliberating group predictably move toward a more extreme point in the direction 
indicated by the members' predeliberation tendencies", and that when like-minded 
people "meet regularly, without sustained exposure to competing views - extreme 
movements are all the more likely" (ibid: 176). This poses a difficulty for partisans: 
they conform to the profile of those who will tend to more extreme views when they 
deliberate together, via a process of mutual recognition and reinforcement of each 
other's outlooks and beliefs. Such a move is liable to make them not only less 
responsive to the views of citizens outside the party, but also less representative of 
those party members who have not participated in this process.  
 However, there is a positive side to group polarisation, or at least to the 
conditions of insulated deliberation which allow it to occur. Enclosed deliberation 
between partisans, as opposed to open deliberations between partisans, independents, 
and other groups, may be beneficial in two ways: first, it will encourage minorities 
which would be otherwise intimidated from speaking for fear of being sidelined or 
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excluded from the deliberation altogether to participate in an atmosphere of greater 
familiarity; and second, a degree of insulation from other groups will be necessary 
for parties both to develop ideas and policy proposals and to nourish a sense of 
shared identity (ibid: 186-187). Doing so will contribute to the plurality of voices 
within the party and the broader public sphere. The experience of inclusive 
partisanship might therefore prove educative for citizens otherwise tentative in 
exposing their political views to scrutiny.  
 How, then, might the deliberative forums in party conferences be structured 
so as to maximise the benefits of deliberative insulation and inclusion while 
minimising the risks of group polarisation tending towards partisan extremism and a 
concomitant loss of democratic responsiveness? One step would be to raise the level 
of partisan self-awareness among participants, reminding them of the tendency 
towards extreme view points and mutual reinforcement. Such knowledge may act to 
curb this tendency. An institutional remedy may be to stage multiple deliberations 
among party members, in such a way that the deliberations were more and less 
inclusive of non-partisans, affiliated members, and independents. The inclusion of 
alternative and opposing points of view may inoculate group deliberations against 
such tendencies, with the objections of outsiders acting to anchor the deliberation in 
the beliefs of the wider public even as it drifts towards extremes. Similarly, exclusive 
deliberations among partisans will allow space to affirm party identities and allow 
for more participation by minority groups within parties that may be marginalised by 
mainstream political discourse.       
 
3.3. Internal Referenda and Agenda-Setting 
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In partisan deliberation, a key question will be: who controls the agenda? Does the 
party leader alone set the tone and direction of discussion among partisans, or is 
there room for greater democracy within political parties? Moreover, is a democratic 
party, in the sense of a collectively self-organising party with no leaders and an 
informal hierarchy only, possible or desirable? 
 As I have argued previously, it is a mistake to ignore the role of leadership in 
democratic politics, just as it is a mistake to ignore the role of parties. Many of the 
claims about the end or redundancy of leadership turn out to be overblown. 
Moreover, many political orders require that it is individuals who inhabit certain 
offices of government, in order to confer some notion of responsibility and 
accountability. A democratically-run committee may appoint a figurehead to hold an 
office in its stead, but this seems an abrogation of certain democratic values, such as 
accountability and publicity.  
 Therefore, I take is as given that parties have leaders who seek election or 
appointment to offices of state. What role ought party leaders have, then, in setting 
their party's policy agenda, and the formulation of policies? That is, in deciding 
which issues are worthy of concern, and in formulating responses to those issues? 
Moreover, what role will partisans have in these issues -- are they simply tasked to 
accept whichever policies their leaders advance, on the understanding that they 
elected them? Furthermore, neither party leaders nor partisans are likely to be 
experts on every contentious area of political discourse. Should partisans therefore 
seek the advice of, or delegate the role of policy-making to experts?   
 The relationship between party leaders, partisan followers, and technical 
experts in policy-making is likely to be complex, but all play a role. Experts bring 
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knowledge, skills, and new information to bear upon the formulation of policy. 
Partisans will play a role in setting the agenda, deciding on which issues have moral 
and political weight for them, and for the polity as a whole. They do not do so alone, 
however. Leaders play a motivational role in activating partisans, but they also play 
an ideational role in deciding the direction and content of policies. The model which 
I envisage here has experts playing a supplemental role to the deliberations of 
partisans and leaders.  
 To be clear: leaders and partisans do not deliberate with each other directly. 
Leaders must lead: they cannot participate in the same way as everyone else. Rather, 
leaders set the direction of policy as a reaction to their followers' input into a 
deliberative electoral process, with partisans continue to deliberate over the policies 
proposed by the leader. The relationship is a dynamic one: rather than a single vote 
signalling the assent of partisans to a policy, there is a continual series of deliberative 
polls and internal referenda regarding the performance of the leader and the direction 
of the party. Similarly, leaders continually act to persuade the partisans, to justify 
their policies, and to shape the internal discourse of the party as well as external 
discourses. Thus, there is not so much a set agenda, or an agenda set by any one, as 
there is a continual shaping and re-shaping of partisan opinion and reworking of 
policies. 
 Such an approach is liable to inspire two criticisms: that such a process 
sounds too vague, chaotic, and underdetermined; and that it is not viable for party 
leaders to be constantly attempting to convince partisans of their proposals, and to be 
continually reworking policies. Firstly, a deliberative process such as I have outlined 
here will be inevitably  messy, lacking both the clarity and determinate character of a 
policy-agenda commanded by party leader with no referral. It will not necessarily be 
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chaotic, however. Recall our discussion of party manifestos as guides for 
deliberation. The proposals for policies and their revision will not be arbitrary, but 
according to values and commitments make public beforehand. As such, policies 
may be reworked, but this need not be inconsistent with established and publicly 
knowable aims. Second, much will depend upon the circumstances  in which parties 
contest for electoral victory. The knowledge that other leaders will portray them as 
not credible if their policies cannot carry the support of a majority of their own party 
will act as an incentive to continually re-engage with party members in what can 
often seem a dispiriting enterprise.   
 
3.4. The Selection of Leaders 
The internal democracy of parties entails, at a minimum, an electoral contest 
between potential party leaders. In hosting such contests, political parties become 
electoral arenas within the larger arenas of parliament and the public sphere. Party 
leadership contests tend towards being ignominious affairs; lacking the public gaze 
and glamour of national election campaigns and debates, and displaying the 
unattractive spectacle of party infighting, descending into factionalism. However, it 
is my contention here that, when suitably modelled, party leadership contests can be 
sites for intra-party representation beyond momentary elections.  
 The number and diversity of candidates standing for the party leadership will, 
of course, be related to but not dependent upon the size and diversity of the party 
itself. In relatively small parties that focus on one or a few related policy issues, such 
as environmentalist parties, there is unlikely to be a great number of candidates. In 
larger and more diverse parties, however, there are likely to be a greater number of 
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candidates, representing a greater range of interests and discursive values. This raises 
an important question: should the whole spectrum of a party's interests and values be 
represented in leadership contests? 
 While such a proposal is attractive from a group representative point of view, 
there is no reason, I think, why this should necessarily be the case. Some discursive 
threads within parties will be better suited to engaged spectatorship and to a critical 
appraisal of the leadership contestants, pressing them to address certain concerns 
without any positive analogue, rather than advancing any positive proposals 
themselves. Moreover, it is not necessary or desirable for every candidate to 
represent a thread of the party's discursive make-up. Such an insistence may have a 
contrary effect: that is, candidates who represent hegemonic discourses may be 
reinforced to the exclusion of insurgent groups, and new strands may be prevented 
from emerging. 
 Furthermore, the scope of who gets to vote in party elections is greatly 
increased compared to the delegated deliberations of party conferences: the 
constituency of the electoral contest encompasses all party members. This raises 
several difficulties from a deliberative democratic perspective, however. First, there 
is a norm in some parties, such as the British Labour party, for members to de facto 
possess more than one vote, not according to a principle of epistemic responsibility, 
but to how many affiliated associations the member belongs.  From both a 
deliberative perspective and the account of parties set about above, such a practice is 
unacceptable because it pushes parties towards faction and undermines solidarity 
between partisans. Unless such practices can be justified to partisan constituencies 
and then ratified accordingly by majority vote, unequal voting is likely to produce 
long-term discontent and instability, as certain interest groups are likely to dominate 
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elections at the expense of others, producing outcomes which many partisans will 
find lacking in representativeness.   
 Secondly, should the votes for party leaders be held as open primaries, that 
is, as elections which are open to non-partisan and independent voters? While the 
practice of open primaries has been introduced in elections in the United States, their 
democratic efficacy is, I think, extremely doubtful. Removing the partisan 
qualification from voting not only risks external manipulation by other groups intent 
on skewing the results of a party's internal election, but also undermines parties' 
ability to reproduce and express their shared values, interests, and identity, 
effectively denuding the party of its representative capacity and diluting the pool of 
argumentative discourses within civil society.  
 Thirdly, should party members cast their votes in secret, as in public 
elections, or in public? The justification for secret balloting is well known: 
anonymity acts as a barrier towards bribery and intimidation of citizens and 
manipulation of electoral outcomes. However, the deliberative defence of the 
practice of open voting from John Stuart Mill onwards makes a compelling counter-
claim, that making voting public pushes citizens to justify their preferences publicly 
and makes them accountable to one another.
20
 While the argument for the secret 
ballot holds in the wider public sphere, the conditions for the prohibition of public 
voting are lessened in party settings. Although the possibility of intimidation and 
bribery still exist, partisans are better placed than citizens in general to police such 
threats, and as members of self-regulating associations they are also responsible for 
constructing the norms which govern partisan behaviour. Moreover, the deliberative 
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 See John Stuart Mill (1975) "Considerations on Representative Government" in John Stuart Mill: 
Three Essays (London: Oxford University Press). 
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benefits of open ballots in partisan setting outweigh the potential costs, as it provides 
a mechanism by which partisans can deliberate together over matters of shared 
principles and identity prior to internal elections. Thus, the private character of 
political parties creates conditions amenable to public voting, whereas the 
differentiated character of the public sphere creates conditions which require voting 
in secret.      
 
3.5. Party Whips 
Whips are perhaps the least attractive feature of political parties to democratic 
theorists, perhaps because they seem to embody the negative connotations of parties: 
whips exert coercive pressures and inducements on representatives to vote on 
legislation along partisan lines, posing a serious threat to independent judgement If 
representatives fail to do so on issues deemed significant (the famous "three line 
whip", signifying the number of times the issue has been underlined by whips in 
party memoranda) the whip can be "withdrawn", thus expelling the representative 
from the party. That the term for the practice originates in 18th century hunting 
terminology, referring to the huntsman's assistant responsible for driving stray dogs 
back into the pack, hardly adds to moral lustre of the practice.
21
     
 However, before rushing to judgement, we must note that the coercive 
function of party whips is not the only function which parties assign to them. 
Effectively, whips act as party administrators, acting to prioritise certain issues and 
debates in order of their importance to the party's interests, and playing an epistemic 
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 Source: http://www.parliament.uk/about/mps-and-lords/principal/whips/ Last accessed 3 June, 
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role in facilitating communication between and in providing information to partisan 
representatives. Whips also manage a "pairing system", whereby members of other 
parties agree not to vote in the legislature when other business prevents them from 
attending. This contributes towards cementing relations of trust and reciprocity 
between partisans of different parties, as well as avoiding controversies over the 
legitimacy of vote outcomes. 
 Party whips therefore play many roles in ordering party government and 
regulating the rivalry between partisans. Even their coercive role has deliberative 
merit: in offering incentives and disincentives to maintain party discipline, whips can 
also maintain party identity, by providing disincentives to break with the party line, 
and contribute towards the successful enactment of manifesto pledges and 
commitments.  
 The reform of party whips that I suggest is less to do with abolishing their 
coercive practices than with expanding their activities to include instigating and 
moderating deliberative forums within the party. These deliberations would be 
activated when one or more representatives express reservations about voting 
according to party commitments, or along partisan lines. The deliberative body 
would then meet to produce reciprocal justifications for why the party and the 
dissenting representatives held their positions, allowing both to state their reasons 
and attempt to convince the other. (Such deliberative forums would also supplement 
party whips epistemic roles of facilitating the exchange of information.) The threat 
of the incentive/disincentive structure would still be present, but would only be 
activated after the deliberation took place.  
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 Overall, then, it should be clear from this brief sketch of several proposals 
that the room for deliberation and intra-party democracy is plentiful. The proposals 
provided here would go some way towards deepening and expanding the deliberative 
capacities of parties, increasing their representativeness and responsiveness to the 
beliefs and convictions of partisan supporters. I now move beyond intra-party 
democracy to consider the deliberative opportunities presented by inter-party 
democracy. 
 
4. Deliberation between parties 
In this section I will extend my analysis of the deliberative capacities of parties, 
going beyond the internal workings of party democracy to the interactions between 
parties in democratic politics. As we have seen, there is space available within the 
structures of modern political parties for more and greater deliberation. However, 
there are also opportunities for greater deliberation in the organisation of conflict 
between parties. I sketch several of these opportunities below.  
 
4.1. Structured Conflict and Regulated Rivalry 
I want to argue here that party competition discharges several important functions for 
democratic politics. I will discuss three such functions, important from the 
deliberative democratic perspective: contributing to democratic stability, producing 
political clarity, and as conducive to prudential governance.   
 Firstly, parties contribute to political stability through the taming of political 
conflict. In other settings, conflicts over interests and values can lead to civil war and 
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violent revolution. Parties, however, maintain a semblance of this conflict while 
divesting it of the potential for violence and civil disorder. To borrow a phrase from 
Mouffe, parties engage in agonistic competition rather than antagonism. Let us 
return to Burke's definition of party: "a body of men united, for promoting by their 
joint endeavours the national interest, upon some particular principle upon which 
they are all agreed" (Burke, 1993). In parties, interest and principle are united around 
some conception of the common good. By conceiving of themselves as proponents 
of the common good, partisans set themselves the task of acting for the good of the 
body politic, not the good of one part of the body politic alone. And in viewing the 
good health of the body politic as concomitant with their own interests and 
principles, parties give expression to the conflicts which characterise political order 
while prohibiting them from spilling over into more violent forms of contestation. To 
not do so would be form of self-contradiction.  
 We can, of course, easily imagine contrary cases, where partisans have 
viewed the health of the body politic as better served by removing a malign element 
rather than in healing or pacifying it. Our response to this can only be that the line 
between factions and parties is blurry, and that parties can easily collapse into 
factions, which feel no attachment to the good of all.
22
 This is not a matter of 
definitional purity: that parties are only truly parties when they act in certain ways, 
and become something else when they act in different ways. For a thing to act in a 
certain way reveals its nature; parties do not act like factions, and factions do not act 
like parties. The internal dynamics of the organisation will have changed to such a 
degree that it will no longer be appropriate to call it by that name. Its external actions 
are simply a consequence of this change.  
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 This raises the question of what mechanisms can be put into place, and what norms can be 
cultivated, to discourage the lapse from parties to factions.  
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 Secondly, parties induce clarity around political issues. Partisan discourse is 
often the lens through which citizens come to see and to understand issues. It is from 
these understandings that citizens come to order their political preferences and arrive 
at some political self-understanding. This is analogous to the widely discussed 
phenomenon of "framing effects" of elite discourse on public opinion formation 
(Druckman and Nelson, 2003). That is, when a particular range of considerations are 
articulated by a speaker, causing individuals to focus on these considerations when 
they construct their own judgements. For example, if a demonstration by an 
extremist group is discussed by a speaker in terms of freedom of speech and of 
association, then the audience will likely base their judgements around 
considerations for the value of these freedoms. In contrast, if the demonstration is 
discussed in terms of public safety and social cohesion, then these considerations 
will likely predominate in an audience's opinion-formation. 
 Similarly, partisan discourse filters issues and interprets events via 
communicative mechanisms such as narratives. Narratives are widely discussed in 
public political commentary, alongside a growing literature within political science. 
Great significance is attached to constructing and controlling one's own narrative. A 
narrative is a rhetorical device which locates events within a larger, linear story, 
usually one of shared identity and hard-won victories (Boswell, 2013). Partisan 
narratives present citizens with ways in which to make sense of public affairs by 
relating events and issues to wider social problems, and to provide citizens with an 
electoral choice between competing discourses, which may be evaluated in terms of 
which appears to make the most sense. 
 Thirdly, political parties, and by implication partisanship, play an epistemic 
role within legislative assemblies and public discourse. Partisans represent different 
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experiences of social order and provides differing perspectives on political issues. 
Thus, partisan antagonists play a complementary role in terms of the inclusiveness of 
the political sphere taken as a whole. John Stuart Mill defended partisan competition 
on similar grounds, claiming that "No whole truth is possible but by combining the 
points of view of all the fractional truths" (Mill, 1969; Muirhead, 2006). Partisans, in 
Mill's view, represent such "fractional truths": that is, our particular circumstances 
and experiences will allow us to see some things clearly, such as certain injustices 
perpetuated by institutions, but will obscure other things from us. For example, 
someone who has a strong sense of the injustices perpetuated by certain political and 
economic institutions will be less likely to appreciate the value of tradition and 
continuity in political and social life. Partisans thus cast their opponents into sharp 
relief, contributing to the deliberative process.   
 
4.2. Loyal Opposition and Institutional Rivalry 
A political party represents a part of the body politic. This implies that a party does 
not represent all parts of the body politic. As we have seen, politicians have  
certainly claimed that their party is the party of the people, or the only authentic 
voice of the people's real interests. Such claims elide a fundamental distinction, 
however. Political parties may not represent the whole, but they must speak to the 
interests of the whole. This changes when parties enter government: in offices of 
state, politicians can legitimately claim to speak for the whole, not as partisan, but as 
holder of public office.  
 Many parties which do not govern form parties of opposition, within and 
outside legislative assemblies. The day-to-day work of parties involves contestation 
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of the actions and policies of other parties, many of which discharge a deliberative 
function. Consider, for example, the British parliamentary practice of Prime 
Minister's Questions: the practice of members of parliament from all parties, but 
principally the opposition parties, putting questions to the leader of the governing 
party over matters of public policy. The practice takes place within a formal 
institutional setting, but similar practices can be replicated in other settings across 
the political and public spheres.  
 Such practices discharge three key functions from a deliberative democratic 
perspective. Firstly, the role of opposition parties in this instance is to hold the 
governing party publicly accountable for its policies and its actions. That is, 
opposition parties can demand that the governing party produce regular justifications 
and explanations for its actions and for the consequences of those actions, and to 
provide relevant information. Opposition parties have no power to officially sanction 
or reward the governing party depending upon the content and extensiveness of those 
justifications. The ability to sanction or reward is not inherent to concept of 
accountability, however.
23
 The motivations of the governing party to comply with 
those demands, and the motivations of the opposing parties in demanding them, may 
be entirely strategic: the former will not wish to be seen as disingenuous or evasive, 
while the latter will wish to portray the former as less able and trustworthy than 
themselves. The ability to produce regular public justifications from the government, 
that is, to give reasons for action, is significant for deliberative democracy. 
 Secondly, oppositional settings are conducive to political authenticity: that is, 
politicians lack control of their own environment, and are thus less able to stage 
performances. As partisans argue with one another, their responses to arguments 
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 See Mark Philp (2009) "Delimiting Democratic Accountability", Political Studies, Vol. 57, pp. 28-53.  
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posed against their positions are more likely to be authentic, because the encounter 
takes place under conditions of uncertainty.
24
 Partisans do not know for certain 
which questions and what issues their opposition counterparts will raise, though they 
may make educated guesses. Politicians can try to undermine this process, of course: 
for instance, by planting questions from friendly legislators in an effort to steer the 
debate in their favour and construct a flattering image. However, the oppositional 
character of partisanship means that such strategies will never be completely 
successful.  
  Third, the oppositional character of partisanship acts as an inducement for 
partisans to sharpen and clarify their arguments and an incentive to structuring their 
justifications. When partisans know that they will be held accountable publicly for 
their policies and actions, and risk public humiliation and electoral damage if they 
are found to be misleading or inadequate, they have a strong incentive to make their 
public justifications as convincing and as clear as possible. Partisans may opt for a 
strategy of misdirection and employ evasive rhetoric, but this remains an 
improvement on the alternative of no inducement whatsoever.  
 Moreover, partisan rivalry can produce better quality of deliberation amongst 
partisans by exposing them to alternative rationalities, thus acting as a counterweight 
to tendencies towards group polarisation, as mentioned above. As an historical 
example, consider Geoffrey Hawthorn's reading of the failures of Pericles in the final 
years of the Peloponnesian war. Pericles was certainly an astute politician, 
possessing the requisite capacity for sound strategic judgement. What he lacked, 
however, was "the discipline, in Athens itself and in Sparta, of politically and 
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 On this, see J. E. Green (2009) The Eyes of the People: Democracy in an Age of Spectatorship (New 
York: Oxford University Press), Ch. 4. 
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strategically coherent adversaries. He knew things could go wrong. But he had not 
imagined that the dominant reasoning in Sparta would not be his own, and that the 
Spartans would be determined to pursue the war" (Hawthorn, 2009: 203-228). A 
similar process is at work in deliberative encounters between parties. Opposition and 
challenge can improve the quality of deliberation between parties. Moreover, 
contestation between parties may play an important role in mirroring the contestation 
between discourses in the public sphere, thus raising the level of overall deliberation 
in a polity and allowing for greater political control of the state by citizens (Dryzek, 
2000, 2010).   
 Processes such as those described here, of inducing public justifications and 
explanations from partisans which are authentic, clear, and well-considered, are 
facilitated by the asymmetric advantages of governing parties and parties of 
opposition. Consider that governing parties hold the opposition at a fundamental 
disadvantage: they have the bureaucratic apparatus of the modern state at their 
disposal, and can call upon its resources to furnish them with more accurate, 
detailed, and recently acquired information, such as the consequences of their 
policies. However, counterbalancing this asymmetry of information, parties of 
opposition hold a populist advantage over parties of government. Opposition parties, 
which are not responsible for the actions of the state, can tap into the public 
discourses much more effectively than parties of government, effectively siding with 
the people in criticising and holding the government to account. These two 
advantages counterbalance each other, meaning that contests between the two are in 
practice evenly matched. 
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5. Conclusion 
 In this chapter I have attempted to demonstrate the compatibility of the theory of  
deliberative democracy with political parties and partisanship. A concern with 
realism  directs us to consider parties and partisanship in more detail. However, 
parties and partisanship seemingly posed a challenge for deliberative democracy, as 
they appeared to display anti-deliberative features such as an emphasis on political 
conflict and interests. I traced this antipathy to parties' association with factions, and 
argued that there is no  necessary antipathy between parties and deliberation once the 
former are disassociated     from factions. Parties provide public justifications for 
their policies, whilst factions do not. Parties are thus attuned to public political 
deliberation. I went on to outline several   important functions which parties 
discharged for democracy, including the organisation of politics and motivating 
citizen participation. 
 I then attempted to demonstrate how parties could deepen their existing 
capacities   for internal deliberation. I sketched five opportunities for parties to do so. 
They were: the production of party manifestos, the occasion of party conferences, the 
setting of internal agendas, the selection of party leaders, and the reform of party 
whips. I then moved to  discuss the role which party competition can play in 
deliberation, suggesting that parties promote democratic goods through their 
regulated rivalry, and that the opposition and challenges which parties present to one 
another improves the quality of deliberation, both within parties and in the wider 
public sphere.      
 As a final word on parties, it should be remembered that, although parties are 
not factions by virtue of providing public justifications for their policies, parties can   
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nevertheless come in better and worse forms. Indeed, the attempt to make parties 
more deliberative is in recognition of the fact that many of the twentieth century's 
most horrific crimes were perpetrated by parties. These parties often provided 
justifications for their behaviour and often sought to redefine 'the people' in an effort 
to exclude or marginalise certain groups. The history of parties makes an 
engagement with them all the more  important, however. It should therefore be the 
task of deliberative theorists, and political theorists  more broadly, to work to 
improve the quality of parties and partisanship. 
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Chapter 5 
Deliberation and Emergency Politics 
 
1. Introduction 
Over the past two decades, the democracies of the Western world have been faced 
with numerous crises on different fronts. The terrorist attacks of September 2001 
against the United States were followed by more attacks against other countries, 
notably the Madrid  train bombings in 2004 and the London underground bombings 
in 2005. The ensuing  military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq remain ongoing, 
and have provoked other conflicts in the Middle East. The 'credit crunch' of 2007 and 
the financial crisis of 2008    have caused wide-ranging dislocations in many 
economies, and have discredited the prevailing neo-liberal paradigm of financial 
capitalism. There are forebodings that the   system which gave rise to the crisis has 
not been sufficiently reformed, and that another   recession is imminent. In addition 
to these concrete problems, climate scientists have   warned ominously that 
widespread degradation of the earth's atmosphere, caused chiefly     by carbon 
dioxide emissions, will result in changes in climate which could well prove 
disastrous for the entire human species.  
 In this turbulent context, the traditional preoccupations of moral and political 
philosophy, including the focus on deliberative democracy, can appear irrelevant, 
and perhaps frivolous. When faced with these mounting and various challenges, 
political philosophy can often seems like Nero fiddling while Rome burns, more 
concerned with matters of abstract rights and justice than with urgent problems 
facing societies here and  now. While this charge may not be wholly deserved, it 
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does carry an element of truth.  Liberal political philosophy has been traditionally 
concerned with theories of distributive justice: that is, with the moral ordering of the 
distribution of social and material goods throughout society. In its ideal form it 
assumes a stable, comparatively affluent society       for its implementation. It should 
not be surprising, then, that this period of crises has coincided with an increasing 
dissatisfaction with this mode of political theorising and a concomitant interest in 
forms of political realism. 
 As we have seen in Chapter 2, theories of deliberative democracy have been 
developed within the framework of liberal moralist political philosophy. Although 
deliberative democratic theories can trace their origins to a multiplicity of sources, 
deliberative theory in its contemporary form owes much to the pre-political, 
moralising Kantianism that runs through the work of John Rawls and Jürgen 
Habermas. We might,   then, ask whether deliberative democracy also relies on the 
existence of a stable and comparatively affluent society, one with embedded norms 
of cooperation and reciprocity, where deliberation belongs to the superstructure of 
politics and relies for its existence on contingent historical conditions. Certainly, 
while there have been expansions in both the literature on deliberative politics and 
the literature on emergencies, both have largely    carried on in mutual isolation (see 
Lazar, 2009; Honig, 2009; Sorrell, 2013; Runciman, 2013). This is not helped by 
many deliberative theorists, who appear to believe that citizens should foster 
deliberative democracy in less than ideal conditions by mimicking ideal behaviour, 
and who rely on the existence of deliberative democratic institutions, which can 
appear eminently fragile, to supply the conditions under which ideal deliberation can 
take place (Gutmann and Thompson, 2004: 1-3; Stears, 2007). Deliberative 
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democracy thus appears vulnerable to the challenge of emergency, where conditions 
appear hostile to the possibility of political deliberation.  
 The animating concern of this chapter is that deliberative democracy is a craft  
suitable only for calm weather, and is wholly unfit for stormy political conditions. 
My aim in this chapter is to argue that deliberative democracy can successfully 
theorise the      conditions of emergency, and is thus not precluded by emergency 
circumstances. This concern cuts to the core of the engagement between deliberative 
democracy and political realism. Deliberation does not have to harmonise with every 
other aspect of democratic politics, but it must be able to coexist with other 
longstanding elements of democratic  politics. To the extent that a theory fails to 
make room for such coexistence, it falls short      as a credible theory of democratic 
politics. Now, I do not claim here that emergencies are  necessary or desirable 
aspects of politics, but they are recurrent features of our political landscape, 
nevertheless. Emergencies may not, as some think, be latent in the human condition, 
but it  makes sense to orientate ourselves, in both our democratic theory and practice, 
as if they were always possible.
25
 As I shall explain below, emergencies neither 
emerge from outside of politics (except in the cases of natural disasters) nor come to      
define or organise the political. They are, to reiterate, features of politics which recur 
in various guises - neither more nor less. If deliberative democracy cannot speak to 
the challenge of emergencies, then it will find itself an increasingly marginalised 
theory in a world dominated by crises.  
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 For the classic theorists of emergency - Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Rousseau - as well as for 
moderns such as Carl Schmitt, the state of emergency, whether potential or actual, was the 
permanent condition of humankind. Of course, this does not imply that these theorists held the 
same position on emergencies. See N. Lazar (2009) Ch. 2, for one possible division along republican 
and decisionist lines.      
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 This chapter has the following structure: I begin with a brief discussion of the 
character of emergencies. Emergencies have often been characterised in the history 
of political thought as exceptional circumstances to the norms governing everyday 
political conduct. Many contemporary political and legal theorists reproduce this 
norm/exception dichotomy, often implicitly. However, there has been a growing 
counter-movement to displace this conceptual framework, and to theorise 
emergencies as continuous with  everyday political norms. This literature 
demonstrates that emergencies do not have to constitute a state of exception from 
normal politics; indeed, that emergencies are better viewed as a part of politics. It is 
in this political context that deliberation is best placed to offer a response to 
emergency conditions.   
 I then focus on four challenges of emergencies. Taken individually or 
together, they are  neither necessary nor sufficient criteria for an emergency. 
Emergencies may exhibit all or none of these features, and they may also occur in 
non-emergency conditions, such as everyday police operations. I have chosen these 
features for examination because they manifest particularly strong challenges to the 
feasibility of  deliberative democracy. They  are: necessity, complexity, secrecy,  and 
urgency. In each of these cases, the possibility for meaningful deliberation is 
challenged. I illustrate these features of emergency through contemporary examples 
which continue to shape our democratic politics, such as the economic collapse of 
2007/08, the ongoing threat of terrorism, and imperceptibly slow environmental 
degradation in the form of climate change. Each of these scenarios pose    recurrent 
challenges to democracies. Helpfully, their open-ended natures allow me to 
emphasise continuities between emergencies and normal politics; continuities often 
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downplayed in a theoretical literature that instead emphasises moments of rupture 
and exceptionality.  
1.1. Theorising emergencies 
Emergencies, by their very nature, pose great challenges for democratic politics. 
While democratic government by democracy may head-off certain forms of 
emergency, such as mass famines, it is far from a panacea (Sen, 1999). Indeed, it has 
been a recurrent lament throughout modern political history that democracies dither 
during crises, producing much talk but little action, while dictatorships, 
unencumbered by democratic imperatives of persuasion and compromise, show 
decisive action in the face of emergencies. Indeed, this was one of Schmitt's 
complaints against parliamentary democracy in the Weimar republic (Schmitt, 
2000). While it is not the case that democracies are completely ineffectual when 
confronted by emergencies, the argument that emergencies pose a special problem 
for democracies nevertheless displays great plausibility.
26
     
 This is especially true when considering the possibilities for political 
deliberation. Emergency conditions are those under which we might expect political 
deliberation to be most needed but also most vulnerable. The importance of careful 
deliberation is felt most keenly in democracy's most dangerous moments, where a 
wrong decision could lead to disaster, and when the temptation to simply override 
democratic procedures is at its  strongest. However, deliberative democracy seems to 
be eminently fragile when faced with the characteristic features of emergency, 
among which we can include necessity, secrecy, urgency, and complexity. The 
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 For the argument that democracy's inherent flexibility and ethos of experimentation is an asset for 
coping with emergencies, see D. Runciman (2013). This is, however, not the approach which I take in 
this chapter.   
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possibilities for meaningful deliberation thus seem to be foreclosed or put under 
extreme pressure by the nature of emergency. Against this, we    might reasonably 
complain that if a political theory cannot assist us in our moments of greatest peril, 
and offers us little guidance on how to proceed when circumstances are far from 
ideal, then it can have only limited application in a democratic politics where the 
possibility for emergency is always present, and where democracies should thus be  
constantly on guard for the next emergency to appear on the horizon.  
 It is not entirely the case, however, that the relationship between deliberation 
and emergencies has been entirely overlooked. Bruce Ackerman, for one, is a 
theorist with interests in matters of emergency government but remains sympathetic 
to models of deliberative democracy. For Ackerman, moments of great crisis, 
notably the framing and adoption of the United States constitution, the Civil War, 
and the Great Depression era,   serve as exemplars of popular deliberation in action 
(Ackerman, 1991). On this view, far from inimical to deliberation, great emergencies 
can actually produce the most authentic instances of deliberative democracy. 
However, the plausibility of Ackerman's account is undermined somewhat by his 
belief that the capacity for deliberation is a scarce resource. It is only in moments of 
emergency, Ackerman believes, that citizens can be sufficiently excited to participate 
in popular deliberation. Normal politics, therefore, cannot and should not be 
conducted according to mass deliberation, which is reserved only for moments of 
constitutional founding or for matters of basic justice.
27
  
 Aside from the historical veracity of Ackerman's account, his conception of 
mass deliberation as a scarce resource to be  parcelled out only in times of utmost 
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 In this respect, Ackerman follows Rawls's prescriptions on the highly limited role of mass 
deliberation in governmental decision-making. See J. Rawls (2005).   
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emergency  tends to make it of only limited usefulness. Even if Ackerman's 
historical account and theoretical argument are sound, emergencies occur in 
moments other than constitutional founding and re-founding. Emergencies are more 
common than the great moments of political crisis which Ackerman examines, which 
occur roughly once a century. In line     with the argument for the essential continuity 
between emergencies and everyday   democratic politics, then, we can say that 
emergencies are not simply confined to the momentous events which inform 
Ackerman's argument. While Ackerman's argument may hold true for these instances 
of emergency, it does not treat with other instances. Moreover, Ackerman hold that 
the capacity to engage in widespread deliberation is best viewed as a scarce, it is 
more plausible to think of it as we would a muscle. When it is regularly exercised, it 
grows stronger and more robust. When it is rarely used, however, it atrophies and 
cannot bear excessive strain. The more emergencies we are faced with, then, the   
stronger our capacity for deliberation must be.   
 In the following section, I examine five different features of emergency 
which pose challenges for deliberative democracy. In each case, the emergency 
brings forward challenges for the possibility of political deliberation - or at  least, 
deliberation as it is regularly characterised in the existing literature. These are 
problems of necessity,  complexity, secrecy, urgency, and scale.  These features of 
emergency are not mutual exclusive, and may occur together in different contexts. A 
global economic emergency, for example, may present threats of necessity and 
powerlessness, but it may also require politicians to conduct their deliberations in 
secret. For the sake of conceptual clarity, however, I treat these features separately 
here. It is also worth mentioning that none of    these features are necessary or 
sufficient conditions for a state of emergency. For example, emergencies may take 
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the form of natural disasters where the correct response, such as a mass evacuation, 
is both indisputable and (cognitively, if not practically) uncomplicated. On the other 
hand, we may be faced on a regular basis by discourses of necessity, or be required 
to assess the claims of experts when dealing with complex issues. My argument is 
that, although emergency conditions threaten deliberation, these threats are not 
insuperable and are indeed prone to be overstated. It is our task here to find the 
spaces within these circumstances, typical of emergencies, in which political 
deliberation can take place. 
 
2. The politics of emergencies 
In this section, I engage with the doctrine of exceptionalism, represented by its 
foremost advocate, Carl Schmitt. As we have seen, emergencies seemingly pose a 
challenge for deliberation, threatening the possibilities for  deliberation in 
democratic politics. However, the importance of political deliberation is never 
greater than during states of emergency, when the outcomes of decisions can prove 
momentous and the temptation to override democratic procedures is great. As such, 
deliberative democratic theory must demonstrate that it is compatible with conditions 
of emergencies. The first step in doing so   is to de-exceptionalise the state of 
emergency; that is, to show that emergencies are a part of 'ordinary' politics, rather 
than moments of exception. To do this, I offer reasons for the superiority of a 
'continuity' thesis of emergencies advanced by recent theorists, showing the norms 
governing emergencies to be continuous with those governing normal democratic 
politics. So conceived, emergencies fall within the same domain as political 
deliberation,   and are one of its proper objects.    
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 A note on the terminology: I employ the term "state of emergency" to refer to 
the conditions under which emergencies obtain, rather than any legal-constitutional 
declaration. For ease of analysis, I limit the discussion of this section to the 
conceptual conditions of emergency, rather than the legal definitions of emergency 
or the legality of emergency executive powers. Much of the theoretical literature on 
emergencies is found with contemporary legal studies, and focuses on the 
relationship between emergencies and constitutional government. Partial engagement 
with this literature is unavoidable, though my primary objective here is to examine 
emergencies tout court rather than elaborate their constitutional status. 
 
2.1. The doctrine of exceptionalism  
 The term "emergency", as Nomi Lazar points out, is "among those words that 
Wittgenstein has taught us to think of as naming not one but a family of concepts, 
which resemble each other in much the same manner that families do" (see Lazar, 
2009: 7;   Freeden, 1996). Emergencies provoke thoughts of moments of extreme 
violence or   hardship, such as riots, plagues, wars, earthquakes and other natural 
disasters. Each of     these cases is different - some are unavoidable, naturally 
occurring phenomena, while    others are the product of human intervention - but all 
share similar features and occupy similar terrain in the conceptual topography of 
politics. They all involve moments of        great danger to life and property, disorder 
and dislocation, and widespread upheaval.  
 In legal and political theory, recent discussions of emergency have 
traditionally been dominated by the anti-liberal thought of Carl Schmitt and his 
critique of parliamentary democracy (Schmitt, 2000).  For Schmitt, the 
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circumstances which count as an emergency and thus constitute a state of exception 
from "normal" politics is a matter decided by the sovereign and the sovereign alone. 
By positing a fundamental rupture between times of emergencies and everyday 
politics, Schmitt is able to cast his sovereign as a wielder of  absolute discretionary 
authority (Schmitt, 2005). His conception of the emergency thus  stands in the 
tradition of sovereign decisionism exemplified by Thomas Hobbes. For   Schmitt, as 
for Hobbes, responding to a chaotic world that is not governed by norms by acting in 
accordance with norms and restrictions is a fool's errand. In conditions of    turbulent 
disorder, only a sovereign with absolute and undivided power can provide an 
adequate response and re-establish the conditions of order. For both thinkers, the 
state of emergency is a spectre which looms over human life; it is the  permanent 
condition of humanity, whether actual or potential. The emergency powers of the 
sovereign are thus unbounded by a constitution and require no public justification, 
because norms can only apply under normal circumstances. It cannot be the case, 
then, that the sovereign violates   any rules because in states of exception no rules 
apply. Moreover,  emergency circumstances and their specific characters cannot be 
predicted ex ante; thus, no laws can be produced to regulate them. Schmitt's doctrine 
of the state of exception and sovereign power is therefore fundamentally at odds with 
the principles of democratic accountability (Lazar, 2009: 19).  
 While Schmitt's conception of the state of emergency has proven 
unsurprisingly controversial in modern political theory, it is dominated the literature 
on emergency conditions. Indeed, in refusing to confront the challenges of 
emergency, it is sometimes claimed that much mainstream liberal political theory 
unknowingly reproduces Schmitt's norm/exception dichotomy, whilst theorists 
explicitly treating with the problems of emergency, such as Giorgio Agamben, tend 
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to follow in Schmitt's wake (Agamben, 2005). The terms of discussion regarding 
emergencies have thus been ceded to, and dictated by, those who advocate a 
fundamental rupture between conditions of emergency and normal politics.  
 
2.2. Against exceptionalism 
Against the norm/exception paradigm advocated by Schmitt and his followers, recent 
theorists (Honig, 2009; Lazar, 2009) have attempted to de-exceptionalise states of 
emergency by stressing the commonalities between emergencies and normal politics. 
The distinction between emergency and normal politics is not categorical, therefore, 
but one of degree. Just as an individual may face an emergency when confronted 
with threats to life or property, a state may faces emergency when confronted with 
the same. The difference is merely one of scale. The  appropriate analogy is that of 
crime. Just as criminals threaten bodies within the state, emergencies threaten the 
body of the state, in either sense of its material body (by threatening the lives of a 
multitude of its citizens) or its ethos (by threatening the values embodied within its 
institutions, for example). 
 The critique of liberalism adopted by the exceptionalists, the argument goes, 
rests on a caricatured view of liberal constitutionalism. Far from viewing rights as 
constant and inviolable, for instance, democratic polities are prepared to overrule 
individual rights when other values, such as survival, are at stake. Indeed, they do so 
regularly. The fact of the existence of criminal justice systems in liberal democracies 
is sufficient evidence of this. As Lazar puts it, "the right to freedom of  religion is not 
absolute, but may potentially be derogated when other interests of critical importance 
are taken into account", such as issues of security and autonomy  (Lazar, 2009: 91). 
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Similar prohibitions exist for freedoms of speech and assembly. (We cannot, to cite 
two classic examples, maliciously spread alarm through a crowded theatre, nor incite 
an angry mob towards acts of violence, without expecting the coercive force of the 
state to bear down  upon us.) While "security, order, desert, group cohesion, cultural 
pluralism, and the preservation and expression of cultural heritage" are not liberal 
values, they are values nevertheless (ibid: 89). And while these values may stand in 
tension with those of liberal democracy, tension does not entail mutual exclusivity. 
Conflicts between values are common and can be navigated successfully in 
democratic politics.         
 Similarly, emergencies exhibit several features which do not conform to the 
exceptionalist account. One such feature is their potentially open-ended character. 
Much scholarship on emergencies overlooks this, and thus reproduces Schmitt's 
dichotomy  between norm and exception. This is a mistake, however,. The received 
view is that, as Scheppele notes, emergencies and normal politics "exist in two 
different states, as if there were a toggle switch between them that one could flip in 
times of crisis and flip black at the end" (Scheppele, 2006: 838). On this 
exceptionalist view, emergencies are temporally contained moments of abnormality, 
and normality recommences when the state brings the emergency to a close. 
However, emergencies are rarely time-bound in so neat a fashion. Indeed, when an 
emergency continues for many years, it can become the norm. In some cases, such as 
in Northern Ireland or Sri Lanka, it can make more sense to ask why an emergency 
came to a close than why it continued for so long, or why it erupted in the first place. 
The contrast between emergencies and 'normal' politics can thus grow vague, with 
emergency circumstances often bleeding into non-emergency politics, with one 
becoming indistinguishable from the other. 
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 Secondly, a binary view of emergency circumstances, where emergencies are 
discrete incidents bracketed by normal politics, occludes the normalisation of 
emergency powers in the everyday practice of states. For example, state and federal 
governments in the United States declared forty-seven states of emergency in 2005 
alone, mostly in response to extreme weather events and in providing assistance to 
the evacuees of affected areas. In the majority of cases, political and everyday life 
continued as normal, uninterrupted. The states of emergency were fairly 
commonplace and unremarkable for the majority of citizens. It is an important but 
unanswered question, therefore, whether contemporary politics is novel because it is 
increasingly characterised by emergencies, or whether contemporary politics has 
migrated towards a state of almost constant emergency. Moreover, the exceptionalist 
view overlooks the possibility that emergencies irrevocably and subtly alter the 
landscape of politics. Far from being self-contained events, emergencies can have 
ramifications long after their termination, even if they are brought to a close with 
relative success. The steady accretion of emergency powers, for example, marks a 
subtle change in the power-relations between many modern states and the ways in 
which bureaucratic organisations discharge their responsibilities. 
 Thirdly, despite the account of sovereign decisionism argued for by Schmitt, 
emergencies are not essentially mysterious phenomena that cannot be predicted in 
advance. The specific character of an emergency may be difficult to specify in 
advance with any certainty, but emergencies are not unknowable or wholly 
unpredictable prior to their occurrence. Indeed, they exemplify certain characteristics 
which I examine in the following sections, such as urgency, complexity, the rhetoric 
of necessity, and the need for secrecy. Fourthly, many emergencies are not random 
and do not appear from nowhere; in fact, they originate from politics. They are often 
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the products of political choices and structures, and even when they are not, as in the 
case of natural disasters, they require political responses and may have long-lasting 
political consequences. For instance, political decisions may increase the magnitude 
of the devastation and uncertainty wrought by natural disasters, such as the 
installation of a nuclear power station in an earthquake zone, or neglecting to build 
flood-levees in along a vulnerable coastline. Whatever the origins of emergency, 
then, whether society, the economy, or the weather, emergencies ought to be 
regarded as a challenge, but not an exception, to normal politics.   
 Similarly, under the assumptions of a norm/exception framework, it is 
confusing whether we should describe, say, an outbreak of pacifist resistance as an 
emergency or      not. There is no threat of violence, after all, but the institutions of 
the political order will  have been challenged. This example points to an unwarranted 
conservative impulse in characterisations of emergencies. Namely, that when 
emergencies are characterised in such broad terms, the institutions and principles 
challenged by emergencies are conceived as   static and inviolable. The concern is 
that order is prized over disorder to such an extent      that widespread urgings for 
political change, notably in the form of civil disobedience,    come to be regarded as 
abnormal events, threats to the security of the polity which must       be ended as 
soon as possible.  
 This concern reveals something of the nature of order (a political value of 
crucial importance to realists). How should we react to a choice between disorder 
and an order  which manifestly unjust? Is order to be prized above all other 
considerations? We may   think, if we follow the influential Hobbesian strand within 
realist thought, that we must   prize order first and above all other values, being a 
prerequisite for the realisation of all   other values (see Williams, 2005). This binary 
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view of order and disorder, which goes hand in glove with the norm/exception 
binary, diverts attention away from the important fact that political transitions can be 
more or less orderly (Lazar, 2009: 110-111). In deciding how to respond to civil 
disobedience, then, it is crucial for the state (and its citizens) to ask whether a 
movement threatens the particular order embodied by a regime or the concept of 
order itself. This can be judged by the degree of orderliness exhibited by the 
movement. For example, a movement threatening violent revolution should be 
regarded differently to a pacifist civil rights movement, even though their stated 
goals of effecting regime-change are similar. This perspective looks less like a 
conflict between order and disorder than a rivalry between different conceptions of 
order. That is, it comes to look more like a political, rather than existential, conflict. 
The exceptionalist doctrine makes no such distinction, however, conflating the two.  
 From all this, it should be clear that emergencies are elusive and resist any 
easy definition. However, emergencies do not fit into the bracket of exceptionalism, 
despite the prevalence of this approach in the literature. Emergencies are not extra-
political moments, governed by a separate set of norms to those which govern 
ordinary democratic politics. Indeed, many emergencies emerge from and are 
terminated by politics. The lines between emergencies and ordinary politics may 
often be obscured, and emergencies may be more predictable than many believe. 
Moreover, the exceptionalist account of emergency is characterised by an essential 
conservatism which is hostile to political transitions. Thus, we can reject the 
exceptionalist account while embracing a view of emergencies which treats them for 
what they are; namely, as aspects of politics.  
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3. The problems of necessity 
The first feature of emergencies I will consider is necessity. In the literature on 
emergency politics, the concept of necessity has featured most prominently in 
discussions regarding emergency powers. Indeed, Ferejohn and Pasquino build 
necessity into their definition of exceptional circumstances. Such circumstances, 
they believe, are constituted by various "needs", such as the need for secrecy, the 
need for a rapid response, the need to move large numbers of people, the need to 
create and mobilise armies, and so on (Ferejohn and Pasquino, 2004: 220-221). 
These needs tend to be associated with the very survival of the political order, and 
thus become normative in justifying leaders to take extra-legal actions - such as 
suspending rights of speech and assembly - to preserve that order. Although there are 
shades of this version of necessity in one of the forms I discuss below, this is not the 
sense in which I use it here. I am more interested in discussing the conditions of 
emergency than the powers granted to politicians and state officials to respond to 
emergencies. This does not mean that such powers are unproblematic for 
deliberation, but they form no part of the discussion presented here. Instead, I offer a 
distinction between two forms of apparent necessity, and suggest ways in which 
deliberation can prevent and manage these forms.    
 
3.1. Two Forms of Necessity 
The sense in which I invoke the concept of necessity here involves a kind of 
determinism or fatalism. That is, a belief that events are predetermined or inevitable, 
and that human beings, both individually and collectively, can exercise only limited 
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or no control over their own societies.
28
 Necessity so conceived denies or radically 
limits the scope for human agency in politics, and thus forecloses the possibility of 
meaningful deliberation. Deliberation, recall, is reflection tied to action. If we think, 
as with Aristotle, that we cannot deliberate over matters beyond our control, such as 
the composition of stars or mathematical abstractions, and can only deliberate "about 
those things that are in our power and can be done", then this conception of necessity 
threatens the possibility for deliberation by removing whole swathes of life from the 
scope of human influence (Aristotle, 1998: 55). On this view, both politicians and 
citizens are swept away by the course of political events as if they were tidal waves 
which cannot be controlled nor escaped from. This conception of necessity has at 
least two variants: the lack of control over politics, and the lack of choice in politics. 
Both of these forms, I contend, are forms of false-consciousness; that is, they are 
ways of thinking which obscure the true nature of one's situation. I shall illuminate 
both of these variants of necessity before suggesting ways in which deliberation can 
help citizens avoid falling prey to them, and, where some courses of action are truly 
necessary, can help us to arrive at a picture of what must be done and how it ought to 
be done.     
 The former conception of necessity signals a declaration of powerlessness on 
the part of a political figure. Politicians frequently claim they had no role in creating 
an emergency, and that they are simply casualties of unforeseen circumstances like 
everyone else. They claim that they could not have possibly predicted the advent of 
the emergency, often simply because no-one else (or, at least, no-one with a 
reputation for credibility) had foreseen its approach. On this account of necessity, 
politicians may attempt to manage events and processes which are well-known and 
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proceed inexorably, such as doctrines of national decline, but it is simply not in their 
power to arrest these processes and change the course of their societies. Politicians 
cannot change the future; they can simply conduct it into the present with a 
minimum of disorder. In adhering to this conception of necessity, then, politicians 
abnegate responsibility for emergencies. (They may sincerely believe that they have 
little control and thus little responsibility over events, of course, or they may simply 
claim this mindset in order to avoid public humiliation and electoral defeat. The 
outcome, however, remains the same.) They may claim that global economic forces, 
much like the weather, are beyond the scope of anyone's powers to alter. Such 
things, they might say, are deeply unpredictable and, like divine will, probably 
unknowable.   
 The second variant of this conception of necessity follows on from the first: 
an    absence of power signals an absence of choice. On other words, this form of 
necessity dictates that there is some course of action which must be undertaken in 
order to achieve or avoid a certain outcome. Emergency conditions have often been 
characterised by such limited and instrumentalist perspectives, usually fostered by 
both the urgency of the circumstances and the desirability (or lack thereof) of the 
outcome. The claim likely to be heard in this context is that emergencies impose 
severe constraints upon action, narrow the range of possible responses to all but a 
few, and drive decision-making down a particular path. The apparent absence of 
choice can also serve to exculpate politicians from their controversial actions and 
policies, such as sanctioning practices of torture or extraordinary rendition. 
Politicians' actions need not be so extreme to adhere to this form of necessity, 
however. The discourse of globalisation, for example, provides an ample resource 
for politicians to claim that their macroeconomic policy options are constrained by 
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the need to avoid capital flight and maintain confidence in financial markets (Hay, 
2007: Chapter 4).  
 Both forms of necessity threaten the possibilities for political deliberation. 
For if we lack the power to control or influence events and have no choice about 
which policies to pursue, then deliberation is simply redundant or inapplicable. A 
drowning man does not, after all, need to deliberate over whether or not to grab onto 
a life jacket. In other words, the conception of necessity as a lack of choice 
forecloses the possibility for deliberation on the means of policies. For instance, 
when the only way to achieve a given end x (such as avoiding the collapse of a 
nation's finances) is believed to be by taking the specific action y and only action y 
(such as injecting capital into failing banks), with any other action producing a 
different outcome, then there is little point engaging in deliberation. Both the means 
and the ends of policies are thus placed above scrutiny. Likewise, the conception of 
necessity as a lack of control seemingly forecloses the possibility for any 
deliberation on policy whatsoever. If we are convinced of the inevitability of an 
event, or of its unpredictable and uncontrollable nature (such as the damage inflicted 
by changing weather patterns due to global climate change) then there is nothing we 
can do except prepare for the worst. The possibilities for stymieing or reversing the 
coming catastrophe will not have been considered. And without the possibility of 
choice, deliberation is impossible.            
 Moreover, the conception of necessity as a lack of control may act to 
reinforce hegemonic ideologies. By conceptualising social and economic processes 
as inexorable and beyond anyone's power to alter, politicians and citizens will likely 
learn to accommodate themselves to the status quo and to be resistant to any attempts 
at and calls for reform, convincing themselves that they are doomed to failure. This 
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conception of necessity as powerlessness thus breeds political pessimism and 
resignation to existing hegemonies of power, which may stifle or undermine other 
values. Similarly, the conception of necessity as a lack of choice can provide a mask 
for authoritarian political actions (Heller, 2006), where the government will pursue a 
given end by any means. This relates to the conception of necessity outlined by 
Ferejohn and Pasquino (2004), where claims of necessity can be used to justify wide-
ranging and permissive emergency powers. Thus, both conceptions of necessity may 
have baleful effects for democracy beyond closing down the possibilities for 
deliberation. 
 Furthermore, both of these variants of necessity become self-fulfilling if they 
are internalised by policy-makers. Put crudely, perceptions can shape reality. For 
example, if politicians perceive there to be a loss of national autonomy when it 
comes to formulating economic policies, or if they perceive a process to be 
inevitable and can only be negotiated rather than challenged, then this will heavily 
condition the range of policy options which they consider. This has perhaps been the 
case in the discourses surrounding globalisation: If politicians believe that their 
national economies are subject to uncontrolled and unstoppable forces of global 
integration, such as free movement of capital and labour, which cannot be 
apprehended at the level of the nation-state, then they will club together into large 
multinational organisations in an effort to bring these forces under control. In so 
doing,     they pool their nations' sovereignty and, in the case of the European Union, 
agree to multinational policies governing the movement of labour and co-ordinating 
monetary and fiscal policies. Ironically, their individual policy-options are duly 
constrained. Thus, they accelerate the very forces they sought to negotiate, becoming 
193 
 
more integrated into (and thus more vulnerable to shocks in) global markets than 
they were previously and would otherwise have been.           
 It is in this way that the conceptions of necessity outlined here are pernicious 
in not only threatening the possibilities for deliberation but also, connectedly, the 
possibilities for democratic accountability and self-governance. For if politicians 
believe themselves to be   subject to inexorable global forces, and that there capacity 
to craft policy is correspondingly diminished, they will act accordingly. As we have 
seen, these actions can become self-fulfilling, leaving societies hostage to forces 
which could otherwise be mitigated and defended against, and which, owing to their 
transnational character, cannot be held accountable through institutionalised 
democratic mechanisms. Similarly, as the discourses of necessity become more and 
more prevalent, policy-makers will believe they have no alternatives and converge 
on identical sets of policies, leaving citizens with indistinguishable electoral choices 
(Hay, 2007: 151). And if citizens are not offered a choice in their public affairs, then 
they cannot be said to be self-governing.      
 Up till now, I have referred to the problems of necessity in terms which are 
speculative. This may lead the analysis to sound fanciful, so a concrete example 
would be helpful here. Consider, then, how significantly these conceptions of 
necessity came to characterise the response to the 2007-08 financial crisis, especially 
(though not exclusively) amongst politicians in the UK.  The favoured mantra of 
Gordon Brown, then Prime Minister and former Chancellor, was that the collapse of 
the international financial system had "started in America", and that it was a global 
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phenomenon which could not plausibly have been predicted.
29
 There was certainly 
much truth in these claims. The financial crisis had originated in the United States, 
was being experienced across the world, and came as an enormous surprise to 
many.
30
 Despite these evidently sound claims, however, Brown's rhetoric was that of 
necessity. The emergency was externalised as the product of complex economic 
forces beyond the ability of any one politician to apprehend and demanded a 
response which was perceived to be the only available option; an injection of capital 
into failing banks. To do otherwise, to allow the banks to fail, would be 
"unthinkable"; just as unthinkable as the notion, in the years preceding the crisis, that 
such a wide-ranging emergency of financial capitalism was possible. Far from being 
purely speculative, then, the conceptions of necessity elucidated here do feature in 
existing political discourse.    
 
3.2. Deliberative responses to necessity 
If the conceptions of necessity elucidated above are hostile to the possibilities for 
political deliberation, as well as other democratic goods such as accountability and 
self-governance, then deliberation can provide a response to this challenge. Indeed, it 
is my contention here that a deliberative democratic culture can mitigate the worst 
features of the conceptions of necessity and can help democratic citizens and 
politicians to avoid them.  
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 For one possible (and highly polemical) exception, see J. Gray (2009; 1998) False Dawn: The 
Delusions of Global Capitalism (London: Granta). 
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 Political deliberation can help citizens to avoid the dangers of these 
conceptions of necessity in at least three ways. Firstly, a political culture in which 
citizens deliberate together can help to increase historical self-awareness; that is, to 
increase awareness of the contingent nature of our social, political, and economic 
institutions and practices. For instance, the global economic structures and practices 
which led to the 2007-08 financial crisis did not appear ex nihilo, nor were they the 
inevitable outcome of any long-term economic processes. Rather, they were the 
accumulated result of political choices made by elected politicians, state officials, 
and actors within the global financial services industry, amongst others, over several 
decades. (In some cases, these individuals had what they believed to be good 
motives for making these choices, such as the Clinton administration's 'National 
Homeownership Strategy' and the Carter administrations Community Reinvestment 
Act of 1977. While these policies likely laid the foundation for the sub-prime 
mortgage regime of later years and the ensuing emergency, they were originally 
intended to increase homeownership in deprived urban areas.) When institutional 
structures are thus seen as the products of human choices through a process of steady 
accretion rather than mysterious outcomes of uncontrollable forces, and when certain 
emergencies are concomitantly seen as the accidental by-products of these choices 
rather than simply occurring for no reason, citizens and policy-makers can be 
encouraged to reform these institutions and make better choices in the future.     
 While deliberation which increases the historical self-awareness of politicians 
and citizens can therefore play an important role in counteracting the discourses of 
necessity as lack of choice, it can also help to puncture discourses of powerlessness, 
revealing them as overblown and contingent. For example, advocates of the 
globalisation thesis have often overlook the fact that globalisation is hardly a new 
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phenomenon, as the world has been gripped by periodic movements towards 
economic and cultural integration since pre-history. Indeed, the nineteenth century 
was, by many measures, a more globalised period than the present (Hopkins, 2002). 
Public deliberation can also expose these discourses as masks for sectional interests 
and as means for politicians to abnegate responsibility. Indeed, evidence suggests 
that processes of globalisation need not compel politicians towards deregulating their 
economies, for example, because the most attractive economies to capital investors 
are those with highly-skilled workforces and extensive public services (Hay, 2007: 
143-150; Swank, 2002). Moreover, far from becoming an increasingly globalised, 
consolidated world economy, the trend has rather been towards greater 
regionalisation (for increased flows of capital, labour, and products within, rather 
than between, trading blocs), in particular the trading blocs of North America, 
Europe, and East Asia. When such knowledge is diffused through processes of 
political deliberation, it can provide both politicians and citizens with a greater sense 
of autonomy and responsibility, avoiding their unreflective acceptance of discourses 
of powerlessness.  
 Thirdly, through and in addition to puncturing the discourses of necessity and 
providing citizens and politicians with increased historical self-awareness, 
deliberation can also expand the range of feasible policies to be considered. It can 
accomplish this by widening the circle of voices included in policy deliberations 
traditionally dominated by an elite class of experts (as I expand upon in the 
following section), and by providing an epistemic scaffolding for politicians to craft 
policy as well as a means for citizens to pool ideas and knowledge. Thus, democratic 
citizens can come to value the emancipatory potential of political deliberation.   
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 Furthermore, even in those case where some courses of action are indeed 
necessary, deliberation is indispensible for deciding precisely what is to be done and 
how. After all, emergencies can be navigated in better and worse ways. In some 
circumstances, such as deciding how to combat environmental deterioration, 
including all the major stakeholder groups in deliberation is essential for ensuring 
both the quality and the legitimacy of the policy outcome (see Fishkin, 2005). At the 
extreme, we can imagine scenarios where strict environmental controls are 
established, but at the cost of many employment opportunities, resulting in 
widespread unemployment. Such trade-offs may be inevitable, but this can only be 
apprehended properly through a process of inclusive deliberation to consider all 
available strategies. And the legitimacy of any such trade-offs, if they are inevitable, 
will only be deepened by this process.   
 In sum, while discourses of necessity, conceived as both a lack of control 
over  politics and lack of choice regarding feasible alternatives, present hazards for 
deliberation and other democratic goods, they can be effectively avoided by a 
deliberative culture which raises citizens' and politicians' historical self-awareness 
whilst also expanding the horizons of plausible alternative policies. Where some 
courses of action are unavoidable, political deliberation can help to confirm this and 
to improve the means by which these actions are performed, as well as deepening the 
public legitimacy of the outcome.  
 
4. The problem of complexity        
As should be clear by this stage, the financial crisis of 2008 was a remarkably 
complex phenomenon. Comprehension of the events as they unfolded required an 
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extensive knowledge of a multiplicity of extremely technical subjects, from the 
American housing market to the organisation of various financial institutions, to the 
history of international regulatory frameworks, and more. Even many of the workers 
within those financial institutions responsible for crafting their policies only 
possessed knowledge which was deeply imperfect. (Indeed, some proved to be 
remarkably ignorant of the workings of       their own businesses.) Moreover, as we 
have seen, even the possession of an extensive     knowledge of these matters was not 
sufficient for many experts, including economic     policy-makers, to recognise what 
they were witnessing. The financial markets were thus complex in the sense that they 
had a great number of parts which interacted with each      other in ways few could 
have predicted (see Zolo, 1992).    
 Complexity, then, generates a large-scale division of labour, which in turn 
breeds collective uncertainty. As technical knowledge becomes increasingly 
specialised, it also becomes more fragmented. Very few individuals, if any, can 
apprehend the details of a complex system in isolation. Complexity of this sort 
undermines deliberation, such that    only two outcomes are likely: either 
deliberation, because of the very limited and partial knowledge of the participants, 
will be a confused, unstructured jumble with only limited content and uncertain 
legitimacy; or, because the only people with sufficient knowledge       to deliberate in 
any meaningful sense are technical experts, the scope of the deliberation    will be 
extremely limited, in both the number of participants and the range of questions   
which it addresses. Deliberation has thus gone from a meaningful, inclusive part of 
democratic politics to either a disjointed meeting of the many or an exclusive 
counsel of     the few.  
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 These are hard issues, and we cannot expect to navigate around them neatly. 
One fruitful place to start, however, is the view that expert deliberations can 
supplement deliberation amongst citizens, rather than replace it outright. The 
challenge here is to construct mechanisms for the diffusion of expert knowledge 
across the polity, so that deliberations can be more informed and informative. (I 
understand an expert here to be someone who possesses an amount of true beliefs 
that is significantly higher than any ordinary citizen for any given subject matter, as 
well as possessing a set of skills which   allows them to test and extend these beliefs 
across their discipline.
31
) Such mechanisms      are likely to be constituted by the 
intermediate institutions between experts and citizens, including the printed, 
broadcast, and digital media, political parties and interest groups, universities and 
think tanks, formal and informal group associations, and so on. When confronted by 
complex emergency circumstances, then, democracies must respond by constructing 
new divisions of cognitive labour, and by coordinating existing divisions to achieve 
a more deliberative polity (see Christiano, 2012). 
   Furthermore, citizens who are not experts in the sense specified above can 
nevertheless provide a different kind of expertise to deliberation, in the form of 
"local knowledge". That is, the knowledge of those who are likely to be effected by 
the consequences of a change in policy, and have been previously. This form of 
knowledge can not only shape citizens' deliberations but can also be included in the 
deliberations of experts (ibid: 29-30). What expert deliberations gain in technical 
knowledge, they sacrifice by becoming more remote from the lived experiences of 
everyday citizens, who will not only have to live with the consequences of any 
policy but will likely feel its effects more keenly. A   change in the marginal rate of 
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income tax, for instance, will affect the lives of citizens at  the lower end of the 
income scale disproportionate to other citizens. The diffusion of knowledge between 
experts and citizens is thus reciprocal in nature. 
 Moreover, while experts can relay their own parcels of information to 
citizens in     the public sphere, they cannot be assumed automatically to be unbiased 
or objective, in  either the content of their information or the mode of presenting it. 
This touches upon    issues of deliberative rhetoric explored in Chapter 3. Citizens 
cannot be expected to    evaluate the claims and arguments of experts on their own 
terms, precisely because they   lack, by definition, the requisite expertise to make 
such evaluations. The challenge then becomes one of assessing the arguments of 
experts based on other criteria, such as     evidence of partial and impartial interests 
and good character (see O'Neill, 2002). And as we have seen, experts may also be 
compromised in the sense that they can inhabit pernicious discourses and rely on 
conceptual frameworks which may be outmoded or lacking demonstrable empirical 
justification to interpret events. Experts, we must remember, also  rely on the  claims 
of other experts. If one set of assumptions is proven faulty, then this will have 
repercussions throughout and across many deliberations. Citizens, then, have good 
reasons not to simply accept the claims of experts prima facie, but to scrutinise them 
according to different criteria and to test them against their expected consequences. 
In this way, the intermediary institutions between experts and citizens, such as the 
media and political  parties. These mechanisms are far from infallible, but they are 
indispensible for the deliberations of everyday citizens.       
 
5. The problem of secrecy  
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Having surveyed the problems for deliberation generated by necessity, which 
radically   limits the possibility for deliberation by restricting alternatives, and by 
complexity, which poses an epistemic deficit challenge for deliberation, I turn now 
to another problem for deliberation, generated by another feature of emergency as I 
have characterised it. This is   the problem of secrecy. Secrecy is often viewed by 
democratic theorists as anathema to deliberative democracy, as legitimate 
deliberation is typically taken to incorporate a strong norm of publicity. That is, for 
the outcomes of deliberation to be considered politically legitimate, they must have 
been reached by a process of deliberation which takes place in public, is visible  (if 
not accessible) to all, and is constituted by the exchange of mutually acceptable 
arguments. The demands for secrecy sometimes generated by emergencies thus pose 
problems of political legitimacy for deliberation.   
 My task in this section is to illuminate and resolve this problem. First, I 
describe instances of how emergencies may produce demands for secrecy. I do this 
by examining emergency scenarios in which requirements for deliberative secrecy 
are especially high,   such as counter-terrorism operations and armistice negotiations. 
Secrecy, as I show, is sometimes consequentially beneficial or necessary in 
emergency situations. I then explicate the apparent legitimacy issues these conditions 
create for deliberation, as they appear in tension with the deliberative value of 
publicity. I then explore the conditions under which secrecy is beneficial for 
deliberation and compatible with it, including the secret ballot to the deliberative 
secrecy of  criminal juries.    
 
5.1. The need for secrecy  
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In the first instance, let us imagine the following scenario: a national intelligence 
agency receives a credible piece of information suggesting that an undercover 
terrorist  cell is planning an imminent series of bomb attacks on that nation's major 
cities and infrastructure, which, if successful, would result in many civilian 
casualties, as well as widespread panic and chaos amongst the general population. 
This, we may confidently assert, qualifies as an emergency - or, at least, as a 
potential emergency. By a stroke of good fortune, the intelligence agency soon 
identifies the group to commit the attacks as already monitored on their surveillance 
watch-lists, and one which they have already successfully infiltrated with undercover 
operatives. The agency then sets about disrupting the group's plans and neutralising 
them as a threat to the public welfare. The public, of course, is unaware of both the 
imminence of the attacks and the operations which are underway to prevent them. 
The agency gained its knowledge of the group from its vast surveillance apparatus - 
the existence of which is also unknown to the public - which   gathers information by 
intercepting personal emails and other electronic modes of communication. If the 
existence of the apparatus and its practices were made public knowledge, the general 
outcry would be such that the capacity of the agency to perceive potential attacks 
would be severely diminished.     
 In the second instance, let us imagine another scenario, involving the highly   
sensitive peace negotiations between rival factions after a long and costly civil war. 
The negotiations are fragile, with delegates from each side worried about being seen 
to have conceded too much to the opposing faction, or to have betrayed their side's 
interests and preferences, thus appearing 'soft'. If this were to happen, they would 
lose the support of    their people, and consequently negotiations would break down, 
perhaps followed by a resumption of violence. The details of the negotiations are 
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thus concealed from the public,  for fear that a mutually satisfactory outcome could 
not be forged while the process was visible to all parties, including extremists ready 
to stoke dissatisfaction among the wider populace. We can extend these concerns to 
similar contexts, including constitutional conventions and even everyday 
parliamentary committee hearings.   
 In both of these examples, emergencies - or, rather, the threat of emergencies 
- provoke the use of secret policies and deliberations by elites to resolve or dissolve a  
problem. We can take it for granted that the resolution of both types of emergency is 
preferable to not doing so, as both would, if permitted to run their course, result in 
widespread violence, death, and misery. We can also say that in both cases, making 
the details of the policy or deliberation known to the public would place the outcome 
in  jeopardy, as well as rendering the process or operation itself defunct. However, 
the desirability of concealing knowledge from the public, while in some cases 
justified,    presents problems for the deliberative democratic account of political 
legitimacy, as we    shall see shortly.  
 Before going any further it is useful to draw a distinction between the  types 
of secrecy presented by these cases, to better understand the particular challenges 
they pose to this account of legitimacy. Secrecy itself must be distinguished from the 
related but separate notions of privacy and deception. Both of these notions 
presuppose the possibility of secrecy or concealment. To keep a secret from a 
person, according to Sissela Bok, "is to block information about it or evidence of it 
from reaching that person, and to do so intentionally: to prevent him from learning it, 
and thus possessing it, making   use of it, or revealing it. The word "secrecy" refers 
to the resulting concealment" (Bok, 1983: 7). To practice secrecy, then, in Bok's 
sense of the term, is to practice intentional concealment. Privacy, on this definition, 
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is one form of secrecy, but it is not the whole of secrecy. While there is a perhaps 
important distinction to be made between intentionally concealing something and 
intentionally not revealing something, with the latter receiving stronger emphasis in 
the notion of privacy, this is not important for present purposes. After all, one can 
conceal matters which are of enormous public significance, such as in the cases 
outlined above, which could not sensibly be described as matters of privacy. Secrecy 
as used in this section refers to "public" secrets, which are matters of common 
concern, rather than the "private" secrets or concerns of individuals.  
 Similarly, secrecy is conceptually distinct from lying or deception. While 
they       may overlap - for successful deception relies on the deceiver concealing the 
truth from        the deceived - secrecy itself does not bear the taint of deception. One 
can admit to   possessing a secret without violating any norm of truthfulness, after 
all. Secrecy is   concerned instead with limiting the spread of information, rather than 
promoting the      spread of misinformation. We might thus claim that while the 
possibility of secrecy is a necessary condition for both privacy and deception, it is 
neither a sufficient condition for the          latter, nor is it identical with the former.   
 Now that we have a firmer grasp on the nature of secrecy and have gone 
some way towards differentiating it from related concepts, let us turn back to 
consider the types of secrecy evidenced in the examples given above. We might 
profitably draw a distinction here   between "open" and "closed" forms of secrecy.
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In the latter example of a ceasefire negotiation, it is publicly known that negotiations 
are taking place between representatives    of the two sides of the conflict. It is 
neither the existence of the negotiations nor their eventual outcome which is 
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concealed, but rather the details of the negotiations between      the parties as they 
occur. We can therefore classify this as an example of open secrecy,  where the 
existence of secrecy is public knowledge. Another example, familiar from literature 
on practical ethics, is the case of unmarked police cars. The police cars are unmarked 
to provide uncertainty for drivers contemplating breaking the speed limit, and  their 
existence is publicised as a disincentive to potential law-breakers. The policy works 
because the details of the policy (that is, which cars are undercover police vehicles) 
are  secret while the existence of the policy itself is widely known and publicised.
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 In the former example of an intelligence agency operating within a network 
of    covert surveillance, we might classify this as a case of closed secrecy. It is 
closed in the  sense that the public is aware of neither the existence of the 
surveillance apparatus nor        the details of how it is employed. Beyond those few 
state officials and politicians who oversee the agency and participate within its 
operational structure, no-one is aware of its existence. (The public is certainly aware 
that intelligence agencies and counter-terrorist operations exist, of course. It is the 
existence of the extensive and intrusive surveillance network which is unknown.)  
 Now that I have ascertained at least some of the sorts of secrecy generated by 
emergencies, and have sketched the distinction between open and closed practices of    
secrecy, I move to discuss the problems which these different forms of secrecy throw 
up for deliberative democratic accounts of legitimacy. To grasp the significance of 
the challenges they pose, however, we must consider the role of publicity as a 
criterion of democratic legitimacy.          
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5.2. Secrecy as a problem for deliberative legitimacy  
Secrecy poses problems for the deliberative democratic account of political 
legitimacy primarily because of the importance which deliberative democrats attach 
to the criterion       of publicity. Deliberative democratic theorists have usually 
employed publicity as one response to the problem of scale in modern, mass 
societies, in which citizens cannot physically gather together to deliberate in one 
single forum (Gutmann and Thompson,    1996; O'Flynn, 2006). Democracy at the 
large-scale thus necessitates some degree of representative governance, which in turn 
needs to be both visible and understandable to ordinary citizens. The requirement for 
publicity here guarantees that citizens who cannot participate directly in the 
legislative process can nevertheless see both the reasoning of public officials and the 
information which informed their deliberations. Citizens can also see that when their 
own positions, or at  least ones similar to them, are overruled in representative 
deliberations it was "not by a mere act of will, but for what are thought to be superior 
reasons" (Mill, 1991: 282). In other words, the requirement for publicity plays a key 
role in the deliberative democratic account of legitimacy.  
 Furthermore, traditional arguments for publicity in government have stressed 
its pragmatic benefits, as well as the legitimating function performed by enabling 
ordinary citizens "to see that their interests and opinions have been afforded a fair 
hearing" (O'Flynn, 2006: 100).  Amongst these benefits, we can list the general 
desirability of greater openness and transparency in political life, where publicity can 
be "regarded as an antidote to the machinations of unscrupulous politicians" (ibid: 
99). Publicity thus performs an important role in  the monitoring of politicians and 
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preventing certain forms of political corruption. In discharging this function, 
publicity also plays an essential role in fostering trust in, and support for, public 
institutions in societies undergoing democratic transitions as well as   more 
established democracies. Publicity is therefore an important precondition for      
political accountability, and thus the wider conditions for democratic legitimacy. 
And at      the most basic level, of course, we can add that citizens require knowledge 
of laws and regulations if they are to be followed (Goodin, 1992: 131). Moreover, 
the requirement of publicity can      compel politicians to consider the common good 
rather than merely pursuing their own private or sectional interests, or to at least 
couch their arguments in terms which are justifiable to the public at large. For Seyla 
Benhabib, "the very procedure of articulating a view in public imposes a certain 
reflexivity on individual preferences and opinions"   which "forces the individual to 
think of what would count as a good reason for all others involved" (Benhabib, 1996: 
71-72).  
 Deliberative democrats have traditionally attempted to place the requirement 
for publicity on a stronger theoretical foundation than that provided by its pragmatic 
or consequentialist benefits, however. While the pragmatic considerations for 
publicity are significant, they are also heavily dependent upon context and offer no 
principled justifications for publicity. On the pragmatic or consequentialist account, 
"politicians have  no moral reason to favour secrecy over publicity, and will keep 
secrets if they believe  they can get away with it" (O'Flynn, 2006: 104; and Gutmann 
and Thompson, 1996: 98).  
  To briefly reiterate, my two examples were of open and closed secrecy. In 
the example of a ceasefire negotiation, the public is aware that negotiations are 
taking place. However, the negotiations themselves take place in secret, for fear that 
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allowing both       sides of the conflict, including extremist elements, to witness the 
give-and-take of the negotiating process would undermine their ability to function. 
This was therefore an   example of open secrecy. The other example, of an 
intelligence agency conducting undercover operations and gathering data from an 
unknown surveillance network, exemplified the practice of closed secrecy. If the 
public knew of the existence of such a network, it would severely hinder the 
intelligence agency's ability to conduct counter-terrorism operations, dictating its 
secrecy. How do both of these cases impact upon deliberative democratic accounts 
of legitimacy?  
 Both examples violate the requirement for publicity, and thus political 
legitimacy,   but do so in different ways. In the case of the open secrecy example, the 
public cannot witness the negotiations of their representatives. They have no 
knowledge of the reasons being offered by either side for various compromises or 
points of agreement in the    armistice treaty which will ultimately be binding upon 
them. Moreover, the public cannot know whether their respective positions have 
been compromised or cast aside for reasons which they would regard as good, or at 
least sufficiently good to end hostilities. There      may also be concerns that the 
negotiators are privileging their own private or sectional interests at the expense of 
the more general parties to the conflict. In short, without the benefit of publicity, the 
public may have little reason to regard the outcome of the elite deliberations as 
legitimate. (Indeed, the examples of the Dayton Accords and the Ohrid Agreement 
demonstrate that this can often be the case in practice, with outcomes often   failing 
to gain the acceptance of either side.) 
 Likewise, in the case of the closed secrecy example, the public is aware of 
the existence of the intelligence agency and the probability that operations are 
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conducted to disrupt terrorist and criminal networks, whilst unaware of the details of 
particular    operations, as this would undermine their purpose. What makes this an 
example of         closed secrecy, however, is the concealment of the existence of the 
vast surveillance apparatus, which monitors supposedly private interactions between 
citizens. While this presents legitimacy issues with regard to the information which 
guides the decisions of  public officials, which is not shared with the public, it also 
poses challenges regarding democratic accountability. Recall that, as noted above, 
the requirement of publicity is an important precondition of democratic 
accountability (Philp, 2009). The existence of secret networks and anonymous public 
officials gathering information on the public and conducting operations on their 
behalf throws up obvious problems in this regard. After all, how can the public hold 
some branch the state accountable for its actions when they are kept ignorant of its 
existence?  
 Examples of open and closed secrecy, then, present different challenges to 
the deliberative democratic account of legitimacy. Open secrecy threatens the 
deliberative component of legitimacy, as the deliberations of elite representatives are 
shielded from  public scrutiny and discussion. Closed secrecy, on the other hand, 
more directly poses challenges for the democratic side of theories of deliberative 
democracy, threatening the public's ability to hold public officials accountable. I 
address how deliberative democracy  can respond to these challenges in the 
following section. Before doing so, however, I consider the merits of secrecy for 
deliberative democracy.           
 
5.3. Deliberative Secrecy 
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Despite the presumptive marriage of democracy and publicity claimed by 
deliberative democrats, we can think of instances where democracy has been better 
served by a turn towards secrecy. Consider, for example, nineteenth century 
arguments surrounding the expansion of the electoral franchise and the introduction 
of the secret ballot (Mill, 1991:    Ch. 10). In this  case, critics of secrecy argued that 
publicity would avert rampant hypocrisy, preventing electors from arguing for one 
policy in public, claiming it would benefit the common good, whilst voting to 
advance their private preferences or interests in secret. Moreover, public voting 
would provide a strong incentive for the public discussion of policy, as citizens 
sought to justify their positions to one another. Of course, there were stronger  
reasons against publicity in this case which prevailed. In a context in which the 
majority      of electors were economically and socially independent and did not fear 
to vote in their     own interests, public voting may have been appropriate and 
successful.
34
 However, as the electoral franchise expanded, this was simply not 
tenable. The lesson of the secret ballot, then, is that we may often face a trade-off 
between some democratic goals (such as deliberation) to  achieve others (popular 
enfranchisement and non-domination).  
 Such trade-offs between different democratic goods apply in other contexts. 
For example, as I have already gestured towards, publicity may conflict with the 
quality of deliberation in certain circumstances, such as sensitive peace negotiations 
(or, in a more everyday setting, the deliberations of juries). In these contexts, 
deliberation may be better served by secrecy than publicity. Secrecy can insulate 
participants in deliberation from pressures brought on by publicity which are 
                                                          
34
 Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin have proposed a national deliberation day to reproduce such a 
social context fostering public deliberation prior to elections, although the feasibility of such an 
event is controversial. See Ackerman and Fishkin (2002: 130).   
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deleterious to the epistemic quality of the deliberation. As Ian O'Flynn notes, 
publicity "makes it harder for representatives to back down from a position once they 
have stated it openly, even if sound reasons are   subsequently advanced by those 
who hold an alternative view" (O'Flynn, 2006: 117). When subjected to the  glare of 
publicity, politicians may often feel compelled to construct or maintain a public 
image, given the incentives of the electoral cycle. They may "play to the gallery", 
rather   than presenting reasoned arguments. This not mean necessarily arguing for 
their own    private preferences or interests at the expense of the common good, 
however. Rather, politicians may present particularly unreasoned or crude notions of 
the public interest,   which Simone Chambers has labelled "plebiscitary rhetoric" 
(Chambers, 2004).    
 One classic example of this juxtaposition of the effects of secrecy and 
publicity    upon deliberation, often cited in the deliberative literature, is Jon Elster's 
comparison of      two historical cases (Elster, 1998). Elster compares the highly 
public deliberations of the Assemblée Constituante in France of 1789 with the secret, 
closed deliberations of the Constitutional Convention of Philadelphia in 1787. 
According to Elster, the deliberations of the latter were of a markedly higher quality 
than those of the former. The deliberations of the Constitutional Convention were 
"free from cant and remarkably grounded in rational argument", whereas the 
deliberations of the Assemblée Constituante were "heavily tainted with rhetoric, 
demagoguery, and overbidding" (Chambers, 2004: 393). Publicity can thus force 
representatives into presenting shallow arguments devoid of deliberative merit, into 
strategies of public flattery and pandering, and "reduces deliberation to the 
articulation of preordained  statements and demands" (O'Flynn, 2006: 118).  
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 Secrecy can therefore foster a setting conducive to higher quality 
deliberation, in which participants can avoid strategic manipulation and engage in 
candid speech with one another, while also reserving the freedom to change their 
minds and positions on the      issues confronting them without fear of losing the 
support of their own side, or of facing reprisals once the deliberations have ended. 
Secrecy "can allow a party to accept a loss on today's agenda in order to gain on 
tomorrow's without any accusations from the outside        of weakness in 
concession" (ibid: 119). Moreover, secrecy can enable compromise, rather than 
representatives being forced to entrench their positions by extremist elements who 
are        prone to view attempts at compromise as undermining the position and 
claims of the     parties. In sum, secrecy has epistemic benefits for deliberation, but 
these may come at         the cost of the benefits drawn from publicity, including the 
willingness of citizens to      accept the legitimacy of the outcome.  
 With this knowledge in hand, we begin to apprehend the scale of the problem     
facing deliberative democracy. It would, after all, be easy to dismiss secrecy if it had 
no benefits. But secrecy seems to be both anathema to the spirit of deliberative 
democracy  whilst enabling the best of deliberation to occur. How might we resolve 
this fraught relationship? When, if ever, is secrecy justified?     
 Theorists of deliberative democracy who have examined the issue of secrecy     
usually point out that raising the quality of deliberation, while an important goal for 
deliberative democracy, does not in itself provide legitimacy for the outcomes of the 
deliberations. Secrecy, after all, has a long philosophical history of being enlisted for 
the benefits of everyday citizens, for example, in Plato's Republic or Sidgwick's 
"government house" utilitarianism. We would be loath to accept the dubious benefits 
of these uses of secrecy as providing their regimes with legitimacy, however. In 
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other words, epistemic authority alone is not a sufficient condition of political 
legitimacy. We might agree with Gutmann and Thompson that, whatever the 
epistemic benefits of secrecy, given the legitimacy costs of such practices, the 
presumption of democratic theory should remain       on the side of publicity. In 
some contexts, a degree of secrecy may be necessary (as in        our unmarked police 
cars example) or desirable (as with the armistice negotiations). However, publicity 
must be given priority, and secrecy must be publicly justified.  
 Accordingly, theorists have sought to justify the secret deliberations of closed   
groups, not by reference to the quality of their reasoning or the efficacy of the 
outcomes produced, but by their subsequent ratification (and deliberation) by those 
bound by the outcomes. For example, the products of the Constitutional Convention 
of 1787 were later ratified by the nascent American states, serving as "a form of 
retrospective accountability   for the process as well as for its results".
35
 Similarly, 
while secrecy played a pivotal role in aiding the parties of the conflict in Northern 
Ireland reaching the Belfast Agreement of 1998, the Agreement was subsequently 
ratified by popular referenda in both parts of Ireland. Secret deliberation is all very 
well, then, but to acquire legitimacy the outcomes  must be publicly justified and 
accepted.  
    When are practices of open secrecy justified, then? Broadly speaking, we 
might claim that open secrecy is justified when (i) the policy could not be 
accomplished if its  details were made public knowledge, and (ii) the public has the 
opportunity to engage in deliberation on the efficacy of this secrecy, and to express 
                                                          
35
 See S. Chambers (2004: 394). Chambers is ultimately dissatisfied with the model provided by the 
Convention of 1787, stressing the lack of deliberation in the public sphere. However, when properly 
supplemented with widespread public deliberation, I do not think this is an insuperable obstacle - 
especially as Chambers does not provide any clear alternative.  
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these deliberations through a procedure of ratification. Covert operations to disrupt 
crime and terrorism, as well as the deliberations of elite negotiators seeking to bring 
about peace settlements between  conflicting parties, are examples of open secrecy. 
And while secrecy has a place in the response to emergencies of war and terrorism, 
the emphasis in theory and practice must remain on publicity. In this way, citizens 
engage in a kind of meta-deliberation, when we deliberate about when it is 
appropriate or beneficial for public deliberation to take place.  
 Moreover, given the examples of secret deliberations which ultimately failed 
to convince   the public to accept their outcomes, a condition of complete secrecy 
may not always be desirable. The outcomes of secret deliberations would carry more 
legitimacy if they included moments of public consultation, to "take regular breaks 
in order to let ordinary people know how the negotiations are progressing and seek 
critical feedback from them" (O'Flynn, 2006: 119). Similarly, secret deliberations 
ought to be carried on in a context of public deliberation, to avoid too strict a 
division of democratic labour between the deliberations of insulated elites and the 
isolated moments of public participation to accept or reject  the outcomes.
36
    
 Furthermore, when might we say that practices of closed secrecy are 
justified, if  ever? The threat to democratic accountability implied by closed secrecy 
suggests that the concealment of information from the public by the state can only be 
justified when in circumstances where no other alternative is feasible. Again, we 
might say that closed   secrecy is justified when the policy (i) serves the public 
interest, (ii) could not be initiated     in any other way, and (iii) moves from closed to 
open secrecy, and ultimately to public deliberation and ratification. On this last 
                                                          
36
 In this way, it is hoped to avoid the abandonment of the public sphere which Simone Chambers 
worries will be the effect of secret, closed deliberation. See Chambers (2004: 394). 
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point, consider the circumstances leading to the Belfast Agreement of 1998. After 
the IRA bombing on the Shankill Road in October 1993, which killed ten people, 
including the bomber, the then Prime Minister John Major told Parliament that direct 
talks with the IRA would "turn my stomach". It was later revealed, however, that 
there were lines of communication open between the IRA and the British 
government, which would eventually lead to the IRA ceasefire and the Good Friday 
Agreement, which was ratified by the public in May 1998 (Mendus, 2009: 3). In this 
case,  the practice of   closed secrecy was necessary in the first instance for the 
genesis of the eventual peace agreement. But what gave legitimacy to the process 
was the gradual move from closed to open secrecy, and then to public ratification. 
The public can thus engage in a form of retrospective accountability. Practices of 
closed secrecy which never appear before the public, however, are not justifiable for 
deliberative democracy. 
 
 
6. The problem of urgency   
Time constraints are features of emergency that seem to generate problems for 
political deliberation, in that there may be an insufficient amount of time for any 
democratic deliberation worthy of the name to occur. Deliberation in democratic 
theory seems to   involve a careful process of reflection, of  mutual reason-giving 
and persuasion, and of   belief and will formation. Deliberation thus conceived relies 
upon conditions of abundant time for careful reflection to occur. Emergencies 
threaten deliberation, therefore, not only because they impose time constraints upon 
deliberation normally insensitive to the passage of time, but because they require 
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decisions to be reached and implemented with relative  alacrity. Consider, for 
example, the infamous  ticking bomb scenario, traditionally employed in discussions 
of political "dirty hands". While this heavily stylised example is hardly a  guide to 
everyday political practice, it nevertheless points towards an important feature of 
emergencies: Decisions need to be reached within a limited amount of time - perhaps 
matters of hours or minutes. In this context, democratic deliberation of the kind 
promoted by  theorists cannot plausibly occur, or can only occur in incomplete or 
partial form.  
 Following Lazar, we may characterise an urgent threat as "one that must be 
dealt   with immediately, if it is to be eliminated or mitigated" (Lazar, 2009: 7). 
Accordingly, she notes that "the  slow creation of law aims specifically at precluding 
hasty decision making, on the understanding that speed often results in error whereas 
deliberation involves care,     attention, and consideration of diverse perspectives and 
interests" (ibid: 116). Deliberation    is   therefore uncomfortable in contexts of 
urgency. One typical way of attempting to remove  this discomfort is by scaling 
down the number of participants involved in deliberation;        the fewer the people, 
the speedier the deliberation. Thus, Lazar remarks "Deliberation in     the heat of the 
moment will necessarily involve fewer heads and less time to scratch       them" 
(ibid: 107). Similarly, Jon Elster suggests that, because of the time sensitivity of 
important decisions, deliberation must be supplemented or replaced by voting and   
bargaining (Elster, 1998: 9). However, these responses concede too much to the 
notion of urgency  without much discussion of its relationship with deliberation. 
They move too  swiftly to dismiss deliberation, and assume the relationship between 
deliberation and  urgency is necessarily antithetical. The question considered here, 
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then, is how might a deliberative politics respond to the challenge of urgency without 
surrendering the capacity  for deliberation? 
 Firstly, we may do well to examine the notion of urgency itself and its 
temporal status. While necessarily requiring a decision to be reached and 
implemented in a short   space of time, it is also the case that something can remain 
urgent for long periods of       time. Someone with a serious illness requires urgent 
but ongoing medical attention, for example. The notion of urgency does not, 
therefore, suggest merely a short-lived but    critical episode and exercise in 
decision-making. On the contrary, a state of emergency, whether personal or 
political, can be sustained for months or years and remain urgent throughout. While 
urgency cannot be wholly divorced from the fact of temporal scarcity  (after all, 
decisions must be reached and actions must be taken in the short-term),     
circumstances of urgency can persist into both the medium and the long-term.  
 The idea that urgency necessarily precludes careful and sustained 
deliberation, therefore, appears to be mistaken. It is not, of course, the case that all 
urgent situations  persist across time in this fashion - or if they do, we may mark this 
as a failure of the decision-making process. A crisis in the financial markets, for 
example, may require        swift and immediate action to prevent the crisis spreading 
to the wider economy and    leading to a prolonged recession. In such cases, urgency 
may indeed require momentary,    on-the-spot decision-making. However, the point 
made here is merely that there is no necessary antithesis between urgency and the 
more careful, ongoing processes of public deliberation favoured by many 
deliberative theorists. Furthermore, we might plausibly    claim that such one-off 
moments of decision, like the ticking bomb scenario, are not representative of the 
majority of emergency circumstances. Situations such as these are currency among 
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theorists precisely because they are extreme, and thus challenge our everyday 
intuitions. As such, however, they are a poor guide to practice, even within 
emergencies. Indeed, they may even be practically dangerous (see Jubb and 
Kurtulmus: 2012).  
 How might deliberation, then, fit into the scenarios of extended urgency 
sketched above? Far from being restricted to momentous occasions, such as matters 
of basic justice and constitutional essentials, as Rawls recommends, if deliberation is 
sustained   across time and in parallel to circumstances of ongoing urgency, then 
there appears to be ample scope for public deliberation to inform - and, perhaps in 
some cases, to direct - decision-making. The process of assembling and reworking 
views as new information comes to light, as an ongoing project of public 
justification, can thus not only occur within the context of, but also provide increased 
legitimacy to, urgent responses to emergencies.  
 Secondly, even where an urgent decision is needed, deliberation still might 
not be redundant as a method of arriving at decisions. To consider why this might be 
the case, let me turn the challenge of urgency on its head by proposing a thought-
experiment. Let us imagine a    world identical to our own in every respect but one - 
there is an abundance of time when       it comes to reaching decisions. No decision 
is rushed or hurried, and there is always space  for careful, reflective, and inclusive 
deliberation which proceeds at the most genteel            and stately pace imaginable.  
In this world, the concept of "urgency" is unheard of, and    there is no matter which 
cannot be put off till tomorrow. There are no ticking bombs, no perishable goods, 
and, we may also assume, no opportunity costs to taking however        much time 
one desires to arrive at a decision.                    
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 How would the residents of this imaginary world deliberate? The likely 
answer     here is: not very well. Their deliberations would most likely be of a poor 
quality, as   without the incentives provided by urgency to structure their reflections 
and speech,  they would most likely be chaotic, haphazard, and unstructured. In the 
absence of any requirement for time-sensitivity, their deliberations would assume a 
meandering and unfocused quality, rather than coherent and purposeful. Moreover, 
without the need for alacrity, participants would be constantly tempted to 
procrastinate, to put off matters till tomorrow rather than motivate themselves to 
discuss and reflect upon matters today. In such a world, deliberation would therefore 
likely be characterised by "wasted time, procrastination and indecision, stalling in 
the face of needed change" (Shapiro, 2005b: 196).   
 Furthermore, we may be tempted to assume that deliberation in such a world      
would be inclusive in the widest possible sense. With an abundance of time at their    
disposal, the residents of this imaginary world would have ample opportunity to 
consult with every party whose interests could be conceivably effected by their 
decisions, and to consider all possible evidence and information. Under such 
circumstances, however,  there would likely be radical uncertainty on where to draw 
the boundaries of inclusion. Without the need for some urgency, debate as to which 
parties count as effected would   likely be extensive and forestall substantive 
deliberation. Moreover, with no incentive          to decided on which information is 
to be included within the deliberation, how much significance to attach to it, and so 
on, an abundance of time is likely to provoke much confusion and, at the extreme, 
perhaps complete agnosticism over who may be rightfully included and what is to be 
discussed.   
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 Far from being antithetical to deliberation, then, our thought-experiment 
reveals     that a sense of urgency may be crucial to coherent, stable, and purposeful 
deliberation.  This sense of urgency provides participants with incentives to get their 
deliberation underway, to make necessary judgements regarding relevance and 
inclusion, and to structure their speech and reflection once the process of 
deliberation has begun. At this   point, it may be objected that there is a distinction to 
be made between urgency and mere time-sensitivity. In the real world, all 
deliberations are time sensitive, but in the conditions of emergency to which I have 
alluded, urgency denotes an extreme time-sensitivity. The implication here is that, 
just as an abundance of time may be fatal to deliberation, it does not follow that an 
extreme scarcity of time may be any less fatal. A  sense of urgency is conducive for 
deliberation.            
 Thirdly, we can imagine circumstances in which deliberation might have a  
productive relationship with urgency, in the sense that it highlights or reveals the 
urgent character of some emergency and provides incentives for policy-makers to 
take action  sooner rather than later. For example, consider the case of widespread 
environmental degradation caused by industrial emissions. As we saw in the above 
discussion of necessity, the importance of perceptions is increased in emergency 
circumstances. An emergency  which distorts perceptions, therefore, is highly 
dangerous, as it can lead to inappropriate action or, perhaps worse, inaction. 
Something like this appears to obtain in the case of environmental crises, such as 
climate change, which may be initiated and propagated unbeknownst to anyone. 
Even if we are aware that a crisis is unfolding, or will eventually reach a threshold 
dangerous for human life, the appearance of the crisis may allow us to succumb to 
the illusion that there is an abundance of time in which to formulate a careful 
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response. Just as our bodies age imperceptibly slowly but nevertheless experience 
the     aging process, so an environmental emergency can occur with imperceptible 
slowness. Moreover, the absence of urgency invites political and economic agents to 
transfer the costs of acting in the short-term, such as unpopular  legislation to control 
carbon dioxide emissions, to their successors in office and to future generations.     
 The lack of any sense of urgency, then, can itself prove dangerous in 
emergency conditions. How might deliberation help in imbuing responses to certain 
emergencies with a sense of urgency? In deliberating over how to promote their 
interests, citizens may take the needs of future generations into account as a 
constitutive part of their own interests. As more information on environmental 
degradation comes to light, enhanced deliberation on environmental questions in the 
public sphere can exercise influence on the priorities and policies of those in power; 
for example, through environmentalist groups and political parties. Of course, there 
is the matter of agenda-setting for deliberation, of who exercises influence   upon 
which matters are discussed and gain prominence. This lieu of elite influence, this  
role may be taken by advocacy and interest-groups within the public sphere, who can 
contribute to public discourses and move in and out of alignment with the state as 
circumstances demand.  
 Drawing the above reflections together, we can conclude that (i) emergencies 
may carry on for some time, thus providing enough time for extensive deliberation to 
occur;     that (ii) a sense of urgency can, indeed, be conducive to structuring and 
motivating participation in deliberation; and (iii) deliberation can provide the 
impetus for urgent responses to emergencies. Not only are there ample spaces for 
deliberation within and  around urgent emergencies, then, but deliberation and a 
sense of urgency can exist in mutually supportive relations with each other. 
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Nevertheless, there remain moments in    which a shortage of time can undercut or 
inhibit deliberation, just as an abundance of        time renders deliberation 
undisciplined and insensate. These are moments in which the    scale of the 
deliberating body must be reduced to or consolidated into representative institutions. 
 
7. Conclusion 
In this chapter I have sought to outline the challenges posed for the prospects of    
deliberation by emergency conditions. After sketching a conception of emergencies       
which departed from the traditional framework of norm-exception as a preliminary 
to      further analysis, I went on outline four challenges which emergencies can pose 
to  possibilities for deliberation within democratic politics. These were the 
challenges of      necessity, where the lack of any feasible alternatives foreclosed the 
possibility of   meaningful deliberation; complexity, which posed an epistemic 
challenge for the  possibilities for deliberation, in that citizens would lack sufficient 
knowledge for    meaningful deliberation to occur; secrecy, which threatened to 
undermine the basis of deliberative legitimacy by removing deliberation from the 
public gaze; and urgency, where a    lack of sufficient time would allow for only 
partial or incomplete deliberation. I proceeded   to answer each of these challenges, 
arguing either that they were less problematic for deliberation than they first 
appeared, or could be accommodated in  various ways in a deliberative politics. 
Whilst emergencies may not be as inscrutable or overwhelming as they first 
appeared, however, it would be a mistake to suppose that political deliberation can 
fully tame emergency conditions. Emergencies are still moments of enormous 
danger for democracy, including for reasons I have outlined here. I have nevertheless 
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argued here that meaningful deliberation far from impossible within emergencies, 
and may help to reduce the possibility of negative outcomes.  
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Conclusion 
The Realist Recovery of Politics  
 
The overarching theme of this thesis has been the importance of deliberation within 
democratic politics understood in realist terms. Over the course of the thesis, I have 
attempted to elucidate how the deliberative potential of those aspects of democratic 
politics assembled here may be   realised. The core argument of the thesis is that two 
streams of political thought which  appear to be incompatible (that is, political 
realism and the theory of deliberative   democracy) are not only compatible, but that 
deliberative democracy can make important contributions to political theory 
understood in realist terms. In this conclusion, I have three objectives: firstly, I wish 
to revisit the central argument of the thesis and clarify how each chapter contributes 
to the overall argument; secondly, I highlight where and in what ways I have 
attempted to make an original contribution to the various literatures and subjects 
touched upon in the thesis; thirdly, I will point towards some directions for future 
research which  have either only been touched upon briefly or which could not be 
included for reasons of space and argumentative coherence. I end with some general 
reflections on the place of deliberation in democratic politics and the recovery of 
politics for the discipline of political theory.  
 
1. The core argument: political realism and deliberative democracy 
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The central argument of this thesis has been that political realism and the theory of 
deliberative democracy are in the first instance compatible, and in the second that  
deliberative democracy can make a contribution to a realist theory of politics. Let us   
consider the former claim first. In what ways might political realism and deliberative 
democracy be compatible; moreover, why might they be thought to be in conflict or 
incompatible in the first place?   
 To recap: the deliberative turn in democratic theory was a turn away from the 
prevailing accounts of democratic politics found in competitive elitist and rational 
voter theories. These theories emphasised the significance of interests and 
competition in a democratic politics conceived as a market for citizens' votes. The 
theory of deliberative democracy was a move away from these rational 
instrumentalist accounts of democratic politics towards a model which placed greater 
emphasis on reciprocal justification, social inclusion, and democratic authenticity. 
The deliberative turn was continuous with the character of much normative political 
theory in the latter half of the twentieth century,   which was influenced greatly by 
neo-Kantian moral philosophy. The two thinkers who exemplified these intellectual 
movements were John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas, their political theories 
evidencing a strong neo-Kantian character. In particular, Rawls did a     great deal to 
establish the moralised character of contemporary liberal political theory     (though 
his utilitarian predecessors also share much of the responsibility) and much 
theorising of deliberative democracy followed in his wake.    
 It is away from this moralised conception of politics and political theory that 
the realist movement has turned. Contemporary political realists comprise a diverse 
group of thinkers, but they converge on a critique of moralised political theory, 
which they charge  with descriptive inaccuracy and normative irrelevance (Horton, 
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2010: 433). As we saw in    chapter one, however, realism is more than a mere 
critique of the prevailing modes of    liberal political philosophy and constitutes a 
positive  account of politics in its own right,   one which lays stress on the autonomy 
of politics from morality, the priority of politics for political theorising, and attention 
to the negative side of politics, typically focusing on the summum malum rather than 
the summum bonum, and on the roles of power, conflicts, and self-interests in 
politics.  
 Political realism and deliberative democracy thus appear to be moving in 
opposite directions, with the former pointing towards an increased engagement with 
aspects of democratic politics such as conflict, power, and interests, while the latter 
finds its wellspring in a moralised neo-Kantian approach of politics which is the 
target of the realist critique. Both literatures proceed and have been developed from 
within different intellectual  traditions, therefore, there have been relatively few 
attempts at promoting a common  dialogue and on finding common theoretical 
concerns. It has been the goal of this thesis to make such an attempt to bridge this 
divide.       
 In chapter one, I examined the challenge which realism appeared to pose to 
deliberative democracy. I began by elaborating the nature of the realist movement 
and the features of political realism, which included the negative thesis against 
liberal moralism,    the autonomy of politics from morality, and the focus on the 
dangers of politics. I then  moved on to elucidate three realist approaches to 
democratic politics. These  were the agonistic approach, exemplified here by Chantal 
Mouffe; the competitive elitist  approach, represented by Joseph Schumpeter and Ian 
Shapiro; and the theory of deliberative democracy. I  drew attention to flaws in the 
former two models, and then outlined several apparent points  of tension between 
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realism and the deliberative approach. These were: rationalism, utopianism, and 
moralism. I suggested that these points of tensions were not as significant as  they at 
first appeared, and that deliberative democracy could accommodate the various 
features of democratic politics which realism directs us towards, which I then 
proceed to explore in the following chapters.    
 In chapter two, I embarked on a discussion of rhetoric as a form of 
deliberative political argument. The prevailing accounts of political argument within 
the literature on deliberative democracy - that is, the account of public reason offered 
by Rawls and the  model of discursive rationality offered by Habermas - are, I 
argued, unduly restrictive and suffered from several drawbacks. These included 
inducements to insincerity in public argument, excluding the moral character of the 
speaker from the dimensions of argument, and  excluding appeals to the emotions in 
political argument, the latter of which leads to motivational deficits and an 
inadequate picture of the process of deliberation. I then, following O'Neill (2002), 
Garsten (2006), and Yack (2006) offered an alternative account of political argument 
drawn from Aristotle's account of deliberative rhetoric. By overcoming the 
dichotomy between reason and emotion which characterised the earlier neo-Kantian 
forms of political speech, as well as incorporating concerns regarding the moral 
character and motivations of the speaker, I argued that deliberative rhetoric could 
provide a form of deliberative political argument  more attuned to the existing 
realities of modern democratic politics. 
 In chapter three, I moved to discuss the role of political leadership in the 
theory of deliberative democracy. Leadership is a topic of repeat concern for 
political realists (Sabl, 2002; Philp, 2007) and is a feature of politics with significant 
consequences for the well-being of democratic societies. However, there appeared to 
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be a tension inherent in the very notion of 'democratic leadership'; a tension which is 
brought to the fore in the work of  John Kane and Haig Patapan. I sought to resolve 
this tension in the first section by demonstrating how political leadership and 
deliberative democracy are compatible. I then addressed the topic of deliberative 
leadership, arguing that a deliberative leader should   aim to avoid the practices of 
manipulation and pandering, whilst exhibiting several deliberative virtues. I moved 
to then discuss the origins of deliberative leadership, arguing that deliberative leaders 
are to be trained within the civil associations of the democratic public sphere, with 
an especial emphasis on the role of political parties.  
 The focus on political parties was developed in chapter four, where I argued 
that parties, once distinguished conceptually from their negative, anti-deliberative 
cousins, political factions, could be sources of greater deliberation in democratic 
politics. Indeed, I argued, parties perform several important roles for democratic 
politics, including organising the terms of political discourse and motivating citizens 
to political participation. I then outlined several mechanisms whereby deliberation 
internal to parties could be promoted, including the production of partisan manifestos 
and the structure of party conventions and conferences. I then moved to discuss the 
role which partisan competition and conflict can play in  structuring deliberation 
between partisans and for the wider public sphere.  
 In my final chapter, I turned to the possibilities for deliberation under 
conditions of political emergency. Following Lazar (2009), I argued that 
emergencies were continuous with the practices of everyday democratic politics, 
rather than constituted by a state of exception, as argued by much of the recent 
literature on emergencies influenced by Carl Schmitt. By de-exceptionalising the 
state of emergency in this way, we make it open to political deliberation. 
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Nevertheless, I suggested that emergencies still pose challenges to the possibilities 
for deliberation, and proceeded to sketch four such challenges. These were: 
necessity, complexity, secrecy, and urgency. In each case, I argued that deliberation 
could overcome or be made compatible with each feature of emergency outlined. I 
concluded that emergencies were still moments of danger for democratic politics, but 
that a renewed focus on the role of deliberation can help to make emergencies less 
dangerous and increase the chances for democracies to navigate them successfully.   
 In each chapter, I have sought to demonstrate that deliberative democracy can 
be made compatible with features of existing democratic politics which realism 
directs us to consider. By engaging with these features of real politics that I have 
attempted to place deliberative politics on realist foundations; that is, to demonstrate 
that the theory of deliberative democracy is both compatible with political realism 
and that deliberative  democracy make contributions to a realist understanding of 
politics. I examine the precise nature of these contributions in the following section.  
 
2. Contributions to research 
This thesis has attempted to make contributions to existing discussions within 
several overlapping literatures. The principal focus has been to connect two bodies 
of political thought which have heretofore proceeded along different paths and which 
appear to be in tension with one another, largely due to the apparent moralist, 
rationalist, and utopian character of much deliberative democratic theory. By 
bridging this divide, I have attempted to show how both streams of thought are not 
only compatible but complementary in understanding the character and purposes of 
democratic politics. The theory of deliberative democracy offers ways into 
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understanding the importance of deliberation for democratic politics and of the 
various conditions under which deliberation can be achieved and conducted. But 
deliberative democracy can often appear an excessively utopian or demanding ideal 
which seems to contrast starkly with the existing practices of democratic politics. 
How we can make our politics more deliberative while navigating the chicken-and-
egg problem of political development - that is, as Bonnie Honig (2009: 13) has 
termed it, the 'paradox of politics', concerning how to establish virtuous institutions 
while lacking virtuous citizens, and vice versa - has been a central preoccupation of 
this thesis. By placing deliberative democracy upon realist foundations which stress 
the importance of existing political practices and institutions, we begin to see that we 
do not need to transcend our political condition and  reach some utopian ideal in 
order to achieve a more deliberative form of politics in the      here and now. 
Deliberative democracy can accommodate the features of politics which I  have 
presented, and the realist conception of deliberation offered here is concerned with 
maximising the potential for deliberation within existing democratic practices and 
with leaving open the opportunities for future deliberation.      
 If political realism can serve to bring deliberative democracy down to earth in 
this way, then deliberative democracy can serve to elevate and expand realism, 
which often focuses on certain elements of politics (conflict, power, and so on) 
above other perfectly legitimate features of political life, and thus risks falling into a 
form of conservatism or pessimism about the possibilities for political reform 
(Stears, 2010: 18; Finlayson, 2015: 8-12). A concern for preserving the possibilities 
and expanding the scope for deliberation in democratic politics thus serves to 
broaden the realist conception of politics, which can     itself appear unduly narrow 
and restrictive. Similarly, a concern with the possibilities for deliberation can point 
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realism towards a greater engagement with existing practices and structures of 
political reality, rather than recapitulating into forms of abstract conceptual argument 
which can sometimes seem just as removed from real politics as the liberal  moralist 
theories which were the realists original target of criticism. Thus, theorists of  
realism and deliberative democracy can aid each other in achieving their respective 
theoretical ambitions.    
 More particularly, this thesis is the only work of which I am aware to gather 
the  various features of democratic politics together and discuss them under the 
banners of  realism and deliberative democracy. While theorists of realism do 
directly focus our  attention on several of the subjects discussed here, such as 
leadership, in other cases connections have not been made between the political 
practice and the realist approach.    This is certainly the case with my coverage of 
rhetoric and political parties, which have    been absent from discussions within the 
realist literature. Similarly, deliberative theorists point our attention towards certain 
aspects of democratic politics, such as rhetoric, but      have seemingly abandoned 
others, such as leadership and emergencies. By assembling    these topics together 
within a single thesis, it is hoped that the links between each can be grasped more 
clearly than they might be in isolation, such as the significance of deliberative 
rhetoric and parties for democratic leadership.  
 Rather than merely filling a gap in the literature, however, it is hoped that I 
have shed new light on how we might think about each of the dimensions of politics 
discussed here. That is, that rhetoric, leadership, parties, and emergencies can be 
conceptualised in a  different way which connects them to wider debates within both 
political realism and the theory of deliberative democracy. This way of 
conceptualising these features of politics is  not wholly new (in particular, rhetoric is 
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becoming a well-worn topic for deliberative theorists, and parties are not so 
neglected as they once were). However, it is to be hoped that in these cases I have 
added to existing debates, both by framing the features under   discussion in slightly 
different terms than is usual (that is, in effecting a reconciliation between realism and 
deliberative theory), and in making substantive arguments and  proposals wherever 
possible (for example, in the case of reforming parties internal structures).  
     
3. Directions for future research 
Throughout the discussion presented in this thesis I touched upon many topics which      
could not be expanded as they were orthogonal to the direction of my argument, but 
nevertheless suggest important and fertile areas of future research for theorists of 
both political realism and deliberative democracy. I aim to briefly sketch these areas 
and to propose directions in which they may be developed. I discuss three such 
areas: the role        and structure of the modern media, the interaction between the 
economic and political spheres, and the domain of international politics. I then move 
to gesture towards wider discussions regarding conceptual issues only briefly 
touched upon here and to possible connections with various traditions in 
contemporary political thought.  
 
3.1 Mass democracy and the modern media 
It has long been observed that in order for democracies to flourish they require a           
healthy and robust public sphere, where citizens can come together to deliberate and    
discuss issues of common concern without the threats of coercion or manipulation.            
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Such public spheres, in turn, require citizens to possess reliable knowledge of 
political   affairs to some degree (just how much citizens should know to be able to 
participate effectively is an interesting but separate question). The dissemination of 
relevant and  accurate information within the public sphere both facilitates and 
enhances public deliberation, whilst also providing important preconditions for 
holding politicians accountable. The character of the modern media and the quality 
of information which it disseminates are thus important and timely issues for 
democratic theorists, particularly deliberative democrats. They are also important 
topics for political realists given the significance of the media within politics, both as 
a means for politicians to spread their messages and thus exercise power over public 
discourse, and as an political entity with discrete interests of its own.  
 Given the ubiquitous and politically significant nature of the modern  media, 
then, it is reasonable to assume that it would be the subject of extensive and 
thorough analysis among political theorists. Yet this has not been the case. There is, 
of course, a detailed empirical literature on the subject in disciplines such as modern 
communications studies, but political theorists have been loath to address this topic. 
It may be the case that there is little here of normative theoretical interest, and that 
such questions can be safely bracketed under the heading of "non-ideal theory" as 
merely inconvenient facts about the social world which the correct guiding 
normative principles should seek one day to overcome. For political realists, 
however, this approach is plainly inadequate. In seeking to provide distinctively 
political accounts of legitimacy, the ways in which politicians and the media interact, 
and act to   shape or reinforce the dispositions and beliefs of citizens, should be of no 
small     importance. Similarly, for deliberative theorists, the modern media presents 
manifold challenges with an implicit normative dimension, such as the deliberative 
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potential of communications technology as well as the potentially deleterious effects 
which sensationalised news reporting presents for public understanding.     
 This is not to say, however, that no work has been done in this area. Jürgen 
Habermas's theory of discursive democracy, after all, rests upon his analyses of both 
communicative action and the rise of the modern public sphere as the site for public 
deliberation. In this vein, a collection of essays edited by Simone Chambers and 
Anne Costain have considered such issues as media representation and elite expertise 
from a deliberative perspective (Chambers and Costain, 2000). However, this 
existing literature is now woefully out of date. In the past two decades, the modern 
media and its role in political debate have changed beyond recognition. These 
developments have been driven by technological innovation,  most obviously in the 
form of the internet and the rise of social media platforms. The consequences of this 
for democratic theory, and for political theory in general, have not been fully 
appreciated by scholars working in these fields. While the  advent of the internet was 
initially heralded as a tool for greater democratisation, with authoritarian regimes 
unable to contain the flow of information and public discussion, the outcomes for 
democracy have been mixed. Cass Sunstein, one of the few theorists alert to these 
changes, warns that, rather than simply providing more information and facilitating 
deliberation amongst   citizens, the availability of greater choice in online discussion 
forums and news outlets  means that the modern public sphere may become 
increasingly fragmented, with many citizens tailoring the discussions in which they 
participate and the news channels  which they watch to their existing values and 
preferences (Sunstein, 2007).    
 Furthermore, the rise of the new and invisible public sphere online which 
could   prove resistant to attempts at state control and provide an insurgent 
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counterweight to large media corporations has not been successful in heralding a 
new era of democratisation. Indeed, the effects have largely been in the opposite 
direction: autocratic regimes such as   the People's Republic of China have proven 
remarkably adept at controlling internet discussions, and have in some case used the 
technology to enhance their control of the population. Even in democratic societies, 
the use and misuse of information technology by state authorities has been the 
subject of hot controversy, raising issues of privacy,  secrecy, and transparency with 
renewed force (Sagar, 2013). Moreover, the new culture of media   saturation has 
provoked concomitant changes in the nature of political speech and    argument, with 
politicians more guarded in their public utterances and acknowledging the 
importance of media management and political "spin" (Kane and Patapan, 2012: 90).  
 It should be clear from this brief survey, then, that the modern media is an  
overlooked but significant topic political theorists of all stripes, including 
deliberative democrats and realists. From my own perspective, this most clearly 
intersects with the   topics of rhetoric and the nature of emergencies, where the 
importance of a greater understanding of the modern media and its technological 
basis would prove fruitful in expanding the scope for deliberation in modern 
democratic politics.   
 
3.2. The political economy of deliberative democracy 
A separate but related sphere of interest into which the analysis presented here could 
be extended is the economy and its relationship with the political sphere. That is, by 
analysing how the institutions of and agents within the economic sphere might 
interact with the institutions and agents of the political sphere, and the consequences 
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of this for the deliberative democratic project. Extending the analysis in such a 
direction is in line with realism's exhortation for political theorists to take political 
reality seriously, as the significance of economic factors for political agency and the 
prospects for democratic deliberation are self-evident. (Although the ways in which 
they are significant are, of   course, much less obvious.) The economic basis of 
deliberative democracy was first  broached by Joshua Cohen (1989a). Since then, 
however, it has received startlingly little attention. This is an oversight which 
deliberative theorists would do well to redress. 
 However, "the economy" is a very large and, for my purposes here, largely 
unspecified topic. It can be analysed in multiple ways, and throws up a multitude of 
important questions. I have touched on several of them in my chapter on 
emergencies, including the question of necessity. A more wide-ranging discussion 
might also include   such questions as: Is deliberative democracy truly compatible 
with capitalism, or must deliberative democrats be committed to some form of 
socialism? How much material inequality can democracies tolerate before it 
undermines deliberation between citizens? Is greater industrial democracy a 
precondition of greater  deliberation in the public sphere?  How do fluctuations 
within our economies interact with deliberation within the political sphere? And is 
political deliberation merely epiphenomenal to economic structures and events the 
determination of public policies? Certainly, one of the arguments of this thesis - that 
deliberation is an important and valuable part of democratic politics that ought to be 
sustained and expanded where possible - suggests the direction in which many of 
these questions would be pursued, if not the answers to be provided. Moreover, a 
renewed focus upon the economic basis of deliberative democracy  could also herald 
a closer partnership between democratic theory and economic theory, perhaps 
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featuring  renewed consideration  of the economic thought of figures such as John 
Stuart Mill, Walter Bagehot, John Maynard Keynes, and Friedrich Hayek, and of its 
political consequences. It could also, finally, pursue avenues of research into the 
study of globalisation and the related prospects for transnational democracy.  
  
3.3. Deliberative democracy and the international sphere 
The question of the economic basis for deliberative democracy leads quite naturally 
to questions of international and transnational politics. What role is there for 
deliberative democracy in the international sphere? How do forces with shape and 
are shaped by the relations between states impact upon deliberative democracy? 
Does greater deliberation across transnational polities require greater integration of 
the economic and political   systems between states? What of transnational 
movements - whether social, political, or economic - which threaten to render the 
nation-state, the traditional venue for democratic politics, a thing of the past? The 
work of Jürgen Habermas offers an immediate point of departure here. As well as his 
theory of discursive democracy, Habermas has long been preoccupied with 
international political order and the politics of European integration. Therefore, his 
thought would offer a natural starting point for deliberative theorists to   consider 
such questions.       
 This is also an area in which a greater engagement with political realism 
offers a productive way forward. While mainstream liberal political theory has not 
been silent on questions of international politics, these responses have typically been 
within the rapidly expanding literature on global justice. When democracy is 
mentioned in this literature, it usually accompanies discussions of cosmopolitanism 
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and global democracy. These discussions are often theoretically elegant, but are also 
overly moralised and, one may   argue, suffer from a deficit of realism. On the other 
hand, there is a parallel body of   literature in contemporary international relations 
theory which eschews questions of moralism in favour of accounts of international 
politics based upon the power and self-interest of the modern state. This appears to 
me to be a lacunae of the sort Bernard    Williams once described as "a Manichean 
dualism of soul and body" (Williams, 2005: 12), in which political theory is over-
moralised and political science is under-moralised. A democratic theory   which 
takes its cue from realism can fill this void, in part by appealing to traditional 
international relations scholars (and self-described "realists") such as Hans 
Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr, and E. H. Carr. Such a project would be 
undoubtedly worthwhile,  even if it leads us back to a greater appreciation of the 
scope and possibilities for   deliberation within the traditional nation-state 
boundaries.     
 
3.4. Wider connections 
There are several wider issues concerning the relationship between political realism 
and deliberative democracy that presented themselves in the course of writing this 
thesis which, in addition to the cases outlined above, could not explored here but 
which nevertheless represent intriguing lines for further research. These issues are of 
a more conceptual nature and more directly concerning traditions of political thought 
than those which I have   specified above, and thus I have assembled them under a 
separate heading into what is inevitably a rather jumbled catalogue. They include: 
questions of the role of impartiality within theories of political realism, given its 
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renewed focus on the contingent factors of political life. This is highlighted in the 
chapters on rhetoric and parties, where issues of particularism in the arguments 
presented to the democratic public are briefly touched upon,  as well as the renewed 
importance placed on the emotions in political argument. Krause (2008) considers 
this issue by appealing to a Humean account of impartiality, and this is one direction 
which could be further explored. Similarly, questions of legitimacy and power 
present themselves in any reconciliation between deliberative theory and realism, for 
both camps place a strong emphasis on the importance of reconfiguring the 
conceptual constellation of contemporary political theory away from issues of justice 
and towards considerations of legitimacy and the forms of political coercion which 
must underlie successful orders.  
 At repeated points throughout this thesis, I have stated that democratic 
politics is characterised by appeals to persuasion and compromise. I have treated the 
former in my chapter on rhetoric, but have neglected the latter. The nature of 
political compromise  suggests another intersection between political realism and 
deliberative theory, as it can appear important for theorists attempting to formulate a 
deliberative model of political disagreement as well as for those concerned with 
modus vivendi arrangements. Finally, in discussions of political realism and 
deliberation, one cannot help but look towards certain traditions in the history of 
modern political thought which seem to attach importance to   both; for example, the 
civic republican and American pragmatist traditions. Both of these traditions have 
had enormous influence on deliberative thinkers such as Habermas and Sunstein, and 
renewing the connections between these traditions could prove fruitful in  better 
articulating the concerns of both realism and deliberative democracy.      
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4. Some final reflections 
It is now over fifteen years since James Bohman observed that the theory of 
deliberative democracy had "come of age" to consider practical questions of 
feasibility besides its  concern with radical ideals of democratic participation 
(Bohman, 1998). And although deliberative democracy has been developed in 
different ways since that time, its core concerns still remain wedded to ideals which 
may seem too utopian to be realised in   practice, and which eschew many of the 
existing practices of democratic politics. In this thesis, I have sought to recover 
democratic politics for deliberative democracy, to show     that a commitment to 
greater deliberation in politics need not be wedded to excessively rationalist or 
utopian models of democracy. In doing so, I have attempted to place deliberative 
politics on realist foundations, and to show how realism and deliberative democracy 
are compatible. But I have also sought to recover deliberation for political realism, to 
broaden the parameters of realist political thought and to help political realists 
appreciated the importance of deliberation in democratic politics.  
 It has been my aim in this thesis to demonstrate that this mutual isolation is a   
mistake on the part of both camps. If realism is truly concerned with politics first and 
foremost, then it must attend to the centrality of deliberation within the structure of 
democratic politics. Politics is the means by which humans shape their collective 
fate, existing in circumstances of disagreement (Waldron, 1999: 102) over 
fundamental values, interests, and beliefs. As such, deliberation (or, put another way, 
practical reasoning) is required to navigate these fundamental disagreements, where 
one party cannot simply  impose their will on others. In democracies, these 
disagreements are navigated by the practices of persuasion and compromise. It is 
therefore incumbent upon democratic realists to take the  prospects for deliberation 
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in democratic politics seriously, and to  mount defences of deliberation in the face of 
calls for de-politicisation as well as rehabilitating the means of popular democratic 
deliberation wherever possible. This is what I have attempted, however imperfectly, 
to do in this thesis.    
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